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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the genesis, outbreak and far-reaching effects of the first 
among a series of incidents of mass violence which determined the course of British 
colonial rule in post World War Two Singapore. I argue that the Maria Hertogh riots 
stemmed from British failure to address four crucial factors which shaped the Singapore 
Muslim community’s attitudes towards the colonial regime: the influence of radical ideas, 
the effects of socio-economic marginalisation, press sensationalisation of the legal 
controversy, and the ineffectiveness of the police force. The outbreak of the riots had a 
negative effect on the image and role of the British colonial administration in Singapore, 
which jeopardised diplomatic ties between the British Empire, The Netherlands and the 
Muslim World. In response, the British utilised a symbiotic combination of proscription, 
surveillance, self-criticism, reconciliation and reform. Through these strategies, they 
sought to redeem their tarnished image, mitigate the negative effects of the riots, and 
anticipate similar outbreaks arising from racial and religious dissent. The politics, 
resistance, collaboration and ramifications upon minorities in Singapore arising from 
each of these five strategies will be brought to the fore.
This thesis contributes to the wider history of colonial Southeast Asia by initiating 
a shift beyond the study of the causes of riots towards an examination of the wide- 
ranging effects and crises faced in the aftermath. Secondly, it will illuminate the linkages 
between the British colonial administration in Singapore and policymakers and officials 
in the Home Government and other outlying colonies. Thirdly, a more nuanced
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understanding of British management of mass violence in Southeast Asia will be 
provided. Fourthly, it proposes new ways of analysing forms of resistance that were 
employed by Southeast Asian communities in confronting colonial rule. Last of all, this 
study extends and refines the corpus of literature pertaining to religious minorities in 
colonial Southeast Asia.
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CAB
CID
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CT
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Imam
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ISEAS
Jamiyah
JMBRAS
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Australia (Archival Record Code)
Established during the Malayan Emergency, the committee’s role 
was to consider the appeals of those who had been arrested by 
colonial administration and pass decisions on the validity of the 
appeals.
Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (Group of Awakened Youths)
Records of the British Cabinet Office 
Criminal Investigation Department 
Colonial Office 
Communist Terrorist
An Arabic word for ‘legal judgement’ or an explanation given by a 
Muslim scholar on matters pertaining to the understanding and 
practise of Islam.
Foreign Office
An Arabic word for ‘leader’. It was used by the Malays to describe 
the leader of a prayer congregation or commander of a Muslim 
army.
Inter-Religious Organisation
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society
Journal o f the Malayan Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society
A Malay word for ‘village’ or ‘a cluster of settlements’ that was 
smaller than a town.
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Kathi
Legislative Council
Lex Domicili 
Locus standi
Madrasah
Maulana
MCP
MNP
MRLA
Mufti
NACPM
NAS
Nikah Gantung 
Parang
Also spelled as Qadi which means a Muslim judge. In Malaya, the 
kathis were entrusted with the registration of marriages and also 
arbitration of marital disputes.
Consisted of twenty-two persons whose main function was to 
assist the Governor in the passing of laws of Singapore. The 
Governor however had veto powers over the Council. A majority 
of the Council’s members were nominated by the British. In 1948, 
there were only six elected members. The number of elected 
members was increased to nine in 1951.
The law of the place of a person’s domicile
Recognised position or acknowledged right to a given issue. In the 
realm of law, it refers to a plaintiff who has reasons to be a party to 
a legal case.
Islamic school
An Arabic word for ‘our lord’ or ‘our master’. It was commonly 
used in South and Southeast Asia as a title for a respected Muslim 
scholar.
Malayan Communist Party
Malayan Nationalist Party (also known as the Pergerakan 
Kebangsaan Malaya Merdeka [PKMM, or the Malayan National 
Independence Movement])
Malayan Races Liberation Army
A Muslim scholar who interprets Islamic laws.
National Archives, College Park, Maryland at the United States of 
America
National Archives of Singapore
A truncated marriage or a marriage that was deemed by Malays in 
the post-war period as valid from the perspective of Islam but 
incomplete for the reason that the customary rites had not been 
performed.
A large knife that was used by Malays to cut through thick 
vegetation and also for self-defence as well as violent crimes.
PERAM Pemuda Radikal Melayu (Radical Malay Youths)
PKM
PREM
RAF
RG
Panitia Kemerdekaan Malaya (or the Committee for Malayan 
Independence)
Records of the British Prime Minister’s Office.
Royal Air Force
Records Group. These are files that are deposited in the 
Washington Archives in the United States of America.
Special Branch A unit within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the 
Singapore Police Force. Its main function was to acquire 
information to protect the public and the colonial state from 
subversive and extremist activities.
Syariah
Ulama
UMNO
Whitehall
Islamic Law (Malay spelling)
Muslim scholars
United Malays National Organisation
A road in London where the Colonial and Foreign Offices were 
located; shorthand for the British government
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
To understand Malaya, study our recent riots. They were a great uprising 
o f Malays against the centuries o f British arrogance. No one led the 
rioters. No one told them what to do. They simply went out 
and killed all the white people they could find.
Abdul Samad bin Ismail1
1 tilOn 11 December, 1950, John W. Davies was travelling on a bus along 
the streets of modem Singapore with his wife and eight-year-old daughter. What 
seemed to be a calm evening was dismpted by a confrontation with rioters who 
were infuriated by a British court’s decision that a Muslim girl named Maria 
Hertogh was to be restored to her Christian parents. Europeans in the colony were 
thus perceived as enemies of Islam. Davies was dragged out of the bus and 
assaulted by the roadside. In desperation, he jumped into a drain attempting to 
hide, but in vain. The rioters prevailed upon him and a barrage of vicious attacks 
soon followed. While the serviceman’s wife and daughter were left unscathed in 
the course of mass violence that spread rapidly in other parts of Singapore, Davies 
was among many who had been mortally wounded. He died two days later.
Since that fateful incident, what has come to be known as the Maria 
Hertogh controversy has occupied a vital place within the Singapore government’s 
depiction of the turbulent colonial past. So much so that the riots have often been 
singled out and invoked in discourses on religion and race relations. The event
1 James Albert Michener, Voices o f Asia (Seeker & Warburg, 1952), p. 24.
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serves, till today, as an admonition for Singaporeans that religion should never be 
enmeshed with secular and radical politics. More than that, it provides a potent 
historical lesson that excessive religious fervour, missionary zeal and moral 
assertiveness are undesirable and have no place within a progressive society. In 
November 1986, for example, upon protests launched by Malay-Muslims on both 
sides of the causeway in response to Israeli President Chaim Herzog’s visit to the 
island-state, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew declared that such moves 
had the dangerous potential of provoking riots similar to that of in 1950 when all
ry
‘hell broke loose’. Constant references to the riots served also as a subtle warning 
to the press that any attempts at incitement would be met with cessation of 
publication and criminal prosecution.3 Michael Hill has recently observed that the 
‘Maria Hertogh case has become something of an icon in the Singapore state’s 
presentation of religious strife in its history and has been revisited on a number of 
occasions as an instance of the destabilising potential of religious conversion.’4
In contemporary Malaysia, memories of the riots and their ramifications 
have never faded. In fact, there arose a renewed interest in the popular media to 
re-enact a critical moment in the country’s political history. Newspapers, 
magazine articles and documentaries have portrayed the riots as artefacts of 
nation-building, challenges to social cohesion and an imperialist plot on the part 
of the British and the Dutch against Islam. The riots serve as a moral warning for
2 Loh Kah Seng, “Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narrative o f History in Singapore”, 
Crossroads; An Interdisciplinary Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies, 12, 2, (1998), p. 12.
3 Hong Lysa and Jimmy Yap,' “The Past in Singapore’s Present”, Commentary: Civil Society, 11, 
1, (1993), p. 36. See also, Eugene Tan, “We, the Citizens of Singapore...”: Multiethnicity, its 
Evolution and its Aberrations”, in Lai Ah Eng (ed.), Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism 
and Social Cohesion in Singapore, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), p. 77.
4 Michael Hill, The Elite-Sponsored Moral Panic: A Singapore Perspective (Singapore: Centre for 
Advanced Studies, 2002), p. 23.
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the nation that no attempt at diverting Muslims from their religion would be left 
unchallenged.5 To Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, the 
Maria Hertogh controversy marked the beginnings of his struggle for the 
country’s independence from the British Empire. He recounted his rage towards 
those who had filed a lawsuit to gain custody of a Muslim girl. Maria Hertogh, the 
Tunku maintained, had been deprived of the care of her foster mother and was 
‘forcibly taken to the convent and converted to Christianity.’ Nonetheless, ‘I had 
gained much popular support for myself and the party I led as a result of this 
case.’6
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Despite such a premium placed on the incident and the emotions it has 
provoked, there has been no comprehensive account of the aftermath of the first 
among a series of incidents of mass violence in post-war Singapore. To the 
contrary, much ink has been spilled in examining the causes and factors that led to 
the outbreak and the eventual suppression of the Maria Hertogh riots. Paul R. 
Brass was not exaggerating when he noted that ‘every scholar who has written 
about riots, pogroms, and other forms of collective violence seek their causes, and 
not a few scholarly articles feature the word in their titles.’7
5 See a series o f articles on the Maria Hertogh Tragedy in Dewan Masyarakat, 27, 2, (1989); 27, 3 
(1989); 27 ,4 , (1989); 27, 4 (1989). See Utuscin Malaysia, 8th June, 2007.
6 Haja Maideen, The Nadra Tragedy (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1989), pp. 
15-16 and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Looking Back; Monday Musings and Memories (Kuala 
Lumpur : Pustaka Antara, 1977), pp. 189-191.
7 Paul R. Brass, The Production o f  Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle: 
University ofWashington Press, 2003), p. 17.
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A case in point would be the pioneering work of Rosemary Shantha 
Jesudason which explores how political and religious factors, coupled with the 
failure of the police force, resulted to the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots. 
Jesudason gives particular emphasis to examining the role of the press in 
propagating the idea that the Maria Hertogh case was a battle between Christianity 
and Islam. In the same vein, Nordin Hussin unveils the agency of a Malay 
newspaper, Melayu Raya, in agitating for mass violence,8 Differing slightly from 
these two works, Mary Kilcline Cody argues that the riots were caused by 
multiple factors that were discursively suppressed by a colonial document, the 
Riots Commission Inquiry, which was published some few months after the 
incident. By stressing the weaknesses of the Malay Police, the unmanaged Malay- 
Muslim feelings and events outside the Singapore Supreme Court, the British 
government endeavoured to remedy its ‘weaknesses and thereby perpetuate its 
own legitimacy.’9 Be that as it may, Cody failed to shed light on other alternative 
causes to the riots and demonstrate the ways in which British legitimacy was 
preserved by the policies following the publication of the Riots Commission 
Inquiry.
The unravelling of the causes and factors that led to the Maria Hertogh 
riots pervades yet another genre of literature: personalised accounts which were 
written by individuals who were involved in, or witnesses of, the events that 
unfolded. A book written by the former Head of the Singapore Social Welfare
8 Rosemary Shantha Jesudason, “The Causes and Significance of the Hertogh Riots” (Unpublished 
Academic Exercise submitted to the Department of History, University of Malaya, 1969) and 
Nordin Hussin, “Malay Press and Malay Politics: The Maria Hertogh Riots in Singapore”, Asia- 
Europe Journal, 4, 3, (2005), pp. 561-575.
9 Mary Kilcline Cody, “Mis-Fits in the Text: The Singapore Riots o f 1950” (Unpublished 
Academic Exercise submitted to the Faculty o f Asian Studies, Australian National University,
2001), p. 34.
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Department, Tom Eames Hughes’ Tangled Worlds, provides insights into the 
cultures and practices that were prevalent in Southeast Asia, especially in the 
realm of the adoption of children and inter-ethnic marriages, which provides the 
background of the legal conflicts.10 This was succeeded by Haja Maideen’s The 
Nadra Tragedy and Joe Conceicao’s Singapore and the Many-Headed Monster 
which narrates the genesis and evolution of circumstances that led to the riots.11 
Due to their personalised nature, these books lack proper citations. Haja 
Maideen’s work is to be singled out as it has been regarded as one of the most 
authoritative accounts of the Maria Hertogh controversy. Yet the work is filled 
with loaded judgements, bordering on the realm of imaginary and fairy-tale like 
accounts, which are poorly supported by reliable sources. Consider for example 
the following account:
When she (Maria Hertogh) retired to bed, waves o f worrying thoughts lashed out
intermittently. She dreamt throughout the night. She dreamt she was taken far, far way -
out o f reach of her beloved Aminah and Mansoor. Some unknown forces were dragging
12her to the uncertain destiny. She suddenly woke up and cried, ‘Emetic.’
Furthermore, the authors provide relatively limited discussion of the 
aftermath of the riots. Only eight out of 300 pages of Haja Maideen’s book touch 
on the subsequent arrests of prominent Muslims, the appeal trials, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman’s role in petitioning for the reprieve of those condemned to death and the 
annulment of the marriage between Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi by British
10 Tom Eames Hughes, Tangled Worlds: The Story o f Maria Hertogh (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1980).
11 Haja Maideen, The Nadra Tragedy (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1989) and 
Joe Conceicao, Singapore and the Many-Headed Monster (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2007).
12 Haja Maideen, The Nadra Tragedy, p. 192,
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and Dutch courts. Following Hughes’ lead, Haja Maideen concludes with a tragic 
narration of Maria Hertogh’s failed attempt to murder her Dutch husband, which 
revealed how the British judge was wrong in his judgment and 'failed to 
determine what would make her more happy.’13
Extending beyond the narrow scope of the above-mentioned works, 
Mohamed Ansari, Firdaus Haji Abdullah, Anthony J. Stockwell, Nordin Hussin 
and Ramlah Adam situate the causes of the riots within a broader context of 
Islamic resurgence, the fear of Christian missionary activities, threats posed by 
Communism, anti-colonial movements in Southeast Asia, racial animosities and 
British imposition of laws that ran contrary to Islamic teachings. These authors 
made effective use of declassified colonial correspondence files and intelligence 
reports and other sources, such as Muslim periodicals, confidential minutes of 
several Muslim committees and interviews with various Muslim personalities. 
More importantly, such works have broken some new ground through their 
expositions of the wider impact of the riots upon the British colonial 
administration in Singapore and Britain. Ansari, Firdaus and Nordin highlight, 
albeit in brief, several after-effects, such as the deterioration of the Anglo-Muslim 
relationship, the proscription of radical activities, the reformation of the police 
force, repercussions within the United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO), 
and the impact upon Chinese as well as Eurasian communities. Adding to the 
above list, Stockwell and Ramlah narrate the tensions within Singapore, Malaya, 
and the wider Islamic world, namely, Indonesia and Pakistan which posed major 
challenges to the British. However, such accounts of the aftermath of the Maria
13 Haja Maideen, The Nadra Tragedy, p. 307.
20
Hertogh riots tended to be descriptive rather than analytic.14 No attempt had been 
made to tease out the variety of strategies that were employed by the British to 
deal with various forms of the resistance against the colonial administration, the 
collaboration of the local elites, and the impact of these processes upon minorities 
in Singapore.
OBJECTIVES AND PERIMETERS OF THIS STUDY
In light of these limitations in the extant literature, this thesis pursues five 
main objectives which necessitate the employment of new data, original 
approaches and critical analyses to the study of the Maria Hertogh controversy. 
Consequently, new terrains in the history of colonial Southeast Asia in the post­
war period will be charted.
The first objective is to initiate a shift beyond the study of the causes of 
riots towards an examination of the wide-ranging effects and crises faced in the 
aftermath. Particular attention will be given to the ways in which the colonized 
and the colonizer grappled with the restoration of peace and the rebuilding of a 
society that was tom asunder by mass violence. The study of the effects and crises 
in the aftermath of violent upheavals such as the Maria Hertogh riots is 
particularly important, as it calls for, ‘the re-examination of the society as a whole,
14 Mohamed Ansari s/o Mohamed Ali Marican, “The Maria Hertogh Riots, 1950” (Unpublished 
Academic Exercise submitted to the Department of Histoiy, University o f Singapore, 1973); 
Firdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and Early Development (Petaling Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1985), pp. 116-140; Anthony Stockwell, “Imperial Security and Moslem 
Militancy, with Special Reference to the Hertogh Riots in Singapore”, Journal o f  Southeast Asian 
Studies, 7, 2, (1986), pp. 322-335; Nordin Hussin, “The Moslem Riots o f 11 December 1950 in 
Singapore”, Kertas Kadangkala Bil. 2 (The Faculty o f Social Sciences and Humanities, University 
Kebangsaan Malaysia); and Ramlah Adam, Gerakan Radikalisme di Malaysia, 1938-1965 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2004), pp. 329-367.
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its institutions as well as its component groups and symbols; the social 
dislocations provide opportunities for the analyst to penetrate and explore from 
within, and not merely arrive at some abstract notions of the phenomena arising 
from the contact between a colonial power and a colonial people.’15 Despite that, 
the causes and circumstances that led to the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots 
will not be neglected. In what follows, I will provide fresh reinterpretations of 
events and developments within and outside Singapore which shaped British 
strategies as well as responses of the local communities.
Secondly, in sharp contrast with previous studies and popular literature 
which depict the riots as part of a national narrative, this thesis will frame the 
Maria Hertogh controversy against the backdrop of British imperialism and 
decolonization in Southeast Asia. Herein, linkages between the British colonial 
administration in Singapore and the policymakers and officials in the Home 
Government and other colonies will be made apparent. To be sure, the British 
Empire functioned within a methodical framework whereby opinions and ideas of 
officials in the peripheries (the colonies) interacted with those of the metropole 
(Home Government) before crucial decisions and policies were executed. To 
focus solely upon micro-politics in the colonies is to lose sight of the macro­
politics that defined the modus operandi of the British imperial network in the 
post-war era. The British Empire, as John Darwin has succinctly pointed out, ‘is 
best understood not as a territorial phenomenon but as the grand project for a
15 Georges Balandier, “The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach”, in Immanuel Wallerstein 
(ed.), Social Change: The Colonial Situation (New York, Wiley, 1966), p. 52.
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global system.’16 As a corollary, this thesis employs Ranajit Guha’s definition of 
the British colonial administration as:
the complex of organisations, activities, and discourses made up o f a chain of command 
extending from Whitehall down to the lowest reaches o f British authority...the 
bureaucracy with its rules, orders, and schedules, all levels o f officially sponsored 
institutions from the central to the local, as well as the laws and executive decisions made 
by them and practical measures used to implement these. Taken together, they stand for 
the ensemble called colonial administration.’17
There were, predictably, instances where the actions of ‘men on the spot’ differed 
from those in higher levels of the colonial bureaucracy. Such inner tensions, 
which had a determining influence upon British attempts to recover their image 
and agency in the aftermath of the riots, will be explored in this thesis.
The third objective is to provide a more nuanced and sophisticated 
understanding of British management of riots and mass violence in Southeast 
Asia. Larry J. Butler writes that British policies towards resistance movements, 
riots and insurgencies in the post World War Two period were characterized by a 
combination of ‘concession (designed to encourage moderates) and coercion (in 
order to contain extremists). But when overriding imperial interests were at stake, 
even if these were relatively short term, Britain was willing to resort to a more 
overt use of force...’18 Such arguments are congruent with those made by Frank
16John Darwin, “A Fourth British Empire”, in Martin Lynn (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s: 
Retreat or Revival? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 28.
17 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 82.
18 Larry .J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris,
2002), p. 194.
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Fiiredi, who posits that British imperial policies in Malaya and other parts of 
Southeast Asia ‘contained elements of both rigidity and flexibility, of repression 
and accommodation.’19 It is intriguing to note that both authors have glossed over 
British usage of its covert agencies -  the intelligence services in particular -  
which performed not only the roles of ‘concession’ and ‘coercion’, but also the 
‘collection’ of vital information for the purposes of anticipating and repelling all 
forms of opposition to colonial rule. Butler and Fiiredi have also overlooked ‘self- 
criticism’ as an essential part of British strategy to insulate the colonial 
administration from a continual loss of legitimacy, and to further justify its 
relevance and dominance upon colonized societies in the aftermath of mass 
violence. Chapters Four and Five of this thesis will address such neglected 
frontiers.
The fourth objective of this study is to narrate and analyse the responses 
by local communities in Singapore throughout the Maria Hertogh controversy. It 
is my contention that British strategies and policies can be better understood by 
elucidating the themes of resistance and collaboration, particularly that of the 
Muslims in Singapore. By illuminating such dialogical exchanges between the 
rulers and the ruled, this thesis cuts against the grain of ‘what has come to be 
called a ‘Europocentric mold, a frame of reference that assigns primacy to what 
the colonial rulers did rather than to the effects of their actions upon their native 
‘wards’ and, at least equally important, to the reactions or responses of the 
indigenous society to the many-faceted colonial impact.’20 The Nigerian historian
19 Frank Fiiredi, Colonial Wars and the Politics o f Third World Nationalism (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1998), p. 5.
20 Harry Benda, “Foreword”, in William R. Roff, The Origins o f  Malay Nationalism (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. viii. See for example, Edwin Lee, The British as
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J.F.A. Ajayi sharply asserts that ‘although Europeans were generally masters of 
the colonial situation and had political sovereignty, cultural and economic
dominance, they did not possess a monopoly of initiative during the colonial
21period.’ More to the point, I will draw upon, and propose new ways of 
analysing, various forms of resistance that were employed by Southeast Asian 
communities in confronting colonial rule. The first form of resistance involves 
violent acts, such as riots and rebellions. This is followed by active participation 
within colonial administrative structures such as Legislative Councils, political 
parties and other state sponsored organisations. Petitions and other forms of 
discursive engagements fit into the next level of approach. Fourth, in applying the 
theories and concepts of James C. Scott, David Nonini demonstrates how silence 
and passivity towards colonial policies served as potent forms of ‘everyday 
resistance’ and ‘weapons of the weak’ for peasants in British Malaya.22 To add to 
the above list, in Chapter Three, I will elaborate upon ‘strategic desertion’ as yet 
another form of resistance in situations where the above four approaches had 
proved futile. ‘Strategic desertion’ refers to a planned and conscious departure 
from the arena of contestation to a new site, beyond the colonial orbit of influence 
and control. Such a strategy was pursued with the intent of sustaining a form of 
resistance from without.
Rulers: Governing Multi-racial Singapore 1867-1914 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1991) and criticisms o f Edwin Lee’s British-centred approach by Nicholas R. Clifford in American 
Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (1993), pp. 168-169.
21 J.F.A. Ajayi, “Colonialism: An Episode in African History”, in Louis H. Gann and Peter 
Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), p. 505.
22 Norman G. Owen, “Economic and Social Change”, in Nicholas Tarhng (ed.), The Cambridge 
History o f Southeast Asia Vol. 4 Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 192- 
197. See also, James C. Scott, Weapons o f  the Weak: Everyday Forms o f Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and Donald M. Nonini, British Colonial Rule and the 
Resistance o f the Malay Peasantry, 1900-1957 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1992).
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Closely linked to the above, the final objective of this study is to extend 
and refine the coipus of literature pertaining to minorities in Southeast Asia, 
particularly, religious minorities under colonial rule. Paul H. Kratoska maintains 
that colonial regimes ‘viewed ethnic and religious minorities as weak and 
vulnerable and in some instances established separate administrative areas and 
special laws or regulations to protect their interests.’23 Although applicable in the 
context of post-war Singapore, Kratoska’s assertion is inherently inadequate. In 
view of this, I will exhibit the ways in which British enactment of laws pertaining 
to the management of religions in the post-war period had, in actuality, a reverse 
effect of dispossessing Muslim and Christian minorities of their perceived 
religious rights. This resulted in the outbreak of mass violence and continual 
grievances in the years that ensued. Chapter Two and Seven of this thesis delve 
into this issue in greater detail.
To put it succinctly, in the following chapters, I shall develop the argument
that the Maria Hertogh riots stemmed from British failure to address four crucial
factors which shaped the Singapore Muslim community’s attitudes towards the
colonial regime: the influence of radical ideas, the effects of socio-economic
marginalisation, press sensationalisation surrounding the legal controversy, and
the ineffectiveness of the police force. The outbreak of the riots had a negative
impact upon the image and role of the British colonial administration in
Singapore, which jeopardised diplomatic ties between the British Empire, the
Netherlands and the Muslim World. In response, the British utilised a symbiotic
combination of proscription, surveillance, self-criticism, reconciliation and
23 Paul H. Kratoska, “Country Histories and the Writing of Southeast Asian History”, in Abu Talib 
Ahmad and Tan Liok Ee, New Terrains in Southeast Asia History (Ohio: Ohio University Press,
2003), p. 114.
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reform. Through these strategies, they sought to redeem their tarnished image, 
mitigate the negative effects of the riots, and anticipate similar outbreaks arising 
from racial and religious dissent. The politics, resistance, collaboration and 
ramifications upon minorities in Singapore arising from each of these five 
strategies will be brought to the fore.
Before engaging in a comprehensive discussion of sources, it is essential to 
point out the perimeters of this study. ‘Muslims’ here refers primarily to Indians, 
Arabs, Malays, Chinese, Eurasians and Europeans whose working language was 
Malay or English. The reactions of Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese and Indians 
expressed in their respective sub-ethnic dialects will not be thoroughly considered, 
due to the author’s linguistic limitations. Their voices and agency have been 
partially recovered through the use of translations and English commentaries 
found within British, American and Australian intelligence reports, as well as 
excerpts from English-language and Malay-language newspapers. In the same 
vein, I will bring forth selected viewpoints and reactions of Dutch, Indonesian and 
Pakistani personalities and organisations in so far as they impacted upon the 
British colonial administration and other communities in Singapore and, to a 
lesser extent, Malaya. Such insights are by no means exhaustive. Indeed, it is 
crucial to point out that Dutch, Indonesian and the Pakistani activism in the course 
of the Maria Hertogh controversy requires a separate and scholarly analysis. Such 
an enormous undertaking is not possible within the confines of this thesis. The 
terms ‘riots’, ‘outbreak of violence’ and ‘mass violence’ are used interchangeably 
to describe crowds and groups of people who committed acts of violence towards 
Europeans as well Eurasians in the colony in reaction to the Maria Hertogh legal
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case. ‘Maria Hertogh’ was also known by her Malay name, Nadra. I have 
maintained both names to refer to the same person.
The time frame of this thesis is from the end of the Second World War till 
the eve of the 1950s. Even so, the main part of my analysis begins from 13th 
December 1950, upon the discontinuation of mass violence. It ends towards the 
closing of the year 1953, which saw a fading of activity among all parties 
involved in the Maria Hertogh controversy. Some discussion will also be devoted 
to developments beyond the given time frame insofar as they illuminate or provide 
necessary background for the understanding of the causes and long-term effects of 
the riots.
SOURCES
' Primary sources for this study are derived mainly from archives and 
libraries in the United Kingdom, the United States of America (USA), Australia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The data extracted from these sources have 
been synthesized to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the topic at 
hand. The United Kingdom offers the most extensive collection of unpublished 
sources relating to the British colonial administration of Singapore, largely 
deposited at the National Archives (Public Record Office) at Kew. They are listed 
under different categories, and a large portion has been consulted by the author. 
The first category of sources are those compiled by the Colonial Office, which 
consists of policy decisions, correspondence files (secret and official), minutes of 
meetings, police records and political intelligence reports. These sources come
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under the series codes, CO 323, CO 537, CO 717, CO 940, CO 953, CO 968, CO 
1022 and CO 1030. This list is followed by sources that were categorised by the 
Foreign Office, which relates to Islamic affairs, the Maria Hertogh case and other 
developments in Singapore and Malaya listed under the series code, FO 371. Last 
in the list, though not of lesser significance, are the Prime Minister’s Office files 
(PREM 11), as well as the Cabinet files (CAB 130).
These official sources are, however, not free from their inherent 
limitations. Dissensions, disputes and debates between personalities and 
departments plagued the day by day operation of the British bureaucracy, which 
led to shifts in viewpoints and policies. In my reading and utilization of these 
sources, I have paid serious attention to such developments which determined 
British management of Singapore and Malaya. As Anthony Stockwell has noted, 
it is vital cto distinguish between the low cunning and paranoia of the security 
services and the high policy, if not complacency, of the more serious officials. 
While the Malayan Security Service was in the business of finding trouble, 
administrators were all too often for brushing it aside.’24
Similar to the above, unpublished sources deposited in the United States of 
America and Australian archives, under the headings RG59 and A1838 
respectively, have also been consulted. Consisting of in-depth reports and 
correspondences between intelligence agencies and diplomats, these sources 
provide third-party perceptions and assessments of various developments in 
Singapore in the 1950s.
24 Stockwell, “Imperial Security and Moslem Militancy”, p. 327.
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The next category of unpublished sources that are relevant for this study is 
private papers. Sources deposited at the University of Durham Library which have 
been used are those previously owned by Malcolm Macdonald (United Kingdom 
Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, based in Singapore). Malcolm 
Macdonald, as C.M. Turnbull contended, ‘has all disappeared from the history 
books, yet, in viewing the whole process of decolonization and the transition from 
the British Empire to the Commonwealth Nations, he is, I maintain, the most 
important single figure, often influential and sometimes decisive.’25 Private papers 
of Robert Heussler (Malayan Civil Service Officer), John Dailey (Head of 
Malayan Security Service), Rene Onraet (Head of Special Branch), Andrew 
Howat Frew (Senior Police Officer) and other unpublished reports available in the 
Rhodes House Library at the University of Oxford and the University of 
Cambridge Library have been utilised. This list is complemented by the papers of 
Tan Cheng Lock (the President of the Malayan Chinese Association) found in the 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Library in Singapore and Zainal Abidin bin 
Ahmad (Za’ba) papers that are deposited at the Za’ba Memorial Library in the 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Another set of private papers that have been 
recovered are those that belonged to Mansoor Adabi, the husband of Maria 
Hertogh, whose marriage was annulled by the British judge in Singapore. Special 
permission was granted by his family to cite these sources for the purposes of this 
thesis. This valuable collection consists of photographs, correspondence, minutes 
of meetings and out-of-print periodicals. Written from a more personalized 
perspective, such sources offer intimate insights into a historical actor’s views on
25 C. M. Turnbull, “The Post-War Decade in Malaya: The Settling Dust o f Political Controversy”, 
Journal o f  Malayan Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society (JM.B.R.A.S), 60, 1, (1987), p. 7.
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events and personalities. They are, inevitably, not free from biases and value 
judgments.
Published materials constitute the second genre of sources. The Hansards 
(House of Commons debates) found in the Senate House Library in London have 
been consulted, and relevant materials have been drawn from them. University 
libraries in Singapore and Malaysia contain rich collections of published law 
reports, legislative proceedings, gazettes and annual reports on social affairs, 
education, economics, law and general information on Singapore and Malaya. 
These sources, which were more often than not, highly filtered and presented in 
ways that legitimized state and institutional policies, have been cross-examined 
with the unpublished sources listed above.
Various English and Malay newspaper collections, readily available for 
public access at the National Library of Singapore, the University of Malaya 
Library and the British Library at Colindale, are also brought to the fore. It is 
undeniable that such newspapers reflect the main concerns of actors in their times, 
embodying certain philosophical and ideological motives which determine the 
selection of news and the texture of commentaries.26 John Lent went so far to 
assert that the press in post World War Two Asia has so often promoted “ correct’ 
ideas rather than the purveying of news - the raw material for the individual 
opinions that collectively make up public opinion - and the furnishing of a forum
26 Mek Siti bt. Hussin dan Aminah bt. Mohd Nasir, “Isu-isu Penting (Awal 1950an) Dari Kaca 
Mata Akhbar Majlis dan Melayu Raya”, in Khoo Kay Kim (ed.), Sejarah Masyarakat Melayu 
Moden (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 1985), p. 250.
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for the competition of ideas.’27 For this research, I utilised a variety of newspapers 
published in Singapore and Malaya of the post-war period to propound a plethora 
of insights into the causes and, more so, the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. 
Foremost in this regard is The Straits Times which had a wide circulation of 
55,000. Although independent, the paper was conservative, pro-British in its 
outlook and functioned as the voice of European expatriates in Singapore. This is 
followed by Singapore Standard, which was owned by Aw Boon Haw, a 
prominent Chinese merchant whose main objective of pioneering the paper was to 
propound ‘Asian’ viewpoints in the colony. By 1954, the paper had a circulation 
of 35,000 throughout Malaya. Three other newspapers included in this study are 
the Straits Echo, Singapore Free Press and The Straits Budget. Known for their 
publication of critical opinion pieces and political polemics, these newspapers had 
relatively small circulations of no more than 15,000. In the realm of Malay- 
language journalism, newspapers in Jawi Arabic script that have been examined 
include the Utusan Melayu, Melayu Raya and Majlis. The history and influence of 
these vernacular newspapers will be discussed in the next chapter. The Muslim 
World, The Islamic World, Qalam, and Dawn are Malay/Muslim periodicals 
which I have explored. Though of lesser importance, several newspapers from 
Indonesia and England have also been examined, so as to shed light on views and 
opinions outside Singapore and Malaya. They are Antara, Indonesia Raya, Suara 
Masyarakat, Pedoman, Suara Ra ’ayat, Observer, The Manchester Guardian, The 
Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express and The Times.
27 John Lent, The Asian Newspapers' Reluctant Revolution (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 
1971), p. xvi
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Oral sources are particularly useful for this study as they can assist in 
recovering ‘neglected or silenced accounts of past experience, and as a way of 
challenging dominant histories, which undeipin repressive attitudes and policy.’28 
Yet, it is imperative to point out that oral histories, like all historical sources, are 
inevitably coloured by various factors, such as social class backgrounds, political 
affiliations, gender and the age of the interviewees. The time, place and 
techniques of interviewing pose another set of complexities that moulds the ways 
in which past events are reconstructed. Initially, my plan was to rely on oral 
histories as primary sources, applying a minimum of influence on the shape of the 
interviews or, to put it differently, ‘to let the interviewee talk. It’s his show. Let 
him run with the ball.’29 However, field trips to Singapore and Malaysia indicated 
that a majority of personalities who played crucial roles in the Maria Hertogh 
controversy have passed away. Many others declined to be interviewed because of 
failing memories and poor health. Although I interviewed several Singaporeans 
and Malaysians from various social backgrounds, a majority of the respondents 
preferred to remain anonymous. Nonetheless, I have managed to make use of oral 
sources in the National Archives of Singapore (NAS). Shaped by state-driven 
projects, this large collection of interviews consists of some eighty-one persons, 
including British officials, Muslim leaders, Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese, 
Malays and Indian personalities who were directly involved or implicated in the 
legal tussle and the subsequent riots.30 Less than a dozen of these interviews dealt 
with the aftermath. Though relegated to a secondary position in view of the
28 Robert Perks and Alistair Thompson, “Advocacy and Empowerment: Introduction”, in Robert 
Perks and Alistair Thompson, The Oral History Reader (New York; Routledge, 2003), p. 183.
29 Charles T, Morrisey, “On Oral History Interviewing”, in Perks and Thompson, The Oral History 
Reader, p. 108.
30 See http://www.a2o.com.sg/public/html/.
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limitations mentioned above, these interviews have been useful in confirming 
selected facts and viewpoints derived from written sources.
Aside from sources that pertain directly to the Maria Hertogh controversy, 
I have also drawn selectively from the works of renowned historians, 
anthropologists, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists who have 
written on related topics such as riots and mass violence, British colonialism and 
imperialism, fonns of indigenous resistance, as well as minority studies. Ideas and 
assertions drawn from such works have been deployed, not as theoretical 
frameworks and models, but as ‘heuristic tools’ to aid in the analysis of the 
sources so as to sharpen the main arguments of this study.31
CHAPTERS
The structure of this thesis is broadly thematic. Each of the chapters adopts 
a chronological description and analysis of events, texts, views, persons and 
institutions.
Chapter Two provides an outline of the challenges faced by the British 
colonial administration in re-asserting their position in post-war Singapore 
following the Japanese Occupation from 1942 to 1945. The failure of the British 
colonial regime to address the influence of radical ideas, the effects of socio­
economic marginalisation, press sensationalisation surrounding the legal 
controversy and the ineffectiveness of the police force, all of which shaped the
31 Christopher A. Bayly, “The State of the World/Reply”, Victorian Studies: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal o f Social, Political, and Cultural Studies, 48, 1, (2005), p.134.
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Singapore Muslim community’s attitudes will be discussed here. Aside from that, 
this chapter illuminates the ways in which the British image and role had been 
tarnished by the outbreak of the riots.
British attempts at proscribing key instigators of violence are the main 
focus of Chapter Three. The concept of ‘proscription’ here is understood in its 
widest sense as deterrent and repressive measures taken against the main 
ideologues, instigators of violence, the media as well as the spread of rumours in 
the aftermath of the riots.
In the fourth chapter, I will focus on surveillance as manifested in the 
heightened role of British intelligence, especially in the realm of Muslim affairs. 
The chapter will also discuss how Special Branch agents and spies perceived and 
dealt with the different forms of threats which they encountered. At many 
junctures, such perceptions were guided by paranoia and unfounded fear.
Chapter Five discusses the strategy of self-criticism through the Riots 
Commission Enquiry and the disciplinary measures meted out to those colonial 
officials who were accused of mishandling the riots. British endeavour to insulate 
the higher echelons of the state machinery from a severe loss in legitimacy, the 
politics and challenges that surround it, will be unravelled in this chapter.
The process of reconciliation between the British and various parties that 
were implicated in the Maria Hertogh controversy are discussed in Chapter Six. In 
particular, the British stepped up their efforts to accommodate the influence and
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role of religion in society, especially in response to the demands of Muslims in 
Singapore. Numerous persons who had suffered from the loss of kith and kin as 
well as property during the riots were also duly compensated by the colonial 
authorities.
Chapter Seven is an exposition of British attempts at reforming crucial 
aspects of their administration that were deemed to be the root causes of the 
outbreak and spread of the riots. Refonns were directed towards transforming the 
police force and education policies as well as marriage and child adoption laws. 
Emphasis will be given here to the dynamics, negotiations and resistance 
encountered in the midst of such efforts.
Aside from summarising the main arguments of this thesis, the concluding 
chapter interrogates the standpoints of renowned historians on the short-term and 
long-term effectiveness and ramifications of British management of crises within 
the colonies in the post-war era.
36
Maria Hertogh and Che Aminah 
Source: Terenjit Singh and Family
Wedding photo of Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi 
Source: Terenjit Singh and Family
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At the residence of M.A. Majid.
At the back row: M.A. Majid standing next to Mansoor Adabi 
Seated in front: Che Aminah, Maria Hertogh, 
wife and children of M.A. Majid 
Source: Terenjit Singh and Family
Demonstrators with banners and Pakistani flag outside the Supreme court
before the outbreak of riots 
Source: National Archives of Singapore
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--------------- CHAPTER 2 ---------------
The Colonial Setting and the Outbreak of Riots
Singapore, in the immediate post-war years, was a site of contestation 
between secular forces of communalism, communism and nationalism. Together 
with these developments, there was a revival of religious activities in the colony in 
response to social, political and economic challenges, as well as wider influences 
from South Asia and the Middle East. In the realm of everyday life, food 
shortages, diseases, poor housing, unemployment and social vices were the key 
problems in that age. Coupled with a weak police force plagued by rampant 
bribery and disorganisation, mass delinquency and criminal activities of all sorts 
were at its peak.32 A noted historian has described this era as one that was ‘full of 
colour and incident, the clash of personalities and ideologies.’33
Three and half years of Japanese rule had demystified the notion of white 
superiority and dominance. Even so, the British were determined to re-establish 
the paramount position of Singapore within their post-war imperial policy. 
Although the population had declined markedly due to the war, the island-colony 
retained a multi-racial and religious outlook where multiple diasporas intersected 
and interacted with one another. It became a centre for the transmission of ideas, 
values and ideologies. The attempts of the British to insulate Singapore from the 
sway of radical movements overseas proved to be ineffective because the 
dismantling of colonial empires in South Asia, Indonesia and Indochina, along
32 ‘Memorandum for Commonwealth Conference, London; Note on the Singapore Memorandum 
(1950)’, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 231.
33 C.M. Turnbull, A History o f  Singapore, 1819-1988 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
p. xiii.
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with the rise of Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism, ‘opened new horizons and 
dramatically raised expectations.’34 In fact, regional links and global interactions 
were intensified in the post-war setting, which had, in effect, transformed 
Singapore into a breeding ground for militant radicalism.35
In view of this, policymakers in Britain promoted the creation of a Pan- 
Malayan identity involving the development of strategic partnerships and aid 
programmes to ensure a more lasting friendship with the colonized peoples. This 
policy was institutionalised in the Malayan Union Scheme, which was formalised 
on 1st April, 1946.36 Yet, Malays and other communities in the Malay Peninsula 
saw the implementation of the Malayan Union as an attempt to erode the powers 
of the Sultans and an impingement upon the special rights of the Malays. The 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was thus registered in 1946, and 
began campaigning for what was to be known as the Federation of Malaya. 
Singapore was excluded from this Federation due to the Peninsula Malays’ fear of 
Chinese numerical dominance on the island. Although a segment of the Muslim 
population in Singapore accepted such a rationale of political separation, many 
hoped that they would soon be incorporated into the larger mainland community, 
where kinship and familial ties were deeply-rooted.
34 Timothy N. Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the Singapore Story”, in Tan Jing Quee and Jomo 
K.S, (eds.), Comet in our Sky, Lim Chin Siong in Histoiy (Kuala Lumpur: INS AN, 2001), p. 16.
35 Timothy N. Harper, “Globalism and Pursuit o f Authenticity: The Making of a Diasporic Public 
Sphere in Singapore”, Sojourn, 12,2, (1997), pp. 261-92.
36 ‘Dominions Office to High Commissioners, 21st January, 1946’, CO 537/1528. For insights into 
the Malayan Union scheme and subsequent reactions by various groups in Malaya, see A.J. 
Stockwell, British Policy and Malay politics during the Malayan Union Experiment 1945-1948, 
(Singapore: Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979); and Albert Lau, The Malayan 
Union Controversy 1942-1948, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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To the members of the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.), the creation 
of the Federation was perceived as yet another measure on the part of the British 
to progressively proscribe their activities, specifically the militant front - the 
Malayan Races Liberation Army (M.R.L.A.). Upon the murder of three British 
rubber planters in Perak by M.R.L.A guerillas on 18th June 1948, the British 
declared a state of emergency throughout Malaya. The enemy fighters were 
nicknamed ‘bandits’ and, in the years that followed, the label was changed to 
‘Communist Terrorists’ (CTs).37 As violence on both sides of the conflict 
escalated, the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, declared in the House of 
Commons that:
His Majesty’s Government have no intention of relinquishing their responsibilities in 
Malaya until their task is completed. The purpose of our policy is simple. We are working 
in cooperation with the citizens o f the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, to guide them 
to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth. We have no intention of 
jeopardising the security, well-being and liberty o f these people, for whom Britain has 
responsibilities, by a premature withdrawal.38
Accordingly, amidst the outward display of territorial ‘separation’ between 
Singapore and Peninsula Malaya following the Federation Agreement, close 
communication and coordination between British officials in the two territories 
persisted.39 Tan Tai Yong observes that throughout the 1950s, British 
policymakers in Whitehall ‘sought to base their policies on a regional approach.
37 Susan L. Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and the 
Colonial Counter-insurgency (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), p. 85 and Chin Peng, My 
Side o f Histoty (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), p. 10.
38 ‘Official Report, 13th April, 1949: Vol. 463, c. 2815’, quoted in ‘Colonial Political Intelligence 
Summary No. 3, March 1950’, CO 537/ 5302.
39 ‘J.M. Gullick to Robert Heussler, 26th August, 1982’, Robert Heussler Papers.
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The consolidation of regionalism - based on security pacts, policy coordination, 
and economic cooperation - was regarded as essential to the security of the region, 
and its natural corollary was the coming together, eventually, of the states of 
Southeast Asia into a regional bloc.’40 Be that as it may, British policies and 
strategies had to be periodically revised in response to the changing conditions 
within Malaya and the emergence of other superpowers in the region. When 
viewed from the perspective of defence planners in London, Singapore’s position 
within British Grand Strategy in Southeast Asia was no less than ‘sacrosanct, 
making the prospect of withdrawal unthinkable.’41 Indeed, the island was regarded 
as a strategic base to ensure the continuation of British global leadership in the
42post-war era.
MUSLIMS IN SINGAPORE
In the face of such a rapidly evolving context, Muslims in Singapore 
recognised that a brave new world was about to be bom, and that the onus was 
upon them to shape it in the ways which they desired. The era was marked by the 
birth of a new ‘public sphere’ manifested in the form of newspapers, journals, 
rallies, strikes, unions, parties and modes of thought43 The 1947 census revealed 
that Singapore’s population was estimated to be over one million, out of which, 
77.6% were ‘Chinese’, 12.2% ‘Malays’, 7.6% ‘Indians’, 1.0% ‘Europeans’, 1.0%
40 Tan Tai Yong, “The ‘Grand Design’: British Policy, Local Politics, and the Making of Malaysia, 
1955-1961”, in Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen and Tan Tai Yong (eds.) The Transformation o f  
Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 2004), p. 146.
41 Matthew Jones, “A Decision Delayed: British Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered”, 
The English Historical Review, CXII, 472, (2002), p. 572. See also, Nicholas Tarling, The Fall o f  
Imperial Britain in South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 171-188.
42 Martin Lynn, “Introduction”, in Lynn (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s, p. 10.
43 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Categoiy o f Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
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‘Eurasians’ and 0.8% were categorised as ‘Others’.44 Arabs were often intermixed 
between the categories of ‘Malay’ and ‘Others’. Exact figures for the population 
of Muslims in the colony lurked in the realm of the unknown till the end of the 
1950s. Each of the Annual Reports for the years 1954 through 1956 maintained 
that an ‘enumeration of religions has not been made and indeed scarcely possible. 
The Malayfsians] are almost without exception Muslim....Of the Indian 
community about 70 per cent are Hindu, 20 per cent Muslim, 5 per cent Christian 
and 2 per cent Sikh.’45 This was no more than a cursory glance at the 
heterogenous nature of Muslims in Singapore.
Upon deeper scrutiny, Muslims were, in the main, fragmented along the 
lines of ethnicity, ideology, notions of belonging, class, affiliation to organisations 
and geographical location. In terms of ethnicity, most Muslims in Singapore were 
of Malay origin. Still, the Malays were not a homogenous ethnic bloc. Judith 
Djamour, in her book entitled Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, notes 
that the Malays in Singapore of the 1950s were divided into two broad groupings. 
The first grouping consisted of those whose families had migrated from the 
Peninsula and had lived in the colony for several generations. The second 
grouping were immigrants from Indonesia, mainly Javanese, Baweanese, Bugis 
and Banjarese, who had been settled on the Island for one, two or three 
generations. ‘Very few Indonesians immigrants, for instance, would claim to be 
Malays unless they were accepted as such by the village community.’46 These 
potent lines reveal the fluidity with which the Malay-Muslim identity was defined
44 Annual Report -  Colony o f Singapore; 1947 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 
15.
45 Annual Report -  State o f Singapore: 1956 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 
27.
46 Judith Djamour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore (London: Athlone Press, 1965), p. 4.
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at that time. Arab, Indian, Pakistani and Chinese Muslims were small in numbers, 
and their assimilation into the Malay society was dependent upon their 
participation in socio-religious activities and adoption of the Malay language and 
culture - a process commonly known as Masok Melayu (‘Becoming Malay’). The 
Chinese girls were, in most instances, converted to Islam through the practise of 
infonnal adoption. Sold by their Chinese parents to Malay and Indian families, 
these female infants were called anak beli (a bought child). Differing slightly 
from the other sub-ethnic groupings, marriage was the key factor that accounted 
for the conversion of a small number of Europeans and Eurasians to Islam, and 
their subsequent integration into the Malay community.47
The second line of partisanship was ideological, due primarily to 
affiliations towards differing schools of Islamic jurisprudence and sectarian 
beliefs. Arabs and Malays derived their understanding of Islamic laws from the 
Shafi’i School, whereas the Indian Muslims subscribed to the Hana.fi tradition. 
There were also members of the Muhammadiyah movement, whose approach to 
Islamic jurisprudence transcended the four accepted schools of law (Shafi’i,
A Q
Hanafi, Malild and Hanbali). All were, however, Sunni. The ‘Shiite’ and the 
‘Ahmadiyya’ - two groups which constituted several other sub-sects - formed the 
next level of sectarianism and were regarded as minorities within a predominantly 
Sunni Muslim community. These sects were often labelled as heterodox and were 
stigmatised by the Sunnis. Shiite elites were, however, active within several
47 Djamour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, p. 8. and pp. 92-101.
48 The headquarters of the Muhammadiyyah movement was at 903-A Lorong Tai Seng. It existed 
as an informal group until its formalisation on 25,h December, 1957. Members o f the group were 
frequently assaulted by Muslims who regarded them as ‘unorthodox’ and insolent towards the 
varied inherited beliefs o f Islam among Malays, For more information on British perceptions of 
the movement, see ‘Special Branch Intelligence Summary (No.4, 5 and 8/60)’, FO 1091/107.
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Muslim associations, but would often conceal their religious leanings. On the 
other hand, the Ahmadiyya movement, whose headquarters were based at Lahore 
in Pakistan, received constant warnings from Muslims on the island and was in the 
centre of controversy due to its active missionizing.49 Like the Ahmadiyya, 
proponents and sympathisers of communism were shunned by most Malays who 
perceived the communist ideology and its objectives as un-Islamic. Upon the 
declaration of the Malayan Emergency in 1948, the number of Malay communists 
declined rapidly to a few prominent radicals who were later proscribed or driven 
underground.50 Paradoxically, spiritual cults and invulnerability sects, which were 
regarded by Muslim scholars as wayward and deviant, mushroomed within this 
tumultuous milieu.51
Not all Muslims in Singapore upheld the idea that Singapore was the 
definite place where they belonged. Notions of belongingness were fluid, 
especially among Indians and Arabs. A small yet influential number of Indian 
Muslims were deeply involved in campaigning for the creation of Pakistan and 
maintained close links with their ancestral home.52 The Arabs, who originally 
hailed from Yemen in a region called Hadramaut, maintained trade and familial 
ties with relatives in the homeland with the aim of preserving fundamental aspects 
of their traditions, culture and language. Even though signs of cultural dilution 
were apparent due to the disruptions caused by the Second World War, the
49 For a discussion on controversies surrounding the Shiite and Lahore Ahmadiyya movement in 
Singapore, see Christoph Marcinkowski, Facets o f Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
(II): Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006), pp. 20- 
40 and Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hasan, “Versions of Eternal Truths: Ulama and Religious Dissenters 
in Kedah Malay Society”, Contributions to Southeast Asian Ethnography, 8, 1989, pp. 43-69.
50 ‘Malayan Security Service, Political Intelligence Journal No. 8/1948’, CO 537/3751.
51 ‘Malayan Security Services, Political Intelligence Journals, 8/1946’, John Dailey Papers and 
“Religious Cults in Malaya”, CO 537/1583.
52 See ‘HQ Malaya Command Weekly Intelligence Summary’, CO 537/1582.
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practise of sending Arab children for religious instruction and enculturation in 
places in Yemen such as Tarim and Sana’a was still pervasive in the 1950s.53 
Most Malays maintained that the island of Singapore and the Peninsula Malaya 
was a single entity to which they all belonged. Anthony Stockwell writes in the 
most lucid way that;
Like Janus, the Malay community in Singapore looked in two directions at once, and its 
attitude to Malay problems in the island often differed from the line it adopted with regard 
to peninsula matters. Singapore-Malaya relations, communal questions and the 
Indonesian link were viewed from different angles by Singapore Malays as they straddled 
the causeway and shifted from foot to foot.54
There existed also a highly-politicised minority within the Malay 
population whose loyalties extended outward to the wider Nusantara (The Malay 
World). These were ardent supporters and promoters of the Indonesian Revolution 
and the unification of Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia into what was called the 
Melayu Raya.55
Muslims in Singapore were also divided into several classes as reflected in 
their occupational patterns which, in turn, had had a great bearing upon the nature 
of public engagement and reactions to issues pertaining to Islam.56 Arabs and 
Indian Muslims were economically more established. Although small in numbers,
53 Ameen Ali Talib. “Hadramis in Singapore”, Journal o f  Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
1997, p. 93.
54 Anthony J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment 
1945-1948 (Singapore: Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979), p. 122.
55 See Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection, 1945-1949 
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003).
56 Francis G. Camell, “Communism and Communalism in Malaya”, Pacific Affairs, 26, 2, (1953),
p . 1 0 6 .
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they were generally of the higher classes and were active in providing socio­
economic, religious and political leadership. Whilst a majority among the 
members of these two ethnic groupings maintained friendly relations with the 
British, their attitudes and approaches towards the colonial regime oscillated from 
collaboration to overt resistance. Indian Muslims of the lower classes, in the 
words of a British intelligence report, ‘largely identified with the Malay 
population and shared the downtrodden position of being economically 
marginalised.’57 The common occupations for men of the lower classes were 
office clerks, labourers, drivers and seamen, as well as the lower ranks of the 
police force, the fire-fighting services and the military. Everyday life for an 
average Malay was described by a poignant expression, Kais pagi makan pagi, 
kais petang makan petang, which means living from hand to mouth. Illiteracy, 
poor education and reliance upon information via word of mouth characterised the 
lower segments of the Muslim community. These factors contributed to the ease 
with which passions were inflamed in the course of the Maria Hertogh 
controversy.
Another line of division was in the form of organisations. This was the 
period in which Muslims of varied social backgrounds and political leanings 
would organise themselves under the banner of uniquely named bodies. There 
were no less than one hundred registered organisations in total, and the 
membership of individual bodies could be as high as several thousands. In most 
cases, only half a dozen die-hard enthusiasts were enlisted and the life span of 
these organisations usually did not last beyond a year of activism. The Muslim
57 ‘Political developments in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, October/November, 1948’, 
CO 537/ 2677.
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Advisory Board, Jamiyah (the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society), the 
Singapore Muslim League, Singapore UMNO (SUMNO), the Young Men’s 
Muslim Association, the Muslim Welfare Association, the Kesatuan Melayu 
Singapura (Singapore Malay Union), the Kesatuan Kebajikan Perempuan Islam 
(Singapore Malay Women’s Welfare Association) and the Persatuan Melayu 
Semenanjung (Association of Malays in the Peninsula) were among the most 
prominent and influential organisations in campaigning for Muslim rights in the 
public realm. Concurrently, activists within these organisations functioned as 
editors and writers in newspapers, journals and periodicals, such as The Muslim 
World, The Islamic World, Dawn, Qalam, Sinaran, Utusan Melayu and Melayu 
Raya. The Utusan Melayu became one of the most widely-read newspapers in 
Singapore and Malaya, influencing and shaping the psyche of the Malays.58 By 
1954, its circulation was reported to have reached 22,000. A majority of the 
subscribers were based in Malaya and the newspaper was also distributed in parts 
of Indonesia. Renowned for its independence from any party or state interests, 
several of its editors and journalists faced imprisonment for their radical views 
and affiliations.59 Even so, Utusan Melayu's influence upon the Malay society 
was not left unchallenged. A rival newspaper, the Melayu Raya, was published in 
Singapore beginning on 29th August, 1950. Regarded in its time as the defender of 
Malay rights, Melayu Raya shot to prominence during the Maria Hertogh episode. 
By the end of December 1950, it had gained the support of more than 7000 
shareholders and a circulation of about 28,000 copies throughout Malaya. A
58 Ismail Hussein, “Singapura Sa-bagai Pusat Kesusasteraan Melayu Sa-lepas Perang”, Dewan 
Bahasa, 3, 2, (1959), p. 540.
59 For an illuminating discussion of the shifting fates o f Utusan Melayu's employees, see A. Samad 
Ismail, Memoir A. Samad Ismail di Singapura (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1993).
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majority of its directors was ex-members of the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) 
and were described by British intelligence agencies as having ‘extremist views.’60
In terms of geographical location, Arabs and Indians were interspersed in 
the central and eastern parts of Singapore and other districts that were dominated 
by Europeans and Eurasians, Malays were located within several sub-ethnic 
enclaves in the south-eastern and south-western parts of the island, largely living 
in squatter settlements and densely populated kampongs built on low-lying 
swampy areas. Sanitation and drainage was poor. Endemic diseases such as 
typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis and malaria were rampant. The Bugis, Javanese and 
Baweanese were located near Kampung Glam, adjacent to the Sultan’s palace and 
mosque. Malays from the Peninsula settled in villages at Telok Blangah, Tanglin, 
Holland Road, Paya Lebar, Geylang and Jalan Eunos.61 This partly explains why 
the Maria Hertogh riots and subsequent skirmishes were most intense in these 
areas.
Despite their divisions along various lines, Muslims in Singapore would 
often rally together as a cohesive whole in the face of infringements upon their 
religious rights. Indian Muslims of this period were particularly acknowledged for 
the forging of strategic alliances with their co-religionists to pursue religious 
goals. A fine example of this was the formation of a Muslim political party which
60 ‘Political Summary August 1950 -  Part III -  Colonial Territories -  Federation o f Malaya’, CO 
537/6087.
61 B.W. Hodder, “Racial Groupings in Singapore”, Malayan Journal o f  Tropical Geography, 1, 
(1953), pp. 31-32.
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contested the 1949 municipal elections.62 The party’s founder was Karim Ghani, 
who, although not a ‘Malayan’ by descent, was able to bring together Muslims of 
different sectarian, ethnic and class backgrounds amidst the restrictions imposed 
by the Emergency.63 Karim Ghani was however not alone in his quest to reassert 
the place of Islam in society. The need to heighten awareness and attachment to 
Islamic precepts and worldview, which had ironically deteriorated during the 
painful experience of the Japanese Occupation of Singapore, was the concern of 
most Muslim elites in the colony. Undeniably, prayers and other basic Islamic 
rites were neglected by the Muslim masses, and mosque attendance was relatively 
low.64 The highly acclaimed autobiographical novel Salina, which is now 
regarded as an important source of information on social life in 1950s Singapore, 
records most vividly the moral laxness of Muslims who were beleaguered by 
prostitution and other sexual vices.65
In the main, British policy towards Islam in Singapore was riddled with 
inconsistencies and contradictions. Rapid transformations within the Muslim 
community meant that policies had to be adapted to changing conditions and 
circumstances. As early as 1947, intensive measures had been undertaken to curb 
Indonesian and Islamic influences on the island as manifested in the MNP and its
62 ‘Minutes o f Singapore Muslim League Committee Meeting, 8th September, 1949’, Mansoor 
Adabi Private Papers. See also, Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian Minority and Political 
Change in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 32.
63 E. Kay Gillis, Singapore Civil Society and British Power (Singapore: Talisman, 2005), pp. 136- 
171.
64 For an illuminating account of Malays’ declining adherence towards Islam during the Japanese 
Occupation, see Abu Talib Ahmad, Malay-Muslims, Islam and the Rising Sun: 1941-1945, Kuala 
Lumpur: MBRAS, 2003, pp. 176-196.
65 See A, Samad Said, Salina (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1961) and Virginia 
Matheson Hooker, Writing a New Society: Social Change through the Novel in Malay (Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1999), pp. 221-249.
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militant youth wing, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API).66 In the same year, the pre­
war Mohammedan Advisory Board was re-established and renamed the Muslim 
Advisory Board to ensure increased communication between the British 
government and the Muslim community in dealing with potential threats. Yet, by 
mid-1948, Malcolm Macdonald and the Colonial Office were convinced that the 
real battle was against Communism and not Islam.67 ‘Communism’, as described 
by a British political report, ‘is the greatest single factor which is likely to
aggravate the internal Security of Malaya during the next few years, in peace or in
68  • •war.’ At the same time, the Special Branch kept a close watch on the movements
and ideas of Muslim revivalists and radicals from the Middle East and South Asia, 
which were influencing the minds of the literate segment of the Muslim 
community in Singapore. The probability of an open rebellion or mass violence by 
Muslims was, however, ruled out. Rather, it was believed that militant Islam in 
Malaya ‘would not go beyond seditious public speaking and boycotts’.69 Coupled 
with press sensationalism and an ineffective police force, it was the failure to 
contain radical influences, the social estrangement and economic crises faced by 
the Singapore Muslim community that resulted in the outbreak of mass violence 
amidst the Maria Hertogh legal controversy.
THE MARIA HERTOGH LEGAL CONTROVERSY
Maria Huberdina Bertha Hertogh was born at Tjimahi, Java, on 24th 
March, 1937. Her father, Adrianus Petus Hertogh, was a Dutch soldier who served
66 ‘Malayan Security Services, Political Intelligence Journals, 2/1946’, John Dailey Papers. See 
also, “Malay Nationalist Party”, CO 537/7243 and ‘Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, CO 537/2151.
67 Stockwell, “Imperial Security and Moslem Militancy”, p. 327.
68 ‘Internal Security Malaya, 14th June 1948’, CO 537/6006.
69 ‘Internal Security Malaya, 14th June 1948’, CO 537/6006.
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in the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. Adrianus’ wife, Adeline Hertogh, was 
a Eurasian who grew up in Java. Both were Roman Catholics at the time of Maria 
Hertogh’s birth, and she was baptized a Catholic on the 10th April, 1937. Upon the 
Japanese invasion of Java, Adrianus became a prisoner of war and was separated 
from his family. To ease the burden of raising five young children, Adeline sent 
Maria Hertogh to be cared for by one of her mother’s friends named Che Aminah 
binte Mohamed, a Muslim of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence who resided in 
Bandung. This was the genesis of the legal contentions in the years to come. Che 
Aminah denied this account during the court proceedings, claiming that the child 
was handed over to her for permanent adoption. Her allegation was supported by 
Adeline’s elder brother, Soewaldi Hunter, who witnessed the adoption process. 
Che Aminah further asserted that Maria Hertogh was circumcised in 1943 in the 
presence of her mother and grandmother. Arguing against this, Mrs Hertogh 
asserted that she was arrested by the Japanese on her way to fetch Maria Hertogh 
from Che Aminah’s house and was interned until the end of the war. Che Aminah 
then proceeded to raise Maria Hertogh as a Muslim and in the Malay way of life. 
After the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, the Hertoghs returned to the 
Netherlands, having been unable to locate their child. A prolonged search by 
Dutch officials with the support of the British finally revealed that Maria Hertogh 
was living with Che Aminah at Kemamam in Trengganu, Malaya. A British 
official, Arthur Locke, requested Che Aminah to be present at a meeting with the 
Dutch Acting Consul-General in Singapore so as to ascertain Maria Hertogh’s 
status as her foster child. Having acquiesced to the request, Che Aminah soon 
realized that she had been lured into a legal battle that changed the entire course of 
her life.
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On the 22nd April, 1950, the Dutch Acting Consul-General in Singapore, 
Jacob van der Gaag, obtained an order for custody in the High Court of Singapore 
under the Guardianship of Infants Ordinance, directing that the child should be 
delivered to the Social Welfare Department. A further order was obtained on the 
19th May, 1950 which gave van der Gaag the liberty to restore Maria Hertogh to 
her parents in the Netherlands. Che Aminah, in turn, lodged an appeal that was 
heard in June. The court declared the proceedings null and void, as neither Che 
Aminah nor Maria Hertogh, who were the necessary parties to the case, had been 
properly served copies of the orders, as required by the Rules of the British 
Supreme Court. The Judge contended that ‘the document purporting to be an 
Originating Summons was prepared in a hurry and without adequate care’ by van 
der Gaag, who had no legal right to claim the custody of Maria Hertogh. All 
claims must be based on kinship relations and the Acting Consul-General was not 
empowered to act on behalf of Adrianus Hertogh.70 The stage was thus being set 
for the legal tussle to escalate beyond the concerns of the British colonial 
administration in Singapore.
A few weeks later, the Netherlands Ambassador in Britain sent a strongly 
worded letter to the Home Government urging that Maria Hertogh be restored to 
her parents. The legal decision that was made by the British Supreme Court in 
Singapore, wrote the Dutch official, ‘was not at all clear and perhaps only formal.’ 
It was feared that Maria Hertogh would, at the very least, be forced into marriage 
or in the worst state of affairs, kidnapped and hid in the jungle.71 The British 
Foreign Office responded empathetically to Dutch demands by stating that the
70 “In the Matter of Maria Huberdina Hertogh, An Infant; Amina Binte Mohamed v. The Consul- 
General for the Netherlands, July 28, 1950”, The Malayan Law Journal, 16, (1950), pp. 214-218.
71 ‘Aide Memoire, 29th July, 1950’, FO 371/84676.
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Home Government had no locus standi in the matter and that ‘any appeal against 
the court decision should be made by the Netherlands Consul-General in 
Singapore through his solicitors.’72
In Singapore and Malaya, the Court of Appeal’s decision had been 
misinterpreted by Muslims to the effect that Che Aminah had been awarded full 
custody of Maria Hertogh. To add fuel to the already inflamed sensibilities of the 
Dutch, on 1st August, 1950, a marriage was arranged between thirteen-year-old 
Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi, who was twenty-one-years-old and a 
probationary teacher from Kelantan. In his personal reminiscences of the Maria 
Hertogh controversy, Mansoor Adabi recollected his naivety concerning the 
implications of his marriage to Maria Hertogh, because his knowledge of colonial 
and Islamic laws was superficial. It was proposed that he was to be in matrimony 
via what was called in the Malay language, nikah gantung (a truncated marriage). 
This was a common practice among Malays in post-war Malaya and Singapore, 
who regarded it as a necessary measure to safeguard young couples from engaging 
in free mixing and uncontrolled interactions that are forbidden in Islam. The word 
‘gantung’ which means truncated connotes that the marriage, although valid from 
the perspective of Islam, was ‘incomplete’. From the Malay cultural point of view, 
the niluih (solemnization) must be followed by wedding rites known as 
bersanding in order for the marriage to be considered as thoroughly fulfilled. 
Mansoor had hoped to return to Kelantan with Maria Hertogh following the 
bersanding rites and his graduation from the teacher training course.73
72 ‘Thomas. Lloyd to JohnD. Higham, 29th July, 1950’, FO 371/84676.
73 Dewan Masyarakat, 27, 3, (1989), pp. 12-13.
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Muslims in Singapore in the 1950s were divided on the acceptability of 
such child marriages. Many held on to the view that the timing of the marriage 
was inappropriate. At the same time, the British Home Government sought yet 
again to defuse Dutch agitation for intervention in the controversy. An assurance 
was made by the British that affirmative steps would be undertaken to ensure that 
Maria Hertogh’s minority status would be protected and that the Singapore 
Governor would keep the Dutch government updated on all developments.74 An 
official at the British Foreign Office anticipated that the case was ‘going to have 
considerable repercussions on public opinion in Holland and consequently on 
relations between the United Kingdom and Holland.’75 His reading of the situation 
was prophetic.
Catholic activists in the Netherlands issued several public statements 
exhorting the British government to give satisfactory explanations for what was 
branded as policies biased against Dutch subjects in the colonies. An anonymous 
letter was sent to a British official at the Hague threatening him ‘with death unless 
Bertha Hertogh is placed on the next boat to Holland.’76 In unison with this, 
developments in Singapore have generated the interest of a member of the Dutch 
royalty, Queen Juliana Louise Wilhelmina, who was active in promoting the 
welfare of children in developing counties. At Bergen op Zoom, a ‘Bertha 
Hertogh Committee’ was established to provide the best legal representation and 
to pay for expenses incurred by Adeline and Adrianus Hertogh. $80,000 guilders
74 ‘William Strang to R.H. Scott, 9th August, 1950’, FO 371/84676.
75 ‘J.O. Lloyd (Foreign Office) to H. Drake (Colonial Office), 5th August, 1950’, CO 323/1922/11.
76 ‘Philip Nichols (The Hague) to Ernest Bevin, 29tl1 August, 1950’, CO 323/1922/11.
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had been raised within a span of a few weeks.77 The Maria Hertogh controversy 
also gained much publicity and provoked strong reactions from politicians and 
organisations in major Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and even as 
far away as Saudi Arabia. Letters promising financial help were sent to Muslim 
organisations in the colony.
In Singapore, British officials saw the affair as developing:
to a small extent in the public eye into an inter-religious and inter-racial question. 
Attempts were made to enlist the intervention o f educated and influential Muslims to 
prevent further complications. Although they deplore the manner in which this marriage 
has taken place and consider the bride to be young, their attitude is that as the marriage is 
legal according to the law o f Islam, it would be wrong for them to intervene. The Dutch 
Consul-General made representations that action should be taken by Government against 
Mansoor Adabi, possibly under the Emergency Regulations, but he was informed there 
was no action which the Government could legally take to prevent the course of events or 
interfere in the matter which was clearly one o f legal concern,78
Admittedly, the British were unsure of the proper course of action as any wrong 
moves would affect public opinion towards the government. On the one hand, 
Muslim organizations were pennitted to raise public funds in aid of Che Aminah’s 
legal battle for the custody of Maria Hertogh. On the other hand, British 
policymakers attempted to introduce the Laycock Marriage Bill on the lines of the 
1929 Age of Marriage Act in the United Kingdom, to ‘make void marriages
77 ‘H.B.C. Keeble (Foreign Office) to J.T.A. Howard-Drake (Colonial Office), 28th August, 1950’, 
CO 323/1922/11 and J. van der Gaag, Vrijgevochten (Naarden: Strengholt, 1984), p. 132.
78 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Grifftiths, 19th August, 1950’, FO 371/84676.
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between persons either of whom is under the age of sixteen.’79 The bill was, 
presumably, a spontaneous reaction to the ongoing Maria Hertogh controversy. 
Campaigning on the behalf of modernist-oriented female activists in post-war 
Singapore, Che Zaharah bte Noor Mohamed, supported the Laycock Bill. She 
went further to highlight on the abuse of Muslim women, which has its roots from 
the backward interpretation of Islam in the Malay World.80 Such radical stances 
drew severe criticism from the ulama (Muslim scholars) in Malaya who 
unanimously condemned the bill as anti-Islam.81 Other organisations, such as 
Jamiyah, the Tamil Muslim Union and the Muslim Welfare Association joined in 
the fray to protest against the implementation of bill. The editorials of Utusan 
Melayu, Melayu Raya and Qalam warned the Singapore Governor, Sir Franklin C. 
Gimson, to exercise utmost discretion before deciding upon the implementation of 
laws that would result in a worsening of Muslim confidence in his leadership.82 
Consequently, the bill was amended, with Muslims excluded from its provisions. 
It was regarded at that time as a major victory for the Muslims.83 More 
importantly, the episode had also revealed the embedded weakness of the British 
colonial administration in facing up to the resistance of its Muslim subjects.
Concurrently, an originating Summons filed by Maria Hertogh’s parents 
was issued in the High Court of Singapore, requesting that the marriage of
79 ‘Singapore Political Report for August, 1950’, FO 371/84509 and Proceedings o f  the First 
Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 19th September 1950 and 13th October 1950 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 317 and pp. B381-382.
80 Malaya Tribune, 19th April 1947; 25th November 1947 and Malaya Tribune, 3rd January 1948. 
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Mansoor and Maria Hertogh be declared illegal and that she be restored to her 
parents in the Netherlands. At the hearing which was attended by hundreds of 
Muslims, Justice Brown of the Singapore High Court awarded the custody of 
Maria Hertogh to her parents on the grounds that the court had no power to 
absolve parental rights. The judge declared that the ‘marriage’ of Maria Hertogh 
to Mansoor Adabi was invalid, on the grounds that Maria Hertogh was legally 
domiciled in the Netherlands. Under the Dutch law, all marriages under the age of 
sixteen are deemed unlawful. It was argued that Mansoor Adabi was not 
domiciled in Singapore, and hence could not assert his rights as Maria Hertogh’s 
husband based on the colony’s laws pertaining to Muslim affairs.84 The Court’s 
decision in declaring the marriage invalid was a critical turning point in Mansoor 
Adabi’s career. He resigned from his post as a trainee teacher and became 
engaged in politics, social activism and legal reform.
Yet no measures were undertaken by the British to arrest the sentiments 
which English and Malay newspapers were capitalising upon at those crucial 
moments. Numerous commentaries portrayed the legal controversy as part of a 
wider and ongoing battle between Christianity and Islam.85 The state of affairs 
worsened when Maria Hertogh was placed temporarily in the Roman Catholic 
Convent of the Good Shepherd. Images of the tearful girl kneeling in the church 
which was published in the Singapore Standard infuriated Muslims in Singapore 
and Malaya.86 On the 4th December 1950, Jamiyah and the Singapore Muslim 
League called for a mass meeting to be held under leadership of Muslim elites in
84 “In re Maria Huberdina Hertogh; Adrianu Petrus Hertogh and Anor. v. Amina binte Mohammed, 
Maria and Ors, December 2 ,1950”, Malayan Law Journal, 17, (1951), pp. 12-19.
85 Melayu Raya, 2nd December, 1950; Straits Echo, 4th December, 1950; Malaya Nanban, 7th 
December, 1950 and Utusan Melayu, 7th December, 1950.
86 Singapore Standard, 5th December, 1950.
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the colony. A consensus was reached among the local Muslim leaders to the effect 
that Maria Hertogh had been brought up as a Muslim girl, and that her marriage 
was legal. Resolutions passed in this meeting further amplified the ubiquitous 
perception that Justice Brown’s verdict was directed against the Islamic law of
• 87marriage. Five days later, radical activists who were enraged by the court’s 
decision formed the ‘Nadra Action Committee’ which incited Muslim crowds 
towards a holy struggle against the enemies of Islam. Despite that, the British 
Special Branch did not fully anticipate the imminent outbreak of mass violence. 
They did not register, as had the American Consul-General (William A. Langdon), 
‘the sharpening of the Catholic-Muslim issue in the affair’ and the rapid escalation 
o f ‘religious fanaticism amongst stone-faced Malays.’88
THE RIOTS
On 11th December, 1950, the court rejected an application for a stay of 
execution of the judgement which had been filed by Che Aminah and Mansoor 
Adabi. The first major riot in post-war Singapore began that day outside the High 
Court. Violence escalated after shots fired by Henry L. Velge, a Eurasian 
Volunteer Police Officer, wounded two Malays. Sporadic attacks developed 
quickly into widespread incidents of arson, robbery, murder and other forms of 
brutality, directed mainly at Europeans and Eurasians. Such acts of violence are 
examples of what Charles Tilly has tenned ‘reactive collective actions’ which 
were undertaken by an enraged mass to defend a moral code. Devoid of a clear
87 ‘The History o f the Hertogh Case’, CO 537/7302. See also The Malayan Nanban, 7th December, 
1950.
88 ‘William A. Langdon (American Consul General in Singapore) to Department o f State, 15th 
December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1550, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
(NACPM).
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political programme and organisation, such a movement would not be able to 
sustain a long-term struggle against an established polity.89 In the short run, 
however, a dozen of troops and policemen who confronted the revolting masses 
proved to be ineffective. Malay police officers refused to comply with orders to 
arrest their co-religionists, whom they saw as pursuing a just cause against the 
non-Muslims.
i
On the second day of the riots, the police were given orders to shoot in the 
face of imminent danger. By then, mass violence had spread to other areas of 
Singapore. Kampong Glam, North Bridge Road, Tanjong Katong and Geylang 
Road were places where the riots had been most virulent. Five persons were 
reported killed, and over 100 wounded.90 Three of those injured were reported to 
be Americans. Concerned about the possible spread of communist influence in the 
midst of the Korean War, the American Consul-General was called upon to 
submit detailed reports on the genesis and daily progress of the riots. During the 
height of violence, the American Secretary of State was informed that all bus 
services had been curtailed, ‘radio warned whites and Eurasians to remain 
indoors. International air travellers still detained at airports. FS [Foreign Service] 
female employees, wives and children told to stay at home.’91 It was only upon the 
arrival and deployment of three battalions of Malay infantrymen under the 
command of Major-General Dermott Dunlop that order was largely restored. 
Helicopters were used to evacuate casualties and to take photographs of rioters for
89 Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 50 and pp. 253-254.
90 Antam, 13 th December, 1950.
91 ‘William A. Langdon (American Consul General in Singapore) to Department o f State, 12th 
December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1250, NACPM.
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i 0*7later identification. On the same day, Maria Hertogh was flown to the 
Netherlands.
In Britain, the riots became a topic of intense debate between politicians of 
opposing parties. Prominent leaders of the Conservative Party, such as Winston 
Churchill and David Gammans, demanded that Labour Ministers in the House of 
Commons provide detailed reports on the incident. Questions were raised as to 
whether such an unanticipated outbreak of violence was a product of communist 
influence, and fears were expressed about the possibility of the impending spread 
of a violent religious movement throughout Malaya. In response, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, James Griffiths, stated on 12th December that the riots had 
not been thoroughly quelled. Curfews that had been imposed since the first day of 
the riots would be extended for several more days. Griffiths dismissed the 
speculation that the riots were caused by a planned intervention by the 
Communists. Leaders of the Muslim community, Griffiths contended, were co­
operating with the British to prevent the spread of violent movements that were 
precipitated by religious sentiments.93
By noontime 011 13th December, the riots had scaled down to sporadic 
attacks against the police. Eighteen people, including seven Europeans and 
Eurasians, were killed. 173 others were injured. Two buildings had been on burnt 
and 119 vehicles were damaged. The death toll arising from two days of rioting 
and police reprisals was said to be the highest when compared with other violent
92 See, ‘Riot Enquiry Commission, Singapore, Summary of the Principal Incidents, as Assistant 
Superintendent of Police, 11-13 Dec 1950, with 86 photographs’, Andrew Howat Frew Papers.
93 Hansard, Vol. 482, 12th December, 1950 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951), pp. 979-982.
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incidents on the island from the years 1945 to 1963.94 Although a majority of the 
persons arrested were Malays and Indonesians, several Chinese members of a 
local secret society were also included in the list of suspects.95
By any standards, the riots were defining moments for the British, as they 
had seriously undermined the legitimacy of the colonial administration in 
Singapore and the image of the Empire as whole. According to Charles Jeffries (a 
former Deputy Under-Secretary of State), unlike previous major disturbances in 
Aden (1947), in the Gold Coast (1948) and in Nigeria (1949), the Maria Hertogh 
riots was particularly significant, as they had exposed the weaknesses of a central 
pillar of British colonialism: the police force.96 The Singapore Governor described 
the two smouldering days as ‘an outbreak of violence unparalleled in the 
peacetime history of this centre of peaceful living and commerce.’97 The probable 
repercussions of the riots were even more worrying. The internal security of 
Malaya as whole was placed under severe strain in the midst of an ongoing battle 
against the spread of Communism in Malaya. Within the larger Muslim world, the 
riots received widespread coverage and negative responses in a plethora of 
newspapers and periodicals. There was a plausible fear that diplomatic relations 
between Britain and the newly independent Muslim countries, such as Pakistan 
and Indonesia would be jeopardised.98 Most crucial of all, for Muslims in Malaya, 
the riots ‘illustrated the ways in which Islam could be mobilised to articulate
94 Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1973), p. 73.
95 ‘Riots: Singapore; Report of Commission o f Enquiry: Leach Report (1951)*, CO 537/7248.
96 Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952), p. 203.
97 Annual Report -  State o f  Singapore: 1950 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 
17.
98 Majlis, 17th December, 1950 and Anthony J. Stockwell, “British Imperial Policy and 
Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-1952”, Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, 13, 1, 
(1984), p. 81.
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general anti-colonial sentiments.’99 In point of fact, the quelling of the violence 
did not end the struggle to restore Maria Hertogh to her rightful husband and to 
Islam. Appeals against the court’s decision were still underway, and there were 
heightened efforts towards gaining the support of Muslims locally and globally.100
Whilst the riots was reminiscent to the Sepoy Mutiny in 1915, in that 
Muslims were the main perpetrators of violence towards Europeans and Eurasians 
in Singapore, there was, however, no turning back to the draconian measures that 
were undertaken during the high noon of the Empire.101 Rather, the British were 
well aware that a more complex and volatile environment lay before them. All 
counter-measures therefore had to be implemented with the utmost discretion so 
as to minimize unwarranted reactions from the local and global Muslim 
communities. Jurgen Osterhammel was not far off the mark in observing that 
colonial states in the post-World War Two period ‘reacted nervously and harshly 
to every stirring of opposition. Its guiding principle was never to let the initiative 
be snatched away and never to lose face. The state always had to have the last 
word; every provocation was to be punished with retaliation.’102 It is to British 
strategies in the aftermath of the riots and their far-reaching ramifications to which 
we now turn.
99 Timothy N. Harper, The End o f  Empire and the Making o f  Malaya (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 337.
100 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 12, December 1950’, CO 825/82/3.
101 Twenty-two mutineers were shot in public and many others were banished or relocated to 
Africa. See R.W.E. Harper and Harry Miller, Singapore Mutiny (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1984).
102 Jurgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (trans. by Shelley L. Frisch) 
(Princeton: M. Wiener, 1996), p. 59.
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CHAPTER 3 
Proscription
The purpose of this chapter is to narrate and analyse the complexities of 
British attempts at proscribing persons responsible for the riots and potential 
instigators from causing further violence. Four key antagonists were identified as 
the British became aware of the causes of the riots. Foremost in this respect were 
newspapers, which were looked upon as vehicles for the communication of dissent 
and anti-British propaganda. Also factored into the equation were ideologues that 
had incited hatred and violence. Third, the British sought to proscribe opportunists 
who saw the riots as a means to pursue their criminal as well as anti-colonial ends. 
More subtle and yet equally dangerous were the rumour-mongers who were bent 
upon aggravating the already tensed situation. All of these elements were of equal 
concern to the British and the tactics employed to cripple their agency were seven­
fold: curfews, raids, arrests, routine checks, the issuing of public warnings, the 
introduction and enforcement of legal regulations and the sentencing of convicted 
criminals.
• INSTILLING FEAR
Arrests, raids and curfews were three tactics which the British employed 
from the worse days of the riots. The aim was to instil fear into the hearts and 
minds of the enemies of the colonial state in order to prevent further violence. 
‘Fear’, as Corey Robin brilliantly puts it, ‘ensures that those with power maintain
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it, and prevents those without power from doing much, if anything, to get it.’103 
For the colonial state, fear was a political tool to diminish all forms of violent 
opposition and to regain agency in the aftermath of the riots. Such tactics, 
however, were not without contradictions and negative consequences. Among the 
ordinary citizens of Singapore, curfews were seen as relics of the Japanese 
Occupation. A majority of the populace were thus averse to having to stay 
indoors, as this had a great impact upon their livelihood. Hospital staff, for 
example, had to work for over sixteen hours each day because doctors and nurses 
on the night shift were unable to report for duty.104 In fact, the British government 
had avoided the enforcement of curfews in previous years as it was looked upon 
as detrimental to the economy and the day-to-day lives of its subjects. The Maria 
Hertogh riots were a watershed in that they compelled the British to impose the 
first among a series of dusk-to-dawn curfews in post-war Singapore.105
At noontime on 13th December, 1950, soldiers of the British army roamed 
the streets and rounded up potential suspects. The police force had been issued 
with search warrants allowing them to enter private dwellings. Adult males in 
selected kampongs were systematically coerced to assemble in open fields to a 
point that it recalled the painful memories of ‘Operation Sook Ching’; the mass 
screening of Chinese in the early days of the Japanese Occupation in 1942.106 The 
police ensured that all informers wore masks in order to hide their identities.
103 Corey Robin, Fear: The History o f a Political Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), p. 162.
104 “Minutes o f Proceedings o f tile Municipal Commissioners o f the Town o f Singapore at an 
Ordinary Meeing held on Friday, 29th December, 1950 (1-92/50)”, in Minutes o f  the Proceedings o f  
the City Council o f Singapore, 1950 (Singapore: The Council, 1951).
105 Chan Kwee Sung, One More Story To Tell: Memories o f  Singapore: 1930s~1980s (Singapore: 
Landmark Books, 2005), p. 102.
106 Victor Seah Tiong Hin, A Life Worth Reliving (Singapore: T.H. Seah, 2002), p. 132.
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Bruises, bum marks and possession of fuel were taken as tell-tale signs of direct 
involvement in the riots. All in all, more than five hundred persons were detained 
and interrogated from the first day of the riots. A majority of those arrested were 
Muslims ranging from the age of fifteen to forty years old. A dozen Chinese 
gangsters who joined the fray were also rounded up. Those detained were 
rigorously interrogated and persons who resisted arrest were subjected to physical 
punishment. Reporters observed that the areas around the Sultan Mosque, North 
Bridge Road and Geylang seemed like miniature war zones, as shops were closed 
and burnt cars littered the roads. In short, the municipal area of the island was 
‘dead’. The Singapore Standard warned that the riots might escalate into an ‘orgy 
of indiscriminate slaughter’ of not only Europeans and Christians, but also 
Chinese and Indians.107 This was a somewhat extreme appreciation of the state of 
affairs but a grain of truth was to be found. Sporadic violence was far from over.
Vehicles were continuously vandalised and men were often seen armed 
with parangs and sticks. A group of youths had taken up positions on the upper 
floor of shophouses to throw bottles and stones. Two police cars were attacked by 
rioters at Jalan Sultan and North Bridge Road. Other forms of criminal acts were 
also reported at Orchard Road, Bukit Timah Road, Serangoon Road and Aljunied 
Road. The scale of damage to public and private property was considerable. The 
police and military responded by firing warning shots at the perpetrators. 
Armoured cars of the 13/18 Hussars continued to patrol the streets and were 
stationed at places where the worst rioting had taken place. A daylight curfew was
107 Singapore Standard, 13th December, 1950.
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imposed over the whole island. In the Geylang district, the curfew was imposed 
until as late as ten in the morning.108
Upon obtaining the permission of the Chief Kathi of Singapore, Haji Ali 
bin Haji Mohd Said, the police went about inspecting the Sultan Mosque. Malay 
detectives were also deployed to monitor and perform bodily checks upon all 
worshippers who entered and left the mosque. A rifle, ammunition, steel spikes, 
bottles and large stones were found. A young Javanese man, who was suspected to 
have joined the rioters, was taken in for questioning.109 Muslim leaders in the 
colony were apparently shocked by the police findings. An appeal by Mohamed 
Javad [M.J.] Namazie (the Joint Secretary of the Muslim Advisory Board) was 
broadcast via radio, calling on Muslims to put an end to the exploitation of sacred 
places for disgraceful purposes. Having proclaimed his support for the British to 
proscribe known suspects and guilty persons, Dato Onn bin Jaafar took on the 
risky task of dissuading Muslims in areas of Singapore where antagonism towards 
the Europeans and Eurasians was still evident.110 Such political posturing by the 
fifty-five-year-old President of UMNO contributed to the decline in popular 
support and the emergence of widespread criticism of his leadership.
On 14 December, parts of the city witnessed their third curfew, which 
extended from six or seven in the afternoon till six in the following morning. At 
certain localities, curfews were extended till noon.111 In areas where curfews had 
been lifted, members of the public were allowed to roam around ravaged areas,
108 The Singapore Free Press, 13th December, 1950.
109 Singapore Standard, 14* December, 1950 and The Straits Times, 14* December, 1950.
110 ‘Malaya: Monthly Political Intelligence Report, 28th December, 1950’, CO 825/82/3.
111 ‘Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioners (Canada, Australia, New  
Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, 14* December, 1950’, FO 371/84677.
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much to their own peril. Altogether, sixty-six persons were arrested for breach of 
curfew, and 104 were detained under the Emergency Regulations during screening 
operations throughout the colony. The number of persons arrested since the riots 
began shot up to 884, of whom forty-two were released. Those who were arrested 
were largely Malays, Indonesians and Indian Muslims.112 Only two serious 
incidents which involved Malay and European casualties were reported on 14th 
December. Non-Muslims, particularly the Europeans and Eurasians, were 
observed to be in constant fear of groups of Malay youths who gathered on the 
fringes of villages from Jalan Eunos to Changi Road. In reaction to this, the 
British deployed hundreds of military personnel to restore order and public 
confidence.113 Together with the Commissioner of Police, R.C.B. Wiltshire, and 
military escorts, the Singapore Governor toured various areas that had been 
affected by the riots.114 On the same day, a full list of the names of the fourteen 
people who had died in the riots and 156 others who had been injured was 
published in The Straits Times}15
Meanwhile, rumours of fresh riots arising from police atrocities were 
spreading in the colony. Although based on false information, such rumours were 
potent in a society where word of mouth was the most common mode of 
disseminating news. In his study of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Paul R. Brass 
has rightly pointed out that rumours ‘are usually attributed, like riots themselves 
to the credulity of the masses, already inflamed by prejudices against another 
group and ready to gather in large crowds to take revenge for the actions falsely
112 The Singapore Free Press, 15th December, 1950.
113 The Straits Times, 15th December, 1950.
114 Utusan Melayu, 15* December, 1950.
115 The Straits Times, 14* December, 1950.
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attributed to that group or for real, but trivial. Actions enlarged upon in the rumour 
process.’116 As seen in an earlier chapter, the Muslims of Singapore had been a 
close-knit community which relied on personal, face-to-face social connections 
and oral communication. All that was needed was a mere rumour to set the 
wounded community of faith onto another rampage.
To inhibit this growing phenomenon, Wilfred F. Blythe, the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary, warned against rumour-mongering over Radio Malaya. He 
maintained that stories of serious incidents occurring in various parts of the island 
were complete fabrications and that persons found guilty of manufacturing 
rumours would be duly prosecuted. The Singapore Colonial Secretary further 
assured the general public that forty-five armed vehicles would be touring the 
island to ensure that all untoward incidents would be dealt with swiftly.117 Still, 
some parts of the island, namely Chancery Lane and Holland Road, were plagued 
by episodes of stone-throwing directed at Europeans. One of the victims quickly 
reported the incident to the police, but many others saw the futility of such
i L
actions. On the night of 15 December, peddlers and prostitutes, whose income 
was severely affected by the curfews, were caught loitering in the back alleys of 
Selegie Road, Jalan Besar, Rochore Road and Desker Road. They were warned by 
the police to stay indoors. Selegie Road, which was one of the most dangerous 
spots during the riots, was kept under close surveillance.118
By 16th December, the Singapore Police had arrested another group of 187 
persons for violation of the curfew order. Seventy-six others were detained under
116 Brass, The Production ofHindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, p. 124.
117 The Singapore Free Press, 15th December, 1950.
118 The Straits Times, 15lh December, 1950.
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the Emergency Regulations. As part of its deterrent measures, the government
revealed publicly that the number of people arrested had totalled up to 1,107.119
Sixty-one persons were arrested on the following day, and 500 others were placed
under detention.120 A Special Branch report noted that the spread of
misinformation regarding the facts of the Maria Hertogh case was still rampant.
To address this, George G. Thompson, the Public Relations Secretary, arranged
for a radio broadcast entitled ‘Police and the People5 appealing, yet again, against
the spreading of rumours. In a melodramatic way, Thompson concluded his
broadcast by mentioning that: ‘There is today and tomorrow whose problems must
be faced by us all, and they must be faced pending a judgment on the past.. ..We
do not wish to ask, what in any case is impossible that the events of the past
should be forgotten but to appeal that now on every side, the task must be taken
up of building confidence and security again.’121 By 17th December, curfews were
limited to certain areas, extending only from eight at night till five in the 
122mornmg.
From time to time, the British had to deal with various challenges in 
enforcing curfews in Singapore. Most salient were persons who were ignorant of 
the riots. The Singapore Free Press, for example, related a humorous stoiy which 
was illustrative of the predicament faced by Malay sailors and fishermen in 
Singapore at that time. A man named Said, who worked on a small boat, was 
totally oblivious of the riots, as he did not own a radio. When he came ashore, 
none of his relatives had informed him of the events that had unfolded. Said thus
119 The Singapore Free Press, 16th December, 1950.
120 Malcolm Macdonald to Ernest Bevin, 2nd March, 1951.
121 ‘Statement by George G. Thomson, Public Relations Secretary (Singapore), 22nd February, 
1951’, CO 953/10/1, pp. 11-12.
122 The Straits Times, 18th December, 1950.
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left home in the late afternoon in search of entertaimnent only to be shocked at 
finding himself arrested by Gurkha policemen. After much difficulty, Said was
released and sent back to his boat,123 Apart from that, there were many others who
had deliberately flouted the curfew orders. A European lawyer, M.H. MacDougal, 
was caught walking alone during the restricted hours. When asked by police to 
produce his identification card, the lawyer stated that he knew his rights and 
resisted arrest. He was brought to the police station and fined $10.124 Favouritism 
towards Europeans was also said to have been practised by high-ranking officials 
in the colony during this period. O.O. Salvesen, a Volunteer Special Constable, 
recounted an incident at Orchard Road police station when a European couple and 
six Asian men were arrested for breaking curfew and for their failure to produce 
identity cards. Whilst the six men were put behind bars, the European couple was 
subsequently released via the intervention of Sir Charles Murray Aynsley, the 
Chief Justice of Singapore. Several officers at the station who witnessed the 
incident saw it as an instance of British favouritism towards all Caucasians.125 In 
response to this accusation, Aynsley noted that: ‘I did not convey by word or 
implication that I wanted their release.’126
Yet curfew-breaking was the least of the problems faced by the British. A 
major obstacle which had to be overcome was the reluctance on the part of the 
Malay police officers to arrest Muslim suspects which, to them, was a fonn of 
betrayal towards their co-religionists. A British colonial officer observed a drastic 
drop ‘in the morale of the Malay members of the Police Force who are 100%
123 The Singapore Free Press, 18th December, 1950.
124 The Singapore Free Press, 20th December, 1950.
125 The Singapore Free Press, 7th March, 1951.
126 ‘Singapore Riots Inquiry: A Study in Responsible Government’, RG 59, 746F.00/2-1951 
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sympathetic to the Muslim cause, and whose intimacy with the resentful members 
of the Muslim community renders them unreliable in the performance of any 
duties which bring them into conflict with Muslims over a religious issue,’127
On the following day, the western areas of the island were freed from 
curfew. The names and identity card numbers of all curfew breakers had been 
recorded, and they would be charged in court if caught for a second time. None 
had broken the curfew twice.128 On 19th December, the curfew orders were 
completely lifted. Muslims were still subjected to routine bodily checks, and other 
members of the public were required to produce their identity cards upon 
encountering with the police. With the exception of the burning of a bus by 
several Chinese youths on the outskirts of the city, no other incidences of violence 
were reported.129
Within governmental circles, plans were laid for the arrest of Muslim 
leaders who were responsible for inciting the Muslim masses to rise against the 
colonial state. A long list of names was brought forth by the Special Branch, 
which included ideologues who delivered polemical speeches in the heat of the 
Maria Hertogh legal case. The British were mindful 'that arresting anyone who 
was too influential would tilt the balance towards Muslim radicalism and, in turn, 
precipitate yet another wave of riots. Upon careful consideration, six influential 
Muslims were singled out. An extensive exposition of the biographies of these 
men is crucial for an understanding of British moves to detain them.
127 Lionel Griffitli-Jones, That’s My Lot: An Anecdotal Autobiography o f  a British Ex-Singapore 
Colonial (New York: Vantage Press, 1984), p. 138.
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IDEOLOGUES AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE
Topping the list was forty-two year old Abdul Mohammed Abdul Karim 
Ghani, more commonly known as ‘Karim Ghani’. Bom in Madras and educated in 
Ceylon, Karim Ghani grew up in Rangoon, where he became a Parliamentary 
Secretary under Ba Maw. In the course of the Second World War, Karim Ghani 
migrated to Japanese-occupied Malaya and was appointed as a Propaganda 
Minister of a virtual Indian alternative government led by Subhas Chandra Bose. 
He was imprisoned upon the British reoccupation of Malaya but was later released 
without being tried. In March 1946, he was diagnosed with mental disorder and 
spent the next two months in an asylum. Following his release, Karim Ghani 
pioneered the publication of several newspapers and periodicals in Penang and 
Singapore, all of which were short-lived. By September 1949, he became the 
General Manager of the Muslim Publishing House, the Chief Editor of a Tamil 
daily newspaper, the Malaya Nanban, and editor of an English weekly tabloid, 
Dawn. With the support of the South Indian Muslim community, he was 
simultaneously elected President of the Muslim League of Singapore and 
President of the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society. Concurrently, he had 
campaigned for the establishment of a Muslim political party.130 The onset of the 
Maria Hertogh controversy gave Karim Ghani a fine opportunity to pursue his 
political goals. Hence, on 17th November 1950, Karim Ghani took over the 
management of the legal case from another Indian Muslim, M.A. Majid. Referring 
to himself as an Imam (Leader) of a Holy War against the unbelievers, Karim 
Ghani gained prominence through his charismatic speeches and erudite
130 Straits Times, 31st December, 1947.
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commentaries in newspapers. Judged by the present-day academic standards, he 
could have been described as a ‘Radical Islamist’.131
It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that Karim Ghani did not call for 
violence against non-Muslims in the colony. In fact, he was instrumental in 
deterring his co-religionists from engaging in criminal activities during the riots. 
He urged Muslims in Singapore to direct their resources towards the pursuit of a 
legal struggle to restore Maria Hertogh in the fold of Che Aminah and Mansoor 
Adabi. In a speech delivered on 14th December at Kuala Lumpur, Karim Ghani 
revealed his intentions of obtaining the support of all Muslim countries at the 
forthcoming World Muslim Congress in Karachi. The Indonesian Government 
would be asked to sever its diplomatic relations with the Netherlands as a symbol 
of protest against Dutch involvement in the legal tussle.132 A few days later, a 
mass meeting was held in Singapore to launch his Muslim political party. Prior to 
his arrest, Karim Ghani had laid plans for a trip to Jakarta in the hope of locating 
Maria Hertogh’s maternal uncle, Soewaldi Hunter. The main intent was to obtain 
the adoption agreement between Che Aminah and Adeline Hertogh as evidence 
for the upcoming appeal in the Singapore High Court.133 Described by the British 
as ‘neither the most sinister nor the most important, but he has been a figurehead 
and a tool’, Karim Ghani’s arrest served as merely a warning to deter other 
aspiring fanatics.134
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The British were however puzzled by the roles of thirty-seven-year-old Dr 
Burhanuddin bin Mohammed Nur (more commonly known as Burhanuddin Al- 
Helmy) and thirty-two-year-old Mohammed Taha bin Kalu. At the same time, 
they had strong suspicions that the two men were the chief architects behind 
Karim Ghani’s manoeuvres. ‘It is not unreasonable to suggest that Dr 
Burhanuddin and Taha Kalu may have had in mind Karim Ghani’s experiences as 
a minister in the revolutionary Indian Independence Government of the 
occupation period when they decided to hitch their wagon to his star,’135 Both men 
were co-founders of the defunct MNP. Bom in Perak and of Sumatran descent, 
Burhanuddin was a homeopathy practitioner whose collaboration with the 
Japanese, leftist leanings and close contacts with the Communists had resulted to 
several bouts of imprisonment.136 He served as the President of the MNP in 1947 
and was appointed as its general adviser from 1948 until party’s dissolution in 
1949. In August 1950, Burhanuddin became one of the founders and the editor of 
the Melayu Raya newspaper. Mohammed Taha Kalu, an Indian Muslim bom in 
Malacca, was a lawyer’s clerk who had led a branch of the MNP in Singapore. 
Both men were known for their Pan-Indonesian sympathies and for campaigning 
for the independence of Malaya. The outbreak of the riots together with the arrests 
of hundreds of Muslims and persistent warnings by the Special Branch had still 
not broken the radical spirits of these men. Merely two days after the riots, Taha 
Kalu, Karim Ghani and Mansoor Adabi visited Kuala Lumpur for a meeting with
1 ^ 7legal advisers. This was followed by a planned tour of major villages and towns 
in north Malaya to obtain the support of Muslims of all ages and affiliations in
135 ‘Extract fromPMRNo. 12/1950 dated 27/12/1950’, CO 537/7302.
136 For a detailed biography o f Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, see Kamarudin Jaffar, Dr. Burhanuddin Al 
Helmy: Pemikiran dan Perjuangan (Kuala Lumpur: Ikdas, 2000).
137 Utusan Melayu, 15th January, 1951.
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regard to the Maria Hertogh legal struggle. In tandem with this, Dr Burhanuddin 
was appointed the new editor of Dawn, a radical newspaper, in place of Karim 
Ghani. From the perspective of the Special Branch, the arrests of Dr Burhanuddin 
and Taha Kalu were deemed necessary, for they were regarded as potential threats 
to the restoration of peace in Singapore. Indeed, the MNP had hoped to capitalize 
on the anti-British sentiments in favour of a violent revolution which would 
overthrow the colonial regime. This was part of the cita-cita perjuangan (the 
hopes and aims of struggle) on the road to the creation of the union between 
Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia.138
The three other potential detainees were somewhat representative of the 
sub-ethnic groupings within the Singapore Muslim community. Originating from 
a well-respected Arab Hadrami family, fifty-year-old Syed Ali Al-Attas was a 
businessman who was prominent within the Malay entertainment arena. He was 
also a member of the Malay Welfare Council and played an active role in 
garnering financial support for Che Aminah and Mansoor Adabi. Similar to Al- 
Attas, Mohammed Mustaza was a Malay businessman from Taiping, Perak. He 
had been a sympathizer of API, the proscribed youth organisation, and later 
became the President of Pemuda Radikal Melayu (PERAM, the Radical Malay 
Youths).139 A British intelligence report described him as ‘nothing more or less 
than an irresponsible firebrand.’ Last on the list was Darus Shariff, a political 
activist who was thirty-five years of age. As a former President of the Singapore 
branch of the MNP and subsequently, the Secretary of the Singapore Malay 
Welfare Council, Darus Shariff was vocal in urging Muslims to rise against the
138 Firdaus, Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and Early Development, p. 117-118.
139 ‘Malayan Security Service, Political Intelligence Journal No. 2/1948, 31st January 1948’, CO 
537/3751.
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tyranny of the colonial state. A champion of Malay communal concerns and 
economic rights, he shot to prominence upon the establishment of the Singapore 
Branch of UMNO on December 1951.140
At three o’clock on a Monday morning of 18th December, 1950, officers 
from the Special Branch raided the houses of the six men, detaining them and 
seizing all documents related to their activism. No resistance was encountered, 
and it was known that Karim Ghani had anticipated his arrest. The men were 
detained under Emergency Regulation 20 which gave the Singapore Colonial 
Secretary the authority to issue detention orders ‘when it appears to him to be 
necessary or expedient for securing the public safety or for the maintenance of 
public order.’141 The arrests, nevertheless, did not see the end of Karim Ghani’s 
resistance against the colonial regime. On the evening of his detention, Karim 
Ghani sent a petition to the Singapore Governor on behalf of the five men who 
had been arrested along with him. He contended that the detention orders were 
unjustifiable and protested against being imprisoned with suspected 
communists.142 Upon rigorous interrogation, the detainees were transferred from a 
high-security prison on St. John’s Island to a detention centre at Pulau Belakang 
Mati.
The British were expecting violent protests from Muslims in the colony. 
To the contrary, unlike the radical protesters in Malaya, Indonesia and Pakistan, 
Muslims in Singapore took on a non-militant approach. An open letter signed by
140 Utusan Melciyu, 31st December, 1951.
141 ‘Singapore Riots, December l l lh-12th, 1950’, CO 537/7302. See Utusan Melayu, 19th 
December, 1950.
142 ‘Report of Visit to St. John’s Island on 31st December, 1950’, Mansoor Adabi Private Papers.
79
more than 100 sympathisers of Karim Ghani was sent to Jamiyah and the 
Singapore Muslim League, urging the two organisations to ‘step up the appeal for 
the release of those unfortunate leaders, who evidently as leaders are suspected in 
a sense quite contrary to their public spiritedness.’143 A monthly political report 
captures vividly the general sentiments among Muslims in Singapore at that point 
in time:
Singapore -  The Arrests on Detention Orders o f Karim Ghani, Dr Burhanuddin, Taha Kalu and 
three other disciples on December 18th, has produced remarkably little reaction. The strong 
Military show o f force and the earlier arrest of over 300 suspects in screening raids have 
undoubtedly had a sobering effect, but even so the signs o f protest have not been such as to indicate 
that Karim Ghani had ever achieved a fanatical following. Muslim leaders who mistrusted Karim 
Ghani and were glad to see him removed, are now amongst those who are appealing for his release 
— but this is a natural manoevre.144
Consecutively, more than 566 persons were detained and 189 released 
after rigorous interrogation. Detention Orders were issued for another list of 171 
persons.145 As the waves of arrests intensified, the Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) announced the creation of the Riots Investigation Unit which 
consisted of twenty-nine officers and detectives. The task of the Riots 
Investigation Unit was to collate information on the causes of. the riots. Such 
information, as will be seen later, assisted in the work of the Commission of 
Enquiry. To address the drain on manpower within the police force due to the 
establishment of the Riot Investigation Unit, arrests and detentions were
143 ‘Open Letter to the Singapore Muslim League and Jamiyah, 29th December, 1950’, Mansoor 
Adabi Private Papers.
144 ‘Extract from PMRNo. 12/1950 dated 27/12/1950’, CO 537/7302.
145 ‘Singapore Situation Report for December, 1950’, CO 717/199/5.
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intensified to discourage lawlessness.146 The CID appealed to the general public to 
provide any pictures or reports pertaining to the riots. It was observed that Malays
and Indians were, by and large, unforthcoming in providing vital infonnation for
the fear of implicating their families and friends. Another possible reason could 
have been the climate of distrust that had developed within the Muslim 
community towards the colonial government as a consequence of the arrests of 
innocent persons. Thus far, ‘infonnation came mostly from Europeans and 
Eurasians and the response from other nationalities was reported to be almost 
nil.’147 The police were, however, on full alert for unexpected provocations by 
Malay youths.148
The role of the press was at the centre of a debate in the Singapore 
Legislative Council on 19th December, 1950. Tan Chye Cheng, a member of the 
Progressive Party, rebuked the press for its ‘gross irresponsibility’ and called for 
harsher measures by the government to address misrepresentations of the Maria 
Hertogh case.149 In an effort to mitigate sensational press descriptions of the riots 
and the legal case, the Public Relations Secretary arranged for a conference with 
the editors of all Singapore-based newspapers at Government House. It was 
reported that the vernacular newspapers, such as Utusan Melayu and Malayan 
Nanban, has increased in sales by 100 per cent in the days immediately after the 
riots. The tabloid Dawn, which was the mouthpiece of Karim Ghani, had ceased 
publication following the editor’s arrest. Even so, the Singapore Governor
146 Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 16th October, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B307.
147 The Straits Times, 19th December, 1950.
148 The Straits Times, 20th December, 1950.
149 The Straits Budget, 21st December, 1950. See also, Proceedings o f  the First Legislative 
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appealed to the press for their fullest co-operation in avoiding reports that could 
further invigorate Muslim sentiments. Publications of pictures and damaging 
captions were forbidden. At another conference with editors of several 
newspapers that were based outside Singapore, Gimson repeated similar appeals 
to not report on the challenges faced by Maria Hertogh in the Netherlands.150 With 
the exception of the Melayu Raya, all other newspapers complied with 
governmental appeals and avoided polemics in their treatment of the legal 
controversy. Utusan Melayu featured updates on the Maria Hertogh case in its 
front page editorials for more than a week following the riots but maintained, in 
British perspective, ‘objective reporting’. Although the Utusan Melayu editorials 
continually asserted that Muslims had been offended by the Government’s lack of 
reverence for their religion and laws, its politics was focused upon widening the 
differences between the leadership of UMNO and its youth bodies over the 
outbreak of the riots. Dato Onn was the main target of its vilification.151
The British had already anticipated resistance by Melayu Raya but were 
optimistic of a change in attitude arising from recent waves of arrests. In reverse, 
the founders and editors of Melayu were not swayed by the Governor’s appeals. In 
his memoirs entitled Malay Nationalism Before UMNO, Mustapha Hussain 
recounts his meeting with Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy prior to the latter’s arrest. 
Having been appointed as a trusted correspondent and distributor of the 
newspaper, Mustapha appealed for Dr Burhanuddin to steer clear of an impending 
crisis, ‘We should do what Utusan Melayu is doing. Be cautious and not be seen 
to be involved.’ Mustapha alerted Dr Burhanuddin to the presence Special Branch
150 ‘Statement by George G. Thomson, Public Relations Secretary (Singapore), 22nd February, 
1951*, CO 953/10/1, p. 11.
151 Melayu Raya, 21st December, 1950.
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agents in the vicinity of newspaper’s office and the possibility of the Melayu Raya 
being banned in Malaya. The response from Burhanuddin was sharp and decisive: 
‘This is a test of Malay faith.’ The newspaper sustained its polemical stance. 
Mustapha was suspected to be an agent of the police and was abruptly replaced by 
a new correspondent.152 Melayu Raya went on to fuel anti-European sentiments 
and rebuked Muslim leaders for their cowardice. A challenge was posed to the 
Utusan Melayu ‘to keep pace in satisfying the Malay public demand for rumours 
and gossip on the case.’ One of the rumours suggested that premeditated attacks 
would be launched upon Christians during the end of the year Christmas 
celebrations.153 Another letter of reminder was thus sent by the Public Relations 
Secretary to all newspapers to refrain from publishing photographs of Maria 
Hertogh. Informal meetings were also held between British officials and the editor 
of Melayu Raya through the intercession of Dato Onn. Yet all was in vain.154 
Repeated warnings by the Special Branch were ignored and a tough reprisal was 
underway.
Below the surface, it had become clear to the British that Indonesians in 
Singapore was one of the driving forces of the riots, as seen from the hundreds 
who were still in detention. A meeting between the Singapore Governor and the 
Consul-General of Indonesia was held towards the end of December to discuss the 
enforcement of the Aliens’ Ordinance Act of 1940 upon Indonesian residents in
152 Mustapha Hussain, Malay Nationalism Before UMNO: Memoirs o f  Mustapha Hussain (trans.) 
(Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications and Distributors, 2005), pp. 369-370.
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* 15 5Singapore. This meant that all Indonesian nationals would be required to 
register with the police and that they would be compelled to update their 
residential addresses in Singapore on a regular basis. The Consul-General of 
Indonesia welcomed the proposal, as his role was to ‘keep a register of his 
nationals and he thinks that Singapore Government action might save him a 
considerable amount of labour.’156 The Colonial Office was initially positive 
towards this development. Similarly, Malcolm Macdonald felt that the Malays in 
Singapore were likely to be preyed upon if  they were exposed to the ploys of 
radical Indonesian ideologues.157 But the British were faced with strained relations 
with President Sukarno as a result of the Maria Hertogh case, and there were a 
series of administrative difficulties involved in differentiating the ‘Indonesians’ 
from the ‘Malayans’. The proposal was later dropped and never implemented.158
• THE USE AND ABUSE OF LAW
By January 1951, the Riots Investigation Unit had completed its report and 
distributed copies of the document to all leading newspapers in the colony. Such a 
policy of deliberate disclosure was part of British strategy to counter damaging 
rumours that were still in circulation. The CID identified five impulses that had 
resulted to the outbreak of violence, the first of which was the personal aspiration 
of Karim Ghani. This was coupled with Malayan and Indonesian nationalism, 
intertwined with anti-Dutch antagonisms. The next cause identified was local
155 Registration o f  Aliens Ordinance, 1940 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1940).
!56 ‘Franklin Gimson to Djakarta, 30th December, 1950s, CO 537/7302.
157 ‘Extract of Minutes of Malaya/Borneo Governors’ Conference, 15th January, 1952’, CO 
1022/429.
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hooliganism manifested in the form of secret societies. Related to this was the 
involvement of persons belonging to cults which harboured fanatical 
interpretations of Islam that had propelled youths to take up arms in the streets. 
The CID report discounted the role of communists as the prime movers behind the 
riots. Members of the Malayan Communist Party seemed ‘to have been taken by 
surprise. It is possible that MCP elements took the opportunity of staging a small 
number of arson incidents, but if so their share in the whole riot was insignificant. * 
Aside from that, the CID emphasized that the placing of Maria Hertogh in the 
Roman Catholic Convent and the failures of the Malay police had made the 
situation far more dangerous than it would have been otherwise.159 The definite 
facts of the report were that persons who were arrested before 20th December 1950 
had been cross-examined and justice had already been meted out.160 Newspapers 
in the colony were, however, ambivalent towards what was perceived as a shallow 
yet notable effort by the colonial government. The Straits Times praised the CID 
Riot Investigation Unit and the police force in general for their ability to produce a 
report amidst other urgent duties. Nonetheless, the editorial suggested that a more 
comprehensive investigation be conducted ‘for this first effort tells very little and 
answers none of the questions that are being asked.’161
On 8th January 1951, in the midst of continued protests by various 
branches of UMNO in Malaya with regards to the arrest of the six Muslim leaders, 
the Government made a bold move by detaining John Eber, one of the lawyers 
representing Che Aminah.162 He was interned along with Abdul Samad Ismail (the
159 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 19515, CO 537/6797.
160 ‘Extract from PMR No. 12/1950 dated 27/12/1950’, CO 537/7302.
161 The Singapore Free Press, 2nd January, 1951.
162 Majlis, 4th January, 1951.
85
Utusan Melayu Editor), Devan Nair (Union Leader), and thirty other 
undergraduates and teachers for their active involvement in a clandestine group 
called the Anti-British League. The arrests were criticised by leftist-oriented 
activists and Muslim elites in the colony. Rumours had it that Eber and Samad’s 
arrests were linked to their involvement in the Maria Hertogh legal case. The 
British denied these wild speculations and clarified that the movements and 
activities of all those arrested had been monitored for many months and that it had 
been firmly established that they were in cahoots with the Communists.163
This incident was met with riots launched by a crowd of one hundred 
Malays, Indonesians and Pakistanis at the junction of Arab Street and Beach 
Road. A patrol car was attacked and the police opened fire on the rioters, who 
were armed with bottles and stones. By midnight of 10th January 1951, the chaos
1 f\Awas over. One man was severely wounded, and many who had sustained 
injuries were arrested. Several dozens were said to have escaped from police 
action by hiding in nearby houses and shops. The police denied any connection 
between this short episode of violence and the arrests of communists or the Maria 
Hertogh controversy.165 The flood of arrests and raids continued unabated and 
random searchers of suspected mobsters and fanatics became normal occurrences. 
It was reported that fourteen people were detained under the Emergency 
Regulations. A CID spokesman mentioned that twelve among those under police
163 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797, Utusan Melayu, 
9th January, 1951 and Singapore Standard, 9th January, 1951.
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custody were Malays and Indonesians who took part in the December 1950 
.riots.166
To fortify the government’s ability to quell future outbreaks of rioting, the 
Singapore Colonial Secretary announced the amendment of the Emergency 
Regulations during the Legislative Council Meeting on 16th January. The new bill 
stated that island-wide curfews could be imposed by any police division. From the 
experience of the December 1950 riots, it was determined that a more advisable 
move was to apply the curfew throughout the island, especially in the event of 
massive attacks against the civilian population.167 Interestingly, newspaper 
editorials in Singapore refrained from registering their dissent towards the bill. 
Extensive coverage was given to the punishment meted out to rioters who had 
been detained, and such reports are particularly useful in unravelling the identities 
(age, ethnicity and occupations) of what George Rude has described as the ‘faces 
of the crowd’ in the worst days of the Maria Hertogh riots.168 Contrary to British 
suspicions that the rioters were largely criminals from working class backgrounds, 
the trials clearly demonstrated that men of white-collar occupations, and even 
employees of the colonial administration, were an integral part of the mass 
violence that broke out.
The first among the hundreds of men who were convicted was a 24-year- 
old police constable, Yaakob bin Mohamed. Yaakob was initially charged with 
causing hurt and destructive mischief. Two witnesses, who were both police
166 The Singapore Free Press, 11th January, 1951.
167 The Straits Times, 17th January, 1951.
168 George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study o f Popular Disturbances in France and England, 
1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1984).
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detectives, claimed that the Malay constable had stopped their car during the riots 
in search of Europeans and Eurasians. Yaakob was allegedly among the rioters 
who were agitating for violence. Upon rigorous cross-examination, no clear 
evidence of Yaakob’s direct role in an attack upon the two detectives was found. 
The charge was thus amended to involvement in an ‘unlawful assembly’ which 
meant that Yaakob was relieved of his post as a police officer and sentenced to six 
months in prison.169 The policeman’s fate was shared by a Javanese man, 
Senordin bin Ahmad, who was twenty-six years of age. He was charged with 
being a ringleader of an unruly crowd of forty Malays and Indian Muslims. One of 
the men led by Senordin was apprehended during the riots, yet was set free by 
their accomplices, who prevailed over the outnumbered policemen. Senordin was 
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Eight Indonesians who were tried for 
‘unlawful assembly whose object was to cause hurt’ were given a maximum of 
two years’ imprisonment.170 Another group of Malay youths, who had chased and 
injured three European sailors along Tanjong Pagar Road during the riots, were 
given similar sentences. A Malay fireman, Abdul Jabar bin Haji Abdul Rahman, 
who was wearing his uniform whilst setting fire to a car, was to serve seven 
months behind bars. Likewise, an Indian Muslim was sentenced to six months’ 
imprisonment for shouting intimidating slogans and threats at Europeans at North 
Bridge Road.171
The general public was particularly informed of court trials relating to 
Father Octave Dupoirieux of the Cannossa Convent. In his testimony, Father
169 Utusan Melayu, 18th January, 1951.
170 The Straits Times, 20th January, 1951 and ‘Riot Enquiry Commission, Singapore, Summary of 
the Principal Incidents, as Assistant Superintendent o f Police, 11-13 Dec 1950, with 86 
photographs’, Andrew Howat Frew Papers.
171 The Straits Times, 1st-10th February, 1951.
Octave told the District Court that Inspector Bujang bin Tunggal had refused his 
appeal to enter the police station, despite his having been attacked by rioters.172 
Bujang’s defense lawyer argued that the inspector was executing the orders of his 
immediate superior, Inspector Ong, to the effect that he was to refuse to permit the 
entry of civilians into the police station in the wake of mass violence. After a 
protracted legal battle, Bujang was acquitted due to contradictory evidence laid
• 1 *73against him. Another case that gained widespread attention within the Muslim 
community was that of the nephew of Che Zaharah, the president of the Singapore 
Malay Women’s Welfare Association. Zan bin Omar, twenty-years of age, was 
charged with rioting, along with several other Malay youths. Che Zaharah became 
one of the defence witnesses, but for a lost cause. Zan was sentenced to 18 
months’ imprisonment.174
Indeed, ‘justice is in the eyes of the beholder’.175 Concerned lawyers and 
community leaders in Singapore declared that British judges had abused legal 
processes and bent the rules that governed the judiciary. Dozens of witnesses who 
testified against persons who were convicted did not actually appear in court. 
Many had concealed their identities for fear of reprisals.176 To address the abuse 
of colonial laws, the Singapore Muslim League created a panel of Muslim lawyers 
to defend innocent Muslims who had been detained by the police and were 
subsequently charged in court.177 Two court cases that were regarded as abuses of
172 Utusan Melayu, 19th April, 1951,
173 “Bujang bin. Tunggal v, Rex, August 15, 1951”, Malayan Law Journal, 17, (1951), pp. 174-177 
and Utusan Melayu, 16th August, 1951.
174 Straits Times, 29th May, 1951.
175 Elaine Walster and G. William Walster, “Equity and Social Justice”, Journal o f Social Issues, 
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177 ‘Minutes o f Singapore Muslim League Committee Meeting, 8th February, 1951’, Mansoor 
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justice were that of a Malay who was charged with being a ‘Dancing Rioter’. 
Juraimi bin Radzi was purported to have ‘danced wildly’ with a cloth tied round 
his head.178 A former senior assistant of the United States Information Service, 
Mohammed Abdul Samad, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for taking 
part in an unlawful assembly. The Chief Justice, Sir Charles Murray-Aynsley, 
held that Mohammed was ‘a man of some intelligence and education. It was more 
serious for a man of his character to be in an unlawful assembly than it was for an 
ignorant man.’ Mohammed’s lawyer argued that there was a lack of crucial 
evidence to prove that he had harmed anyone. Rather, Mohammed was a mere 
passer-by when the rioting happened. The lawyer chided the Judge’s decision as
• 170‘excessive’. A Baweanese youth, Arshad bin Sinwan, was sentenced to a total 
of five years imprisonment by Justice M. Buttrose for taking part in an unlawful 
assembly that had ravaged a van belonging to a British company.
For many weeks thereafter, reports on the crimes committed and the harsh 
punishments meted out to hundreds of persons who were involved in the 
December 1950 riots were continually published by prominent newspapers on the 
island and aired via radio broadcasts as deterrents against further violent 
behaviour. In general, the charges laid against men of varied occupations, ages 
and ethnic backgrounds could be reduced to several types: ‘Unlawful Assembly’, 
‘Causing Grievous Hurt’, ‘Public Mischief, ‘Robbery’ and ‘House Trespass’, 
Only a handful among those tried was acquitted on grounds of insufficient 
evidence.180
178 The Straits Times, 22th February, 1951.
179 Utusan Melayu, 22nd March, 1951.
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In the intervening time, Gimson’s forbearance towards the Melayu Raya 
had been diminished by the paper’s inflammatory articles. Sensationalised stories 
on the Maria Hertogh case and riots were published repeatedly across its pages, 
and editorial columns called for heightened activism among Muslims in resistance 
to the colonialists and disbelievers. As a matter of fact, Muslim leaders in the 
colony were distraught by the newspaper’s provocative posture. In one of its 
editorials, for example, Melayu Raya avered that the ulama in South Thailand 
referred to the Hertogh case as a test of the Muslims by Allah and an admonition 
that divine laws should be preserved and not taken lightly. The paper also reported 
that the ulama saw the Maria Hertogh controversy as an important moment in 
determining the future course of the Muslim community in Singapore and the 
Federation.181
The coverage given on the statements made by the much-revered ulama in 
South Thailand was regarded by the colonial government as an unambiguous sign 
that the Melayu Raya was fermenting hatred among Muslims in Singapore. On the 
night of 19th January 1951, J.E. Fairbam, an Assistant Superintendent of the 
Special Branch, walked into the office of the Melayu Raya Press to issue an order 
withdrawing the license of not only the newspaper but of the entire publishing 
firm as well. Justifying such a contentious move, the Singapore Colonial Secretary 
invoked the Printing Press Ordinance, which provided him with the jurisdiction to 
withdraw the license of any publishing firm or newspaper that threatened public
181 Melayu Raya, 18th January, 1951.
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peace. The Ordinance permitted the proscribed parties to lodge an appeal with the 
Go vemor-in- Council.182
During an interview with news agencies in Singapore, Mohammed Saleh 
bin Alu (the Secretary of the Melayu Raya Press) mentioned that the publishing 
firm was appalled by the abrupt withdrawal of its license, which was due to expire 
in December 1951. The directors of the Press were undecided on the question of 
lodging an appeal. What was certain was that seventy-five of the finn’s employees 
had now lost their source of livelihood.183 Gimson anticipated a barrage of verbal 
attacks from sympathizers of the Melayu Raya Press. Astonishingly, major 
newspapers in Singapore and Malaya refrained from publishing any commentaries 
on the issue. Newspapers of smaller circulation regarded the closing down of the 
publishing firm as a discriminatory act. The colonial administration attributed 
such benign resistance to the effectiveness of the large-scale arrests, and to the 
influence of several Muslim elites in providing detailed explanations of the 
rationale behind governmental action.184 Even members of the radical Singapore 
Muslim League planned to reinstate Melayu Raya Press’ license only through 
legal means.185
More interestingly, the closure of Melayu Raya Press brought about severe 
criticisms of the Singapore government from British officials in London. It is 
worthwhile here to quote a memorandum from the Colonial Office at length so as 
to illuminate the tensions between the Home Government and Singapore:
182 Utusan Melayu, 20th January, 1951.
183 The Singapore Free Press, 20th January, 1951.
184 ‘Extract from PMR No. 1 dated 31/1/51 \  CO 537/7302.
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The practice adopted in the case of Melayu Raya, a Malay daily, o f withdrawing the 
license of its printing press, is a clumsy one, since a press often publishes more than one 
paper and does a considerable amount o f printing on the side. To close down the press in 
such cases unnecessarily penalizes persons and papers against whom there is no 
complaint. Consideration is therefore being given to enforcing a section o f the Printing 
Presses Ordinance passed pre-war by which individual newspapers and periodicals have 
to obtain permits to publish. It will facilitate control over the press and, as has been 
mentioned above, is part o f our peacetime laws. The Emergency Regulations published 
last year, do not allow action to be taken until the damage has been done; that, as has been 
too tragically proved by the events o f last December, is often too late [italics mine].186
The local government in Singapore responded to this criticism by stressing 
that the Melayu Raya newspaper had inflamed Muslim feelings both before and 
after the riots. Although the newspaper did not engage in acts of sedition that 
could have amounted to contempt of court, it was a major threat to public peace 
and the colonial order. Furthermore, the paper had, on numerous occasions, 
ignored warnings and appeals that were issued by governmental agencies. The 
editors had also been given the privilege to appeal against the withdrawal of the 
firm’s license, but they had not done so.187 To address the Home Government’s 
concerns, Malcolm Macdonald gave specific instructions to British officials in 
Jakarta to emphasise that the Melayu Raya Press had transgressed the laws of the 
colony. British officials were also required to stress that ‘the main reason for the
186 ‘Singapore Political Report for January, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
187 ‘Federation of M alaya- Political Report No. 1 for January 1951’, CO 537/7341.
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attitude taken by the newspaper has been a drive to increase circulation by 
sensationalism, in which they were far from successful.’188
On 16th February, 1951, the Singapore Colonial Secretary proposed a 
motion in the Legislative Council to prolong the period of Emergency. His main 
justification was a decline in the security of the colony as reflected by the arrests 
of subversive elements in schools, cases of arson and, most crucially, crimes 
committed during the riots. The motion was agreed upon without any
* 1RQdissension. The continuation of the period of Emergency meant that large 
numbers of policemen and army officers could be mobilized in the face of any 
perceived threats. Such prerogative was exercised just two weeks later when large 
numbers of uniformed policemen together with a Gurkha squad, were dispatched 
to the Singapore Supreme Court as a precautionary measure in the midst of the 
lawsuit filed by the Melayu Raya Press against the Singapore Colonial Secretary. 
The gallery of the court was packed with directors, employees and sympathisers 
of the Melayu Raya Press. Counsel for the appellant, Nazir Mallal, argued in court 
that the withdrawal of the publishing firm’s license ran contrary to the laws of the 
colony. In an interview with newspaper reporters outside the court’s premises, 
Nazir Mallal remarked that: ‘It is monstrous that an executive officer should have 
the authority, by a stroke of the few [sic], not only to gag a newspaper but to kill it 
outright., .We were under the impression that such things happened only in 
totalitarian states.’190 The case gained much publicity in the days that followed. In 
the last analysis, the court ruled that the paper and its publishing firm were to
188 ‘Commissioner-General in South East Asia, Singapore to Djakarta, 26th January, 1951’, 
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(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. B41.
190 The Straits Times, 27th February, 1951
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cease all forms of publication for ten months. A requirement for its future re­
opening was the sacking of one of its chief editors, Haji Mohd Dahlan bin 
Masod.191
The court’s verdict did not lead to the demise of Melayu Raya's rhetorical 
resistance against British colonial rule. In the same month, one of its directors, 
Amir bin Haji Omar, told an audience in Malacca that Muslim youths in 
Singapore were ready for violence far greater in intensity than the Maria Hertogh 
riots. He appealed for Malays in the Malay Peninsula to support their oppressed 
compatriots in Singapore. The outbreak of a third world war, Amir highlighted, 
was inevitable. This, along with the assistance of Muslim organisations, would 
enable Malays to obtain their independence.192 The British reacted by arresting 
another batch of suspected agitators. Fifteen Malays, seven Indian Muslims and 
one Chinese Muslim were detained under Emergency Regulations.193 In mid-April 
1951, the Singapore Colonial Secretary revealed that another group of 333 persons 
had been detained in connection with the December riots.
In his report to the Prime Minister, Emmanuel Shinwell (British Minister 
of Defence) highlighted that the situation in Singapore and Malaya was far from 
improving.194 British troops and policemen were expected to intensify the 
proscriptions of instigators of violence. At the same time, some disquiet had arisen 
within British circles in regard to the wrongful arrests of suspected criminals.
191 ‘Melayu Press Limited v. W.L. Blythe The Colonial Secretary, March 9, 1951’, The Malayan 
Law Journal, 17, (1951), pp. 88-90.
192 ‘Federation of Malaya -  Political Report No. 3 for March 1951’, CO 537/7341 and ‘Monthly 
Political Intelligence Reports: Federation o f Malaya, March -  April, 1951’, CO 537/7343.
193 ‘Colonial Office -  Malaya -  Period 2nd " 8th March (1951)’, CO 537/7271.
194 ‘Emmanuel Shinwell to Clement Atlee, 28th April, 1951’, CO 537/7263.
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Officials in Singapore and Malaya observed that a significant number of those 
detained under Emergency Regulations were victims of private quarrels, or 
grudges between informants and suspects. Adding to the complications, police 
detectives were reluctant to disclose the names of their informants upon the 
request of the Advisory Committee.195 High-ranking officials in Whitehall were 
perturbed by the issue, viewing it as a source of diplomatic fissure between Britain 
and the colonized peoples in Malaya. Finally, it was decided that:
where a member o f the public volunteered information but was unwilling to make a 
signed statement, the police should forward a report o f their interview with him to die 
Committee and should include in it an account of the circumstances in which words or 
actions reported by him had occurred; and, if  he was unwilling that his identity should be 
disclosed even to die Committee, the police should be prepared themselves to attend 
before the Committee and give evidence o f their knowledge o f the informant and their 
estimate o f the value o f his infonnation. Where information had been supplied by a 
regular police agent whose identity ought not to be disclosed, even to the Committee, his 
name was not mentioned in reports but it was stated how long he had been known to the 
police, whether he had been found reliable in the past, and what were his relations with 
and knowledge of the appellant.196
Towards end of May, the Singapore Government announced that twelve civil 
servants had been detained in connection with the riots. 406 persons who were 
arrested in the aftermath of the December riots had been released, seventy-eight
195 ‘Attomey-General’s Chambers (Kuala Lumpur) to W.L. Dale (Colonial Office), 15* May, 
1951’, CO 537/7281.
196 ‘A.S. Oakley (Home Office) to B.O.B Gidden (Colonial Office), 31st May, 1951’, CO 
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others were convicted and twenty-one acquitted. Most of those who had been 
acquitted were still under detention.197
• TO ERR IS HUMAN, TO FORGIVE DIVINE
The first death sentence for participation in the riots was passed on 15th 
June, 1951. A.K.S. Othman Ghani, an Indian Muslim, was found guilty of the 
murder of an Royal Air Force (RAF) Corporal, Peter Hugh Bell.198 He was 
accused of attacking and setting fire to the soldier at Victoria Street, which led to 
the latter’s death. The defendant’s lawyer, David Marshall, argued in court that his 
client had played no part in the murder.199 Six other Muslim men were condemned 
to death on the following month. Thamby bin Osman, Habee Kassim bin Syed 
Abdul Kader, Tamby bin Sidek, Dawood bin Mohammed, Zainuddin bin Taha 
and Mat Din bin Said were found guilty of the murder of a Warrant Officer, John 
William Davies of the RAF, who originated from Hereford, West England. The 
defendants for this murder were represented by Sandy Pillay, who successfully 
applied for an adjournment of the Appeal hearing to 31 August, 1952.200 Tamby 
bin Osman maintained that he had no role in the murder of John Davies as he was 
not at the scene of the crime.201
Meantime, in an effort to tighten its grip on the press, the Singapore 
Government promulgated a new Emergency Regulation, which, as of 1st August
197 ‘Colonial Office -  Malaya -  Period 18th “ 24th May (1951)’, CO 537/7271 and Proceedings o f  
the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 22nd April, 1951 (Singapore: Government 
Printing Office, 1954), p. B46.
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199 The Straits Times, 15th June, 1951.
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1951, required all newspapers and magazines published in the Colony to obtain a 
permit from the Singapore Colonial Secretary. The new Regulations provided the 
Singapore Colonial Secretary with wider powers to withdraw the permits of all 
sorts of publications without closing the printing presses where the material had 
been printed. Parties who had been proscribed were allowed to appeal to the 
Govemor-in-Council, whose decision was final.202 Arguing in defense of the new 
regulation, British Malaya magazine stated that,
No one likes the powers or the situation which has made them necessary, but they are 
necessary reserve powers against any subversive press which may spring up. Government 
have confidence in the mature Press at present established in Singapore, a great 
international press activity, and hope that the powers will not have to be used and, that if  
they are used, the Press will be convinced of the justice o f the Government action.203
Political activists in the United Kingdom were not persuaded. Rather, the 
regulation was denounced as a strategy concocted to silent dissenting voices 
within the colony. Criticisms and protests were hurled against the colonial 
government by influential newspapers in London, which soon, inflamed the 
sensibilities of the Singapore populace.204 At a Legislative Council meeting, C.J. 
Dasaratha Raj suggested that ‘the new regulations have been motivated purely and 
simply by the greed of the Executive to arrogate to themselves sweeping powers 
over the Press, not out of necessity for public safety, but as a protection against
202 •Proceedings o f the Second Legislative Council Colony o f  Singapore, 17th July, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. B148.
203 British Malaya, September, 1951, p. 318.
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public criticism.’205 As a result of the tough resistance from newspapers and 
community leaders, the Regulation was amended. Printing presses that had been 
proscribed were given the right fo appeal to an Advisory Committee, instead of to 
the Govemor-in-Council. The press in Singapore and London congratulated the 
government for its handling of the matter and for its positive response to 
criticisms of the original Regulations.206
The Singapore police continued to conduct routine checks and raids on 
residences of persons with radical intents, namely Communists and opportunists 
from within the Muslim community. In one successful raid of a Malayan 
Communist Party Communication Centre, evidence was found linking several 
communists to planned assaults upon British servicemen during the December
0 (Y 71950 riots. Another source of unanticipated trouble emerged out of a ploy by 
four Malay prostitutes, who were reportedly Muslims. These prostitutes were 
known to have serviced several men who were working at the Salvation Army 
Home. On one fateful evening, the prostitutes were heard shouting over a wall at 
the Home, appealing to a Malay passerby for help. They claimed to have been 
coerced into attending Christian religious services. The Special Branch reacted 
swiftly. The prostitutes were detained and placed in the custody of the Social 
Welfare Department. They were later transferred to a non-religious reform 
institution to avoid further controversies. The British hastened to seek the 
assistance of members of the Muslim Advisoiy Board, who clarified to the 
Muslim public that the rumours of the forceful conversion of the four prostitutes
205 ‘Colonial Office -  Malaya -  Period 27th July -  2nd August (1951)’, CO 537/7271 and 
Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, ISh September, 1951 
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were untrue.208 Reporting these incidents to James Griffiths, Gimson asserted that 
the ‘possibility of trouble cannot be ignored. In consequence, police and military 
are ready to act at once if  required.’209
Melayu Raya Press regained its license in September, 1951 and resumed 
publication on 11th November of that year. Even so, its popularity as seen during 
the height of the Maria Hertogh legal tussle had waned.210 The paper was also 
faced with serious financial problems, due to the withdrawal of funds by its major 
share holders.211 Fissures had developed among the editors, who disagreed 011 the 
operations of the newspaper. Although intensive efforts were made to regain the 
newspaper’s daily circulation by publishing articles pertaining to Malay 
education, Islamic thought and various social problems that were plaguing the 
Muslim communities in Malaya, the readership had progressively shifted to 
Utusan Melayu, In August 1953, Melayu Raya finally collapsed.212
Towards the end of 1951, Muslims in Singapore combined their energies 
to agitate for the release of Karim Ghani and five others who had been detained 
with him. The services of Ahmad Ibrahim, a renowned social activist and expert 
lawyer, were engaged, and in consequence, two detainees, Darus Shariff and Syed 
Ali Al-Attas were released. Although suffering from tuberculosis, Karim Ghani 
maintained that he had been unjustly detained and thereby refused to present his 
case to the Advisory Committee. Fully informed of the seriousness of his
208 ‘Singapore Political Report for August, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
209 ‘Franklin Gimson to J.D Murray, 31st August, 1951’, FO 371/93117. See also CO 953/10/6.
210 Melayu Raya, 12Ul November, 1951.
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condition, the Singapore Muslim League appealed to the Singapore Colonial 
Secretary to expedite Karim Ghani’s release.213 The British were unsure of the 
political ramifications arising from the League’s appeal. Karim Ghani’s detention 
was extended.
Together with this, Muslim activists in Singapore and Malaya gathered 
signatures for a petition on behalf of the men who were condemned to death. The 
leader of this venture was Tengku Abdul Rahman, who after the fall from favour 
and resignation of Dato Onn on 26th August 1951, had been elected as the second 
President of UMNO. Having given their full support to Dato Onn bin Jaafar, who 
was dubbed by Sir Henry Gurney (the British High Commissioner in Malaya) as 
the ‘hope of the Malayan peoples’, the British were perplexed by the Tengku’s 
political stances and manoeuvres.214 They viewed the forty-eight-year-old Tengku 
as an elusive figure whom, despite his friendly disposition and close relationship 
with several prominent British officials, was pressing for a rapid transfer of power 
to a Malay-led government in Malaya. This was in sharp contrast with the 
straight-talking Dato Omi who advocated a slower movement towards 
independence.215 To Henry Gurney, the Tengku was far from being the ‘sort of 
leader who will be capable of holding UMNO together in any important
916controversy.’ Gurney’s prediction turned out to be far from accurate. 
Determined to protect the rights and interests of the Malays and to gamer support 
for his leadership and party, the Tengku avoided stirring up Muslim feelings 
amidst such heated moments. Instead, he stressed repeatedly that the party should
213 ‘Minutes o f Singapore Muslim League Committee Meeting, 6th December, 1951’, Mansoor 
Adabi Private Papers.
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adopt non-violent means in campaigning for the release of the convicted persons 
and that UMNO members should be ‘friendly with foreigners and not be led away 
by specious arguments.’217 During his visit to Singapore in December 1951, which 
was hosted by the Singapore Branch of UMNO, the Tengku again gave ‘sensible 
advice that they should approach their problems in a constructive spirit and aim at 
improving education as the first step in a constitutional struggle for a proper place 
in the community.’218 By the end of February 1952, the Tengku had obtained 
more than five thousand signatures on a petition against the death sentences and 
for the verdict to be reduced to imprisonment. He had played a decisive role in 
raising funds to aid the condemned men’s dependents, and was also present at 
every court proceeding to show his overt support for those convicted.219
Consequently, Othman Ghani’s death sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment. Tengku Abdul Rahman was proclaimed the Hero of the Malays.220 
Following on to this was the waiving of the death sentences passed upon 
Zainuddin bin Taha and Mat Din bin Said for their part in the murder of John 
Davies. The death sentence was commuted to seven years of rigorous 
imprisonment for charges of rioting. The appeals of four other men were rejected, 
as there was strong evidence of their direct involvement in the murder.221 
Although Malays in Singapore were pleased by such developments, feelings of 
unhappiness were also slowly developing, not due to the Maria Hertogh case, but
217 ‘Extract from PMR, 12/1951’, CO 1022/183.
218 ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report -  15th March-15th April, 1952’, CO 537/7343.
219 ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report -  15th March-15th April, 1952’, CO 537/7343.
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because of their weak economic position and difficult access to employment.222 
Local Indian Muslims reacted otherwise. Rumours were circulated that the British 
were in cahoots with the Dutch, and that there was no longer any justice in
Singapore. The police reacted by issuing warnings to identified rumour-
223mongers.
Karim Ghani was released a month later under Suspension Orders, as the 
British considered him to be inconsequential to the colony’s security. Still, his 
movements were severely restricted.224 In spite of strong appeals and 
encouragement from his supporters to pioneer another newspaper, Karim Ghani 
refused to partake in any forms of activism within Malaya. He expressed his 
decision to live in a sovereign state and continue the struggle for the cause of 
Muslims who were subjected to colonial rule. Accordingly, he was an example of 
many activists in Southeast Asia who had sought to challenge the colonial order 
through constitutional, discursive as well as violent means, and in the process, 
failed to achieve their intended objectives. The last yet significant act of resistance 
Karim Ghani had employed was ‘strategic desertion’ - a planned and conscious 
departure from the arena of contestation to a new site beyond the colonial orbit of 
influence and control. Such a strategy was pursued with the intent of sustaining a 
form of resistance from without 225 Karim Ghani was not the first to have adopted 
the course of strategic desertion as a form of resistance. Merely two years before 
his arrest, some thirty Malays from Singapore and Malaya had fled to Indonesia to
222 ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report -  15th February-15th March, 1952’, CO 
537/7343.
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regroup and pursue their struggle against British colonialists in the wake of the 
Emergency.226 Led by Ibrahim Haji Yaakob, the group of radicals had established 
an organisation named the Panitia Kemerdekaan Malaya (PKM, or the Committee 
for Malayan Independence) whose main objective was to agitate and, if necessary, 
to militate for the creation of an independent Malaya. In the aftermath of the 
Maria Hertogli riots, the organisation sent letters to the British Parliament in 
London urging for the immediate release of Karim Ghani and many others who 
had been detained. To them, the series of arrests of Muslims in Singapore 
represented an infringement of democratic principles and the rights of the Malays 
who were the natives of the island. An appeal was also sent to the United Nations 
and all major Muslim organisations in India, Burma, the Philippines and 
Indonesia, appealing to them to pressure the British against the suppression of 
Muslims in Singapore and mainland Malaya.227
Although bom in India, Karim Ghani’s application for his return to his 
native country was categorically rejected by the state authorities. Politicians and 
activists in Pakistan, on the other hand, welcomed him with open arms, and began 
to prepare for his accommodation and other necessities several months prior to his 
release.228 On 2nd May, 1952, Karim Ghani was escorted by two Pakistani 
representatives to the Singapore airport. A crowd of about seventy supporters, 
consisting mainly of Indians and a small group of Malays, assembled at the airport 
to see their leader for the last time. Speeches were delivered in praise of Karim 
Ghani’s sacrifices and contributions to the Muslim community in Singapore.
226 Gordon Means, Malaysian Politics (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), p. 119.
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There were a few who exploited the occasion to rouse the feelings of the crowd by 
shouting Islamic war cries. Indian Muslims were reported to have made several 
comments which created a limited commotion within the community. The British 
were very much relieved that the voice of Karim Ghani had been muted for many
229years to come.
Karim Ghani’s permanent departure from Singapore was followed by the 
release of Mohamed Taha Kalu, Mohamed Mustaza and Dr. Burhanuddin, upon 
the recommendation of the Advisory Committee. The British foresaw the 
discharge of these men as having ‘a far wider effect’ upon the growing positive 
attitudes among Muslims towards the Government.230 Neither demonstrations nor 
ferment directed against the British were seen when the three Malay personalities 
were greeted by a crowd of supporters. Yet, prayers were offered to the four 
Malays whose appeals for their death sentences to be reprieved had been 
rejected. Tengku Abdul Rahman had collected more than 140,000 signatures 
from UMNO members and 2000 Muslims in Singapore on a petition appealing for 
clemency on the behalf the condemned men.232
Meanwhile, four Malay men who were charged with the murder of Charles 
Joseph Ryan, a non-commissioned RAF officer, were acquitted of their crimes 
due to contradictions in the witnesses’ testimony and the poor visibility at scene in
229 ‘Singapore Political Report for April, 1952’, CO 1022/206; ‘Extract from P.M.R, 5/1952’, CO 
1022/434; ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report -  15th May-15th June, 1952’, CO 
1022/208 and ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report: 15th April -  15th May, 1952’, FO 
371/101224.
230 ‘Federation o f Malaya: Political Report No, 4 for April, 1952’, FO 371/101224.
231 ‘Intelligence Report for Fortnightly ending 16th June, 1952’, CO 1022/206.
232 Melayu Raya, 19th June, 1952 and Singapore Standard, 19th June, 1952.
105
which the murder had taken place. Describing the crucial part he and F.B. Oehlers 
played as attorneys in defending the men, Lee Kuan Yew recalled that:
There was disgust on the faces of the English judge and English prosecutor. I, too, was 
sickened by the result.. ..I had casted doubt on the prosecution’s case and thwarted justice. 
I had no doubt that my four clients did kill Ryan, that they were keyed-up that night and 
would have murdered any white or partly white person who came their way, anyone 
associated with the Christian religion and thus, to them, against Islam. I had no faith in a 
system that allowed the superstition, ignorance, biases, prejudices and fears o f seven 
jurymen to determine guilt or innocence.’233
The long-term effects of Lee Kuan Yew’s discontentment with the legal 
verdict will be elaborated upon in the concluding chapter of this thesis. Suffice it 
to state here that on 22nd July 1952, the newly installed Singapore Governor, John 
F. Nicoll, reprieved Tamby bin Osman, Habee Kassim bin S.A. Kader, Thamby 
bin Sidek and Dawood bin Mohammed who had all been sentenced to death for 
the murder of John W. Davies. Instead, they would serve terms of life 
imprisonment, and would be eligible for early release for good conduct.234 The 
governor’s decision was undoubtedly part of a progressive endeavour to overcome 
the colonial government’s legitimation crisis in the aftermath of the riots. Muslims 
were oveijoyed, and registered their appreciation towards Nicoll’s gesture of 
clemency. The Utusan Melayu and Majlis editorials went as far as commending 
the Governor’s move as ‘wise’ and thanked the Tengku for his efforts in being a 
true leader of the Malays. . Towards the end of the year, UMNO members in
233 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Stoiy: Memoirs o f  Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 
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Selangor sent yet another letter of appeal to Queen Elizabeth II, appealing for the 
shortening of the prison sentences of hundreds of others who had been detained 
during the riots.237 The British responded negatively to the letter and upheld the 
verdicts of the Singapore courts. More importantly, the beginning of the year 1953 
marked the end of the British strategy of proscriptions related to the Maria 
Hertogh case.
• CONCLUSION - ANNUS HORRIBILIS
In conclusion, it was reported that there was more crime and violence in 
Singapore in 1951 than in any year since the restoration of peace and order in 
Singapore in 1947. This, according to the Annual Report o f the Singapore Police 
Force, ‘was almost entirely due to the reaction following upon the riots in 
December 1950 when lawlessness was still high amongst the criminal elements in 
Singapore.’ In other words, 1951 was an annus horribilis (a horrible year) for 
the colonial government. Partly due to the tactics of imposing curfews, raids, 
arrests, and routine checks, as well as the issuing of public warnings, the 
introduction and enforcement of legal regulations and the sentencing of convicted 
criminals, there was a drastic drop in street violence and other criminal activities 
related to the Maria Hertogh controversy in the months that followed. Oddly 
enough, in the process of restoring the security of the colony, the British had 
engaged in the use of coercion and, in many instances, the abuse of their authority. 
They had responded to mass violence by reasserting the ‘claim to the monopoly of
236 Utusan Melayu, 24th July, 1952.
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legitimate physical violence within a certain territory.’239 Still, for the British 
intelligence agencies, statistics were not clear indications that the rage among 
Muslims in Singapore had entirely dissipated. In the next chapter, I will explore 
on the covert role of the Special Branch and other related bodies in teasing out 
fanatical undercurrents that were already rooted and fortified by the outbreak of 
violence.
239 Max Weber, Weber: Political Writings (trans. by Ronald Speirs) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 310-311.
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Muslim demonstrators outside the Supreme Court guarded by scores of policemen 
Source: National Archives of Singapore
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CHAPTER 4 
Surveillance
The outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots revealed, most crucially, the 
entrenched weaknesses of the British intelligence services. The basic assumption 
that all threats emanated from foreign agencies whose sole object was the 
displacement of British colonial rule and that ‘subversive activities were always 
due to outside influence’ was shattered and deemed obsolete, or, at least, 
shallow.240 Rather, the British became certain that the Islamic threat was from 
within as much as it was from without. Militant and radical ideologies and 
movements, the British now believed, were rooted within the Singapore Muslim 
community itself and there was to be no delay in redressing their past oversight. A 
broader and more effective system of espionage was established. Agents and spies 
infiltrated Muslim gatherings of all kinds, and monitored the evolving sentiments 
of all communities on the island. In some cases, however, the concerns and 
anxieties registered in British intelligence reports were driven largely by a 
paranoid sense of magnified dangers, rather than what was real.
This chapter provides a comprehensive account of the mechanics of 
‘surveillance’ as part of the British strategy to anticipate selected forms of 
opposition to colonial rule in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. The French 
philosopher, Michel Foucault, posits that ‘surveillance’ is a vital function of 
modem states, as being ‘the auxiliary of justice in the pursuit of criminals and as
240 Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background (London: Dorothy Crisp, 1946), p. 109.
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an instrument for the political supervision of plots, opposition movements or 
revolts.’241 In connection with this, I will demonstrate that, through the gathering 
of information and the monitoring of situations, the British had exposed crucial 
threats facing the colonial order. Yet, before moving on, it is instructive to point 
out that, although the concept of ‘surveillance’ is inextricably linked to the 
‘proscription’ of the local population, as examined in the previous chapter, there is 
one fundamental difference which necessitates a separate discussion of the two 
spheres.
Unlike proscription, the identification of threats through surveillance did 
not necessarily lead to the arrests of individuals and the outlawing of institutions. 
In his study on the role of intelligence gathering prior to the outbreak of the Maria 
Hertogh riots, Anthony Stockwell noted that ‘intelligence reports did not, after all, 
amount to policy.’ Even so, it is essential to expound upon the role of the 
intelligence services and other related agencies as this provides us with insights 
into how the ‘men on the spot’ made sense of and dealt with the varied forms of 
resistance that confronted them. Indeed, in examining dozens of intelligence 
reports pertaining to Muslim issues and other related affairs in such a tense 
setting, a historian will be enthralled by the intimate details with which day-to-day 
events and conversations were recorded. It reveals, most certainly, that a 
considerable number of the spies and infonners consisted of Muslims from all 
classes and backgrounds.243 More than that, as Khoo Kay Kim has observed, these
241 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison (trans.) (New York: Vintage, 
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reports enable the recovery of voices and discourses of local actors that are often 
muted within the pages of published sources, such as memoirs and newspapers.244 
Intelligence reports are, undoubtedly, partial representations of the realities of the 
day. To address such limitation, I have juxtaposed the reports against a variety of 
other sources in order to reconstruct the context within which the surveillance of 
the local populace had been conducted.
Beyond that, insights into various developments in Malaya, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, and the Netherlands will be provided in so far as they affected the 
security of Singapore. From the perspective of the intelligence services, the 
epicentre of Muslim discontent resided in the colony, which called for a more 
widespread and intense surveillance. Though important and not to be neglected, 
developments in other territories were however looked upon as seemingly less 
dangerous due to their geographical distance. Indeed, one of the decisive measures 
that had been undertaken by the British was to harness the support of native 
collaborators in these territories who sought to exercise restraint upon the masses. 
The British Foreign Office in London had also instructed ambassadors in major 
Muslim countries, namely in cities such as Jakarta, Karachi, Cairo, Baghdad, 
Tehran, Jeddah, Damascus and Amman to provide updates on ‘any agitation about 
this case [Maria Hertogh] which comes to your or their notice, and of any special 
angle which is being exploited and is likely to be exploited further...’245 The 
international context had a strong bearing upon the course of events in Singapore,
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and it was of paramount importance, therefore, that potential threats in these 
countries were detected at the very early stages. Crucial information that was sent 
to London would immediately be relayed to Singapore.
• MOMENTS OF ANXIETY
British intelligence services in Singapore and Malaya were on high alert 
for several fundamental developments that had been identified as serious threats to 
the security of the colony in the last days of December 1950. It was observed that 
misunderstandings and ignorance pervaded the minds of the general public. A 
majority were still poorly informed of essential facts pertaining to the legal 
dispute over the custody of Maria Hertogh, the reasons for the dissolution of the 
girl’s marriage with Mansoor Adabi, and the circumstances that led to the 
confinement of Maria Hertogh in a Catholic Convent. The prevailing notion held 
by the Muslim masses was that the government was responsible for such unwise 
decisions. Another issue of contention was the arrest of Karim Ghani and the other 
members of his Nadra Action Committee.246
Then, there was also the plausible fear of communist exploitation of the 
case through subversive methods. Muslim members of the security forces in 
Malaya were reported to be troubled by their commitment to defend the polity 
against the communists after having witnessed the unfair treatment of their co­
religionists. The communists, predictably, capitalised on this state of affairs by 
attempting to widen the split between the Christians and the Muslims. The
246 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797.
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communist reaction was ‘one of glee that they have at last found seeds for 
dissension between the British and the Muslims.’247
On 13th December 1950, a group of communists distributed two 
propaganda pamphlets in Romanised Malay, English and Chinese, highlighting 
jaundiced British policies towards the local population. Entitled ‘Seruan Rakyat’, 
the communists agitated for the transformation of the Nadra case from a mere 
religious struggle to a political one, led by a party capable of fighting for the 
people. Two weeks later, an English edition of the ‘Freedom News’ was 
circulated, with an article entitled ‘Develop the fight against the Nadra decision 
into a wide struggle against the British Imperialists!’ There were also posters seen 
in public places in Singapore which called for all races in Singapore to coalesce 
against the colonialists. The British initially suspected that Chinese students with 
leftist leanings were responsible for these productions. There were questions about 
whether or not the Central Command of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 
could have been the mastermind.248 As the Special Branch stepped up its raids 
upon various communist cells, it was found that the MCP was indeed the 
publisher and distributor of posters intended to entice Muslims and members of 
other communities to join an armed struggle with the ‘Anti-British Liberation 
Army.’249 Such propaganda spilled over to the Peninsula in a drive to incite 
Muslim rage.250
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The next threat to security was a looming possibility that relations with 
Indonesians within and outside the colony would further deteriorate. From the 
perspective of the British intelligence agencies, such volatile relations would 
accentuate anti-Dutch and anti-British propaganda, which would then influence 
the perceptions of Muslims in Singapore towards the colonial administration. This 
sense of anxiety was not unfounded. On 14th December 1950, a day after the 
quelling of the riots, several prominent Muslims in Indonesia established a 
provisional committee in defence of the marriage between Mansoor Adabi and 
Maria Hertogh. The committee authorised two renowned laywers, Dr. Datuk 
Djamin and D. Sujudi, to study the British court’s verdict in preparation for the 
pursuit of a legal case. Telegrams were also sent to Dato Onn reminding him of 
his duty to defend Mansoor Adabi. Members of the committee planned to launch 
protests against what was seen as an insult to Islam.251 Writing in a widely 
distributed daily newspaper, Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (or Hamka), a 
well-respected Muslim scholar and the leader of Muhammadiyah (one of 
Indonesia’s largest Muslim movements), remarked that the placing of Maria 
Hertogh in a Catholic Convent was a clear sign of Western religious fanaticism. 
Muslims, according to Hamka, had remained submissive towards the oppressive 
measures undertaken by the British in the midst of the Malayan Emergency. In 
spite of that, as seen in the riots and other forms of resistance that would soon 
follow, their will to protect their religious beliefs should not be under­
estimated.252 Hamka’s polemics was complemented by resolutions passed by a 
newly established women’s organisation, the Front Wanita Indonesia (Indonesia 
Women’s Front). The organisation condemned the British for insulting Islam and
251 Antara, 14th December, 1950.
252 Pedoman, 20th December, 1950.
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expressed sympathy towards Maria Hertogh, Mansoor Adabi and Muslims in 
Singapore who were struggling for their religious rights. Representatives of Front 
Wanita Indonesia urged Indonesian Muslims to give their fullest support towards 
regaining Maria Hertogh to Islam and to the fold of her husband.253
Hitherto, foremost in the British intelligence agencies’ list of concerns was 
the heightened activism of Muslims in Singapore in the aftermath of the riots. 
Distrust between Muslims and the British government had become so deeply 
entrenched that ‘there is no prospect of any solution acceptable to the Muslim 
community. Even the moderate religious leaders, and the leaders of the Muslim 
communities have only told their adherents to “ wait and see’ the result of the 
appeals. No Muslim leader has yet indicated publicly that if the final decision goes 
against them it should be peacefully accepted.’254 As a result, Malay detectives 
were deployed to keep a watchful eye on all fonns of antagonism. The Special 
Branch was especially concerned with the Southeast Asia Muslim Missionary 
Conference organized by Jamiyah.
From the 24th to the 25th of December 1950, the Victoria Theatre in 
Singapore was packed with delegates from the Philippines, Perak, Kedah, Kinta, 
Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Perlis and Selangor as well as UMNO representatives 
from various parts of Malaya. Dozens of prominent Muslim and Christian leaders 
from Singapore were also present as observers. Indonesian Muslims were reported 
to have expressed their readiness to send their representatives, but such plans were 
later shelved. The Conference had actually been scheduled for an earlier date, but
253 Antara, 23rd December, 1950.
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was postponed due to the lack of funding and the poor response from Muslim 
organisations in the region.255 The violence that had taken place in the colony 
delayed the event further. Even so, key personalities, such as Maulana Abdul 
Aleem Siddique and Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff, who were deeply engaged in calming 
Muslims during the riots, ensured that the event which they had been planning for 
many months was finally held.
The aims of the Conference were essentially three-fold. The first was to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of Muslim missionary activities in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in territories where Muslim minorities were faced with state 
intrusions upon their religious rights. In relation to this, the organizers hoped to 
establish a coordinated network of missionary activities under the umbrella of 
Jamiyah. Secondly, the Conference sought to address the threats posed by 
Christian missionary activities in Southeast Asia. This was a problem that had 
been repeatedly raised by a Singapore-based journal, The Muslim World. In one of 
its earlier issues, the journal had criticized the underhanded methods of Christian 
missionaries in offering material gifts to proselytise Malays.256 It was thus not 
incidental that the 25th of December (Christmas Day), was chosen as one of the 
days of the Conference. Last of all, the Conference organisers hoped to obtain the 
support of the participants towards the establishment of a Muslim Theological 
University in Southeast Asia.257
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Informed of the Conference’s aims and objectives since its planning 
stages, British intelligence was predictably nervous about stray comments and 
public statements related to the Maria Hertogh incident. Their worst fears were, of 
course, met. In his keynote address, Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddique expressed 
regret about the absence of important delegates from various parts of Southeast 
Asia. A significant case in point was the last minute cancellation of the arrival of 
representatives of Masyumi (Indonesia’s largest Muslim political party) in view of 
the recent disturbances in Singapore.258 The Maulana emphasized that, since 
Islamic laws were divine and comprehensive, they did not need any fundamental 
reforms. It was obligatory for Muslims to sacrifice their lives, property and 
children to uphold Divine laws. The Maulana went on to elaborate on how 
Muslims in various parts of the world were oppressed by secular regimes, subtly 
referring to the state of affairs in Singapore. Muslims, he argued, had for many 
years been denied of proper education, yet still remained a powerful force to be 
reckoned with. Realising this, the enemies of Islam had devised manifold schemes 
to destroy Islam from without, but their efforts had failed. They then attempted to 
destroy Muslim unity from within. A stark example, said the Maulana, was the 
case of the Turkish people who had placed nationalism above their faith, leading 
to a progressive dismantling of their traditions. The Maulana further reiterated the 
rhetoric of Muslim revivalists who called for the restoration of the internationalist 
nature of Islam and universal Muslim brotherhood. Muslims were expected to 
show respect to all other religious beliefs and, in the process, demand due respect 
from them. Alluding to the British, he forcefully asserted that democratic 
governments should not, in any way, compel Muslims to act in ways contrary to
258 SeeAntara 2lldand 9th December, 1950.
118
their beliefs. He urged Muslim missionaries who were present at the Conference 
to view the world as their stage and to place upon their shoulders the 
responsibility of working towards the betterment of mankind. Muslim 
missionaries should be well-prepared to be dispatched to all comers of the globe 
in order to admonish Muslims of their neglected religion, and to convert non- 
Muslims. The Maulana further informed the audience that committees had been 
formed to discuss ways to improve Muslim education, missionary work, and 
funding for missionary efforts, as well as to enact measures towards the 
preservation of Islamic laws in Southeast Asia. He appealed for the support of all 
delegates for the fonnation of a unified Muslim body in the region.259 The 
conference ended with the passing of nine resolutions. The Maulana closed the 
session by appealing to Muslims to contribute to the Nadra fund to secure the best 
legal aid possible. A prayer was read with the hope that Maria Hertogh would 
hold fast to Islamic beliefs.260
Muslims in Singapore were unimpressed with the objectives and intended 
resolutions of the conference. Echoing the views of a selected segment of the 
community, the Melayu Raya editorial contended that the aims of Conference 
were grandiose and impractical. Moreover, most of the delegates were not 
respected Islamic scholars from the region. The editorial caricatured Maulana 
Abdul Aleem’s speech as lofty rhetoric that fell short of addressing the real 
problems faced by Muslims in Southeast Asia 261 Utusan Melayu concurred with 
Melayu Raya’s viewpoints, but gave more emphasis to the presence of spies at the
259 Ahmad and Wanjor, Report o f the Southeast Asia Muslim Missionajy Conference, pp. 14-24. 
See also, The Singapore Free Press, 26th December, 1950 and Straits Echo, 27th December, 1950.
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Conference. The number of Special Branch officers, according to Utusan Melayu, 
was ‘extraordinary’ and as such was a direct encroachment upon the civil liberties 
of Muslims.262 Seen from the perspective of the British intelligence agencies, the 
event ‘has certainly served to give greater solidarity to Muslim opinion.’263
The day after the conference, a Eurasian who had shot and wounded two 
Malays during the riots was released from detention. Henry L. Velge was an 
officer in the Singapore Volunteer Corps (S.V.C.) and a member of the Special 
Constabulary. His release from all legal charges heightened public antipathy 
towards the British judicial system. The British anticipated vengeful attempts 
upon Velge. To the contrary, Velge was left unharmed as the news of his release 
was kept from the general public and a small circle of Muslims within 
Singapore.264 Much of the public attention was directed towards campaigning for 
the release of six Muslim activists who were arrested via Detention Orders on 
18th December 1950.
Meanwhile, British agents kept a close watch on the formation of several 
Muslim-based committees. On 20th December 1950, the day after the detention of 
Karim Ghani, an action committee was founded by Jamiyah to provide legal aid to 
the detainees and to supply them with books, periodicals and other necessities. 
The committee’s first course of action was to issue a press statement highlighting 
governmental violation of basic human rights, asserting that if the arrest of Karim
262 Utusan Melayu, 26lh December, 1950.
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Ghani and five other men ‘was a precautionary measure, as tranquillity and order 
is restored in the city, their early release should now take effect. In any case, if 
their detention is to be prolonged, they should be given chances to represent their 
case to the Advisory Committee set up under the Emergency Regulation,’266 The 
committee was classified as a minor threat by the British intelligence. It was 
perceived as a mere ‘face-saving manoeuvre’ to appease the Muslim public and a 
platform to offer legal advice in accordance to the laws of the colony.267 Another 
committee that was scrutinized was the Nadra Appeal Committee. Formed by the 
Singapore Muslim League, its chief objective was to centralise and distribute 
monetary aid from Muslims locally and globally. More than $20,000 was raised 
by the end of 1950. A large amount of the money came from Muslims within the 
rank and file of the Malay Regiment, the Special Constabulary and various 
departments of the Civil Service in Malaya.268
Members of the Singapore Muslim League went beyond the mere 
collection of funds. To step up their opposition to British arrests of respected 
Muslim leaders, Karim Ghani was elected as the organisation’s Patron at an 
Annual General Meeting which was held on the 28th January 1951. The election of 
Karim Ghani was proposed by Hussain Mohammed Khan of the Muslim 
Publishing House and seconded by Mohammed Sulaiman, who was working as a 
broker. Attended by sixty-five persons, a majority of whom were of South Indian 
Muslim origin, the meeting was delayed for some few hours due to the absence of 
a substantial number of members who neither supported nor opposed the election
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of Karim Ghani. A possible explanation for their non-attendance was the fear of 
being placed under detention by the British. ‘Extremist elements’, as a British 
intelligence report put it, ‘dominated the meeting. They rebuked the previous 
committee for its cowardly approaches in agitating the release of Karim Ghani and 
five others who had been detained.’ Although he disagreed with the criticisms 
launched by the ‘extremists’, M.J. Namazie did not explicitly express his opinions 
during meeting, for that would have led to his defeat in the struggle for the 
presidency of the organisation.269
Namazie’s strategy turned out to be successful, and he was eventually 
elected as the new President 270 In an interview with Special Branch officers, 
Namazie explained that the election of Karim Ghani as the patron was not 
representative of the views of the majority. Three key personalities, Sardon Jubir, 
J.M Jumabhoy and Adam Haji Ibrahim were elected as Executive Committee 
members, yet were absent during the meeting. Furthermore, the position that had 
been created was a symbolic gesture in view of Karim Ghani’s role as a founder 
member of the League. Although the British were relieved that Muslims whom 
they regarded as ‘moderate’ had prevailed during the elections, the incorporation 
of new members such as Mansoor Adabi and the resolutions that were passed to 
assist the Melayu Raya Press in regaining its printing license were bound to have 
political implications 271
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• A YEAR OF HIGH DRAMA
1951 was a year of high drama for the British intelligence services as well 
as the Colonial and Foreign Offices. They were on the alert for potentially 
dangerous developments in Singapore, which the Australian High Commissioner 
described as being in ‘an atmosphere of tension.’272 Adverse statements were 
expected from state authorities and Muslim organisations in Cairo that would 
bring about hostile reactions from other Muslim majority countries. Much to the 
relief of the British, the leaders of Arab countries refrained from expressing any 
views related to the Maria Hertogh case.273 The reactions of Muslims in South and 
Southeast Asia were quite different which, in effect, threatened Singapore’s 
security.
In Kelantan, the voices that appealed for moderation were drowned out by 
a rapid escalation of anti-British feelings. Such sentiments were amplified by two 
radical groups.274 The first was a band of twenty young men in Kota Bahru who 
adopted the title Nikat (a Malay word which means ‘to engage in acts regardless 
of expected consequences’). Commanded by Ismail bin Mohamed Salleh, a clerk 
at a local hospital, the group’s objective was to kill selected Europeans who were 
involved in the Maria Hertogh case. Its supporters and sympathizers numbered 
eighty in all, one of the most prominent being Mustapha bin Mahmood, who was 
the brother-in-law of the Chief Minister of Kelantan. Another radical group 
originated from a small school outside Kota Bahru. A large number of its 
members were religious teachers and students who were financed by influential
272 ‘Annual Report for British Territories in South East Asia for the year 1951’, A4231.
273 ‘From Cairo to Foreign Office, 8th January, 1951’, FO 371/93114.
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families within the state hierarchy. The main aim of this collective was to 
indoctrinate Malays in the nearby villages against British rule, which they regard 
as hostile to Islam. None of these groups had initiated any forms of violent acts, 
but their potency was not to be underestimated. The same degree of hostility 
towards the British was observed in Johore, and it was anticipated that such 
resentments would spill over to Singapore.275
British High Commissioner for Malaya, Henry Gumey, was informed of 
the conversion of two Malay blind children to the Christian faith in Penang. A 
precautionary note was sent by Dato Omi alerting the High Commissioner that the 
incident ‘would arise [szc] more feeling than even the Nadra case and would be 
more difficult to handle, as there seemed to be no answer.’276 However, departing 
from the radicals in other parts of Malaya, Muslims in Penang came in aid of the 
British in allaying suspicions and unhappiness among those who had been 
informed of the conversions of the two children. In a widely publicised 
declaration, Muslim elites in Penang appealed to their brethren in Malaya and 
Singapore to work towards the re-establishment of peace and harmony with other 
races. At the same, they registered their despair over the arrest of Karim Ghani, 
and contributed large amounts of money to the Singapore Muslim League for 
legal expenses during the appeal trial,277
Together with these developments, public statements and protests by 
Muslims from other outlying Muslim countries were heightening emotions in
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Singapore. During his meeting with the British ambassador in Jakarta, President 
Sukarno referred to the Maria Hertogh case ‘as another serious political blunder of 
the West.’ Muslims all over the world, the President maintained,
....regarded the marriage as a valid Moslem marriage which civil law could not in their
conviction invalidate. The Court’s riding roughshod over deep religious convictions had
spread resentment throughout the Moslem world. This could not be dispelled by purely
legalistic explanation and he feared that there might be unfortunate and far-reaching
278political consequences for Britain. He greatly regretted that this should be so.
A number of non-govemmental organisations and newspapers in Indonesia 
expressed strong and indignant views on the legal case and the riots. The Moslem 
Propagandist Front in Jakarta alleged that the Maria Hertogh legal controversy 
had brought about a widening ‘gulf between the East and West’ and urged 
Muslims to be mindful of the urgent need to defend their religion.279 This stance 
was supported by radical youth movements which were bent upon forwarding 
their grievances about Britain’s suppression of nationalist movements to the 
United Nations. Another committee was formed to pursue an appeal in an 
international court of law. Indonesia Raya, an influential newspaper which was 
circulated in several Indonesian provinces, severely criticized the arrests of 
Muslims in Singapore and urged their immediate release. Other Muslim activists 
staged several anti-colonial protests at public places.281
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Similarly, the President of the All-Malaya Students Association in Mecca 
sent a letter of protest against the British handling of the legal case and their 
repressive measures against Muslims. The letter was published in Malay 
newspapers in Singapore. Several hundred copies were reported to have been sent 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and selected religious and political 
leaders in Indonesia, the Middle East and South Asia.282 Malay students in 
London established a ‘Bertha Hertogh Committee’ to win support for the appeal 
case in April and to agitate for an inquiry into conflicts between Islamic and 
secular laws. In Pakistan, all attempts by the government to mitigate the 
manufacturing of false news by the press proved to be counter-productive.284 A 
populist organisation in the country, Motamer-e-Alem-e-Elami, launched a protest 
against British handling of the legal proceedings and the arrest of Karim Ghani, 
who was to have led the Singapore delegation to the World Muslim Conference in 
Karachi. The organisation depicted British policies as yet ‘another example of 
aggression of white people and of their interference with other religions.’285
Gimson initially held that the World Muslim Conference lacked the 
support of the Pakistani government, and therefore should not be regarded as a 
major threat. The event would provide an opportunity for the British Home 
Government to obtain the cooperation of the Pakistani authorities in clarifying the 
proper facts of the Maria Hertogh legal case. Conversely, Malcolm Macdonald 
perceived the Conference as a diplomatic threat, seeing that Muslim leaders who
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were vehemently anti-European had been invited to the event. As a proactive 
measure, he suggested that representatives from the Colonial Office be despatched 
to the Conference in order to present the Maria Hertogh case ‘in its true light and 
make comments which would have a calming influence on Muslims in Malaya 
and elsewhere.’286 Plans were thus crafted for an Information Secretary, Mr 
Crichton, to be in Karachi for a few days before and during the conference. He 
was to be briefed about all facts and misperceptions among Muslims in Singapore. 
Part of his task was to send daily reports of the proceedings of the conference and 
other discussions that were conducted informally 287
It was a disquieting period for British officials in Singapore and in Britain. 
Prospective World Muslim Conference representatives from Singapore were 
closely watched. Towards the end of January, British intelligence services were 
informed of two nominees, the first being Mohammed Khan (the President of the 
Young Men’s Muslim Association) who was described as a writer of ‘an 
inflammatory article’ in a banned newspaper, Melayu Raya.2*8 The other person 
identified was Syed Abdullah bin Yahya (President of the Arab Union) who had 
made prior arrangements to leave Singapore by plane on 7th February, 195 1 289 
Fully aware of the Special Branch’s heightened role within the realm of Muslim 
affairs in Singapore, Bashir Mallal (the Secretary of the Muslim League) assured 
the British government that the two men would abstain from initiating any 
discussions that were deemed to be controversial by the colonial government. All
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opinions expressed by both men were based on their personal views, rather than 
the official views of any Muslim organisation in Singapore.290 Syed Ibrahim 
Alsagoff and a Chinese Muslim, Haji Ibrahim, were also expected to be in 
Karachi to attend the Conference.291 Franklin Gimson, who had many past 
dealings with Syed Ibrahim, viewed him as rather ‘conservative’ but ‘helpful’ in 
explaining the true facts of the Maria Hertogh controversy.292
From 9th to 12th February 1951, the Muslim World Conference proceeded 
as planned with informal sessions held by Muslim leaders of varied nationalities 
and affiliations. News agencies from European and non-European countries 
covered the event and published day-by-day comments made by the attendees. 
Even Ahmadis and Shi’ite delegates, who were regarded by the Sunni majority as 
heterodox, were given the opportunity to air their views on the creation of a united 
Muslim front. Towards the end of the conference, a consensus was reached to the 
effect that the Muslim world should be a third and unified coalition in the face of 
the dominance of the Communist and Capitalist blocs. Several resolutions were 
passed:
(1) That an act of aggression against one Muslim Country should be considered an act of  
aggression against all. (2) That Muslim peoples and Governments should unite to defend 
their tenets, peoples, holy places, and lands. (3) That Arabic be made lingua franca of 
Muslim countries, without prejudice to local languages. (4) That support be given to the 
stand taken by Muslims on Palestine for safeguarding their rights and launching a full 
struggle to meet the aggressor. (5) That Muslim governments be urged to direct their
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representatives at the United Nations to support the cause o f the people o f Kashmir, 
whose ties with the people of Pakistan no power on earth can break, (6) That the Security 
Council should take action over India’s aggression, looting, and genocide in Hyderabad 
and Junagadh,. and take steps to permit the holding of plebiscites in those territories. (7) 
That support be given to the demand of the people of the Nile Valley for the unity o f the 
Valley and the withdrawal o f the British troops of Sudan and the Suez Canal. (8) That the 
sufferings o f the Muslims in Yugoslavia represent a violation of the principles o f freedom 
and humanity.293
British officials in Singapore and London were informed that the ‘Karachi 
World Muslim Conference passed off smoothly without any reference to the Riots 
or the Hertogh case.’294 The Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Singapore 
authorities were relieved but puzzled by the apparently deliberate omission of the 
Maria Hertogh case in the Conference’s resolutions. The following report 
describes vividly the views of the British Foreign Office:
The Conference surprisingly, avoided another controversial subject, the Bertha Hertogh 
case, which might have aroused the spirit o f Islamic fanaticism if  it had been ventilated. It 
has been expected that the subject would be debated, especially as one o f the prospective 
delegates from Malaya, Karim Ghani, had appointed the girl’s “husband” as his private 
secretary for the Conference. The reason for the omission is not known, but the fact that 
Karim Ghani was unable to attend the Conference owing to his detention in Singapore 
following the riots o f December 1950, may have affected the matter. The omission of the 
Bertha Hertogh case is more surprising in view of the anti-Western tendencies of some of 
the participants o f the Conference.295
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In an interview upon landing at the Singapore airport, Syed Ibrahim 
Alsagoff disclosed that ‘though delegates, in their talks with him, had expressed 
sympathy with the views of responsible Muslims in Singapore, they had no wish 
to make the subject a matter for discussion.’296 The unexpected outcome of the 
Conference was followed by yet another positive development for the British. 
Sultan Abu Bakar of Pahang revealed his plans to organise visits and discussions 
with several influential Muslims in Singapore. He hoped to enjoin patience and 
self-restraint, as well as to advocate that the Maria Hertogh legal controversy 
should not be viewed as a religious issue 297
• MANSOOR ADABI AND THE APPEAL COURT CASE
In concert with its monitoring of the World Muslim Conference in 
Karachi, British intelligence was closely following the developments leading to 
the appeal court case in April. The appeal was lodged by Mansoor Adabi against 
the decision of Justice Brown on 2nd December 1950, which had infuriated and 
provoked Muslims in the Singapore to engage in street demonstrations. The 
appellants contended that the Lower Court had no jurisdiction to declare marriage 
between Mansoor Adabi and Maria to be illegal and void. Secondly, it was argued 
that Maria Hertogh had accepted Islam out of personal choice and conviction. 
Seen in that light, her marriage to Mansoor Adabi was to be deemed valid.298
296 The Straits Times, 16th February, 1951
297 ‘Extract from PMR 2/1951’, CO 537/7302.
298 See “In re Maria Huberdina Hertogh; Inche Mansoor Adabi v. Adrianus Petrus Hertogh and 
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Anxious about a recurrence of mass violence in the event of the appellants’ 
defeat in the trial, the British sought the help of pro-British Muslim leaders. Secret 
meetings were organised ‘to induce Adabi the husband of Maria to dissolve his 
marriage in accordance with the law of Islam.’299 Evidently, the British has ceased 
to be a neutral party between the Dutch and Muslims in the whole fiasco. Still, 
Mansoor Adabi was not deterred from pursuing the appeal in the Singapore High 
Court. The Special Branch tracked him during his visit to Kelantan, fearing that he 
would seek the support of Muslim elites in that state. Their suspicions proved to 
be incorrect. He was merely escorting Che Aminah who had familial ties with the 
Sultan of Kelantan.300 Mansoor Adabi himself was not unaware that he was the 
subject of British intelligence operations.301 He was, however, determined to 
secure mass support and apply political pressure upon the British government 
during the appeal case. Nomination Day for new members of the Singapore 
Legislative Council on 8th March 1951 provided an excellent opportunity to 
pursue his aims.
The inclusion of additional non-European members in the second 
Singapore Legislative Council in 1951 was, in part, a subtle and planned strategy 
by the British to orchestrate the movement towards providing the locals with the 
responsibilities of managing the state. Nevertheless, a majority of those entitled to 
vote were sceptical towards what were seen as hypocritical gestures of the 
colonial state. ‘Apathy, rather than violence,’ wrote an Australian official who 
was based in Singapore, was ‘the prevailing atmosphere of the elections.’302 No
299 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 1st February, 1951’, FO 371/93116.
300 ‘Extract from PMR 2/1951’, CO 537/7302.
301 Melayu Raya, 3rd January, 1951.
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candidate from the Malay community took part in the elections, and such 
deliberate non-participation could be read as a form of passive and everyday 
resistance against the colonial regime.303 To a limited extent, Muslims in 
Singapore were represented by Indian Muslims such as Nazir Mallal and M.J. 
Namazie. Although the Indians were one of the smallest ethnic groupings on the 
island, they constituted more than half the total number of candidates. Contrary to 
British expectations, the texture of political parties in Singapore was non- 
communal. The Progressive Party and the Labour Front were notable examples of 
parties that sought to gain the popular votes by embracing a multi-racial 
outlook.304
Moments before the registration of candidates was closed, Mansoor Adabi 
enrolled himself as an Independent. The Special Branch was caught unawares 
which exhibits how comprehensive measures by any intelligence services are not 
at all fool-proof. ‘[Intelligence failures’, Richard K. Betts argues, ‘are not only 
inevitable, they are natural.’305 Muslim leaders, probably through the last minute 
plea of British officials, urged Mansoor Adabi to withdraw his candidature. After 
much persuasion, Mansoor Adabi relented and withdrew his name a mere five 
minutes before the list of candidates for the elections was formalised. When asked 
by bewildered reporters about his sudden change of heart, Mansoor Adabi 
explained that it was due to ‘complications I cannot disclose.’306 A British
303 See James C. Scott, Weapons o f  the Weak: Eveiyday Forms o f  Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) for a discussion o f passive strategies adopted by ordinary 
people against state dominance.
304 Ampalavanar, The Indian Minority and Political Change in Malaya, p. 122. See also 
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305 Quoted in Micheal Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 223-224.
306 ‘Singapore Political Report for March, 1951’, CO 537/7341 and ‘William A. Langdon to 
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political report noted that Mansoor Adabi’s ‘blood-stained cause celebre* would 
not have made for a peaceful election with his Appeal case pending.’307
Another personality that came under the close scrutiny of the British 
intelligence for his participation as an Independent in the Legislative Council 
Election was M.A. Majid (President of The Muslim Welfare Association). A 
union activist and a co-founder of the Labour Party, Majid was a well-respected 
figure within the Muslim community due to his involvement in ensuring legal 
assistance for Che Aminah. He was later responsible for arranging the marriage 
between Mansoor Adabi and Maria Hertogh. In the weeks leading up to the 
Nomination Day, Majid appealed for Muslims in the colony to vote for him as 
part of the ongoing straggle for Maria Hertogh. But the tactic proved ineffective. 
He received a meagre ninety-five votes which constituted only four per cent of his 
constituency. Upon forfeiting his deposit, the British were convinced that Majid 
was no longer influential.308 To ensure that Malays in Singapore were still 
represented, the Singapore Governor nominated Ahmad Ibrahim, the legal 
representative for Mansoor Adabi, as an unofficial member of the Legislative 
Council.309
As the appeal court case drew near, key Muslim elites, who were 
concerned with the growing antipathy towards the colonial administration, 
requested Muslims in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya to maintain a calm 
attitude and to trust their leaders with the duty of ensuring that a fair judgement be
307 ‘Appendix A: Report on Singapore Legislative Council’s Election, April 10th, 1951’, CO 
537/7341.
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obtained. Nonetheless, radical elements within the Muslim community were 
opposed to all attempts to bring about a rapprochement. They viewed the appeal 
proceedings as a means to mobilize the masses towards the resort to violence. 
There was also a growing suspicion among politically inclined Muslims that the 
government was progressively asserting its influence upon the legislative 
process.310
Sir Roland Braddell, a famous British lawyer in Malaya, along with Nazir 
Mallal and Ahmad Ibrahim, represented the appellants. Towards the end of 
March, Braddell informed the other legal representatives of his inability to depart 
from England due to ill-health. The earliest possible date of his arrival to 
Singapore was in early May. Reluctant to be deprived of his services, the 
appellants sought an adjournment of the appeal. But the request was categorically 
opposed by the Dutch solicitors for the respondents. Members of the quasi- 
govemmental Muslim Advisory Board were manifestly distressed. Things came to 
a head when M.J. Namazie crafted a press release accusing the Dutch and the 
British of harbouring prejudices against Muslims. The letter was subsequently 
sent to numerous newspapers in the colony but was intercepted by the Special 
Branch following a tip off. Gimson regarded it ‘as likely to endanger the 
maintenance of law and order and possibly provoke attacks on Dutch and other 
Europeans.’311 Acting upon the advice of the Attorney-General, the Public 
Relations Secretary warned newspaper editors in Singapore that any publication of 
the press release, or even a slight reference to the document, would lead to their
310 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation o f Malaya, April-May’, CO 537/7343.
311 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 16th April, 1951’, FO 371/93116.
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prosecution for contempt of court.312 The Colonial Office in London was taken 
aback by Namazie’s radical streak, as he had ‘throughout these proceedings, taken 
a helpful and conciliatory line, should have not been guilty of such act of 
provocation and folly. ’ A copy of the press release was sent to selected politicians 
in the Netherlands by way of reminding them that an uncompromising stance on 
their part would lead to disastrous consequences in Singapore.313 It is intriguing to 
note that the British did not consider the detention of Namazie for his outright 
show of resistance against the Dutch and the British. As a member of the 
Singapore Progressive Party and other community organisations, Namazie’s 
leading position within the Singapore Muslim community was secure. The British 
were cognizant of the fact that the arrest of a person of his social standing would 
provide a convenient pretext for radical dissenters to incite the Muslims to action. 
The short episode was also a clear indication that no prominent Muslim elite on 
the island was to be left unmonitored.
In the interim, Nazir Mallal had become convinced that the Dutch were 
determined to proceed with the appeal in the absence of Braddell. A deceitful but 
logical method to buy time was for Mallal to absent himself on the day of the 
appeal, claiming to be in poor health.314 The Singapore Governor was enraged. In 
his long telegram to the Colonial Office, Gimson expressed his annoyance at 
Mallal’s devious stratagem. A close reading of the telegram clearly points towards 
the probable defeat of the appellants.
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On the same day a letter went to you saying that Mr Mallal, Counsel for the appellant, 
might prove difficult in Court. I never anticipated, however, that he would descend to the 
low level o f obtaining a medical certificate in order to have the case postponed. I don’t 
think that I should be distorting the truth if I suggested that the Judges of the Court o f  
Appeal entertain doubts as to the accuracy o f the facts stated in the (Medical) Certificate.
The Judges have some difficulty now, in fixing a suitable date to hear the Appeal and are 
naturally not prepared to undergo any inconvenience themselves in fixing any date. June, 
or even more likely, September, are mentioned as possible dates for the future hearing of  
the Appeal. I hope Counsel for the appellant realizes that the interests o f their clients are 
likely to be prejudiced owing to the fact that, at the time the Appeal is now heard, Maria 
Hertogh will have been in Holland in the company o f her parents and her sisters and 
brothers, since December last [italics mine].315
‘Singapore’, as an American observer noted, ‘was twittering like a nervous 
bird over the possibility of a renewed outbreak of disorders among local 
Malays.’316 The British reacted by publicizing reports on the extensive 
preparations and readiness of the police and army troops.317 The newly appointed 
Commissioner of Police, John P. Pennefather-Evans, told reporters that, although 
no planned attacks had been uncovered, the police and the Special Branch were 
still taking all necessary precautions.318 In Malaya, public interest on the Maria 
Hertogh case had substantially decreased. Likewise, there was a decline in 
fanatical agitation in Indonesia.319 Yet a majority of the Muslims in South and 
Southeast Asia maintained that the lower court’s decision in December 1950
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should be publicly condemned. The Communists, on the other hand, sustained the 
policy of exploiting the legal controversy for the purpose of anti-Western 
propaganda.320
At the same time, the British had to muddle through rapid developments in
the Netherlands, which had implications for Singapore’s security. On 27th March
1951, the Breda Court declared that Maria Hertogh was a Dutch citizen and,
therefore, under Article 86 of the Dutch Civil Code, she was to be considered as a
child and her marriage was invalid. Neither Maria Hertogh nor Mansoor Adabi
were present or represented during the proceedings. Following a request from the
Dutch Public Prosecutor, who was acting upon the instructions given by Baron
van Ittersum at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the case was adjourned in view of
the appeal case which has yet to be heard at the High Court in Singapore. In his
updates to the Foreign Office, Peter Garran at the British Embassy in The Hague
expressed his hopes that the judgement of the appeal in Singapore would be in
favour of Maria Hertogh’s natural parents. ‘Otherwise there may be tiresome 
" \0 1complications.’ The reaction of a British official in London reflects the Home 
Government’s worries about the outcome of the legal case. Replying to Garran’s 
telegram, John D. Murray wrote that if the appeal was delayed further, it would 
most probably provoke another riot in Singapore. To safeguard their image and 
already tarnished position, the British Home Government should emphasise in its 
propaganda ‘that the decision of the Dutch Court only relates to the decision under 
the Dutch law. It might also be possible to make play with the fact that the case 
would not have preceded the hearing of the appeal in Singapore if the latter had
320 ‘Review of Islamic Affairs -  First Quarter 1951’, FO 371/91250.
321 ‘British Embassy (The Hague) to South East Asia Department (Foreign Office), 24th April, 
1951’, FO 371/93116.
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not been adjourned at the request of the appellants [italics mine].’322 In addition to 
that, Murray’s telegram provides us with deeper insights into British indirect 
influence upon the judicial process despite their rhetoric of neutrality. Murray 
wrote that it was ‘more than probable that the Court on May 8th will admit the 
Government's application and declare the marriage null and void [italics 
mine].’323
Concurrently, dozens of Roman Catholic organisations in the Netherlands 
demonstrated in protest of the adjournment of the court proceedings. The Dutch 
High Court was issued with warnings to categorically invalidate Maria Hertogh’s 
marriage with Mansoor Adabi. Failing that, Catholic support for the government 
would be called into question. In view of such fervent political debate, the term of 
office of Jacob van der Gaag (the Acting Consul-General of the Netherlands in 
Singapore) was extended until the end of the appeal trial, as he was deemed as 
acceptable to the Catholics in the Netherlands.324 The Breda court resumed its 
proceedings on 8th May 1951, A week later, the marriage between Maria Hertogh 
and Mansoor Adabi was annulled.325
Much to the astonishment of the British, no mass demonstrations were 
staged by Muslims in Singapore. Rather, Muslim leaders verbally resented the 
high-handedness by which legal decisions had been imposed by the Dutch court. 
The Chief Kathi of Singapore made a solemn avowal that persons who were 
responsible for the annulment of the marriage of Maria Hertogh and Mansoor
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Adabi would soon be punished by God.326 In Malaya, Muslims were relieved by 
the delay of the appeal case. A majority were said to have tenaciously held on to 
the notion that the judiciary was subservient to the demands of the British 
government. There was also a pervasive impression that the British were siding 
with the Dutch against the Muslims in the interest of maintaining diplomatic 
relations with their European counterpart.327
In Indonesia, it was observed that public interest in the Maria Hertogh case 
had slowly subsided, yet the Special Branch kept track of organisations who were 
capable of instigating Malays in Singapore to launch another series of riots.328 A 
British intelligence report noted that the start of the fasting season in early June 
would further weaken public interest in the Maria Hertogh case. Describing the 
religious practise in a rather derogatory way, fasting was said to have brought ‘its 
usual lassitude to the Malays. The Maria Hertogh case was forgotten, but interest 
in it may well be revived when the Appeal comes on for hearing in Singapore on 
25th July.’329
Uniformed police doubled the number of onlookers at the Singapore High 
Court on the first day of the appeal hearing. Special Branch officers in plain 
clothes mingled with a crowd of bewildered Malay men and women, and at the 
same time, the Singapore Governor had ensured that extra troops were brought in
326 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation of Malaya, May-June 1951’, CO 537/7343.
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from Malaya and put on standby in the city to quell possible disturbances should 
the appeal be dismissed.330 By the second day of the proceedings, the number of 
persons had decreased to the extent that the public gallery in the courtroom was 
almost empty.331 Although most Malays who were present felt that the appeal was 
bound to fail, Indian Muslims maintained that Mansoor Adabi would emerge 
triumphant at the end of the legal battle. The hearing lasted for five days. Public 
interest in the case declined sharply in the weeks that followed because Muslims 
in Singapore and Malaya were preoccupied with the appeal for clemency for those 
who had been sentenced to death for committing murder during the riots.332
Judges of the Singapore High Court gave their verdict on 30th August, 
1951. They contended that the court had the jurisdiction to consider the validity of 
the marriage in order to determine whether the appellant had established a prior 
right to the custody of Maria Hertogh. The judges did not, however, see the 
necessity of deciding whether Maria was a Christian or a Muslim. They readily 
conceded that Maria Hertogh was a Muslim rather than a Christian by faith at the 
time of the marriage. It is enticing to suggest that such a discursive strategy was 
subtly employed to bring to a close an arena of contestation which might enliven 
the hostility that Muslims had shown towards the colonial government. The judges 
further argued that under both the English and Dutch legal systems, the capacity 
of a woman to be married was governed by her Lex Domicili (the law of the place 
of a person’s domicile). Maria Hertogh’s father was Dutch and hence she was
330 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation of Malaya, March-April5, CO 537/7343.
331 ‘Reuter Report, 31st July, 19515, CO 953/10/6 and The Straits Times, 31st July, 1951.
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subject to the laws of the Netherlands, which held that she was below the legal age 
of marriage. In sum, Mansoor Adabi’s appeal had been rejected.333
British intelligence observed that the ‘Muslim public appeared to take the 
result of the Appeal as a foregone conclusion.’334 The Special Branch were 
however vigilant of many who subscribed to the assumption that the government 
had it all planned from the onset; a conspiracy par excellence. With the exception 
of several instances of non-violent resistance, conspiracy theories did not bring 
about aggressive behaviour on the part of Muslims in Singapore. A notable 
example of non-violent resistance was that of a Malay Special Constable who was 
on duty at the rear gate of Government House in the days after the decision of the 
appeal was made known. Seemingly unhappy with the verdict, the Malay Special 
Constable expressed his opposition towards the British by shouting in English, 
‘We want Mariah back as a Muslim, if not....’335 Concomitantly, the British 
Foreign Office was informed that Muslims in Singapore had sought the help of a 
renowned Pakistani lawyer, Syed Ahmad Rafiq, who was studying the case so as 
to pursue another appeal, this time to the Privy Council in October.336 The British 
predicted that such plans would be abandoned, since the economically depressed
'1 'I H
minority could not, by any means, meet the steep expense of such an appeal. 
They were wrong.
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• RESIDUES OF MUSLIM RESISTANCE
At a meeting held in November 1951, the Nadra Action Committee arrived 
at a consensus that an appeal would be brought to the Privy Council in England. 
The main intent of the appeal was legal rather than political. Although the 
Committee accepted the fact that the personal case of Mansoor Adabi and Maria 
Hertogh was closed, their overriding and long-term concern was to seek 
clarifications on legal issues related to marriages between Muslims and potential 
converts. A clear judgement on this issue could only be obtained from the highest 
echelons of the British judicial system, which would thereby set the precedent for 
other Commonwealth nations.338 The colonial administration in Singapore was 
perplexed as to whether such manifest objectives were free from latent gambits. 
There was also the ominous possibility that the appeal would accentuate adverse 
reactions from other Muslim countries and, in effect, be perceived as yet another 
example of the lack of respect for Muslim customs and laws. The Special Branch 
was tasked to unravel the underlying agendas. Meetings with key Muslim leaders 
were arranged to extract crucial information.
On the 31st of December 1951, the Foreign Office was informed that the 
Nadra Action Committee would contend that the Singapore High Court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the validity of the marriage as a preliminary issue to the 
question of custody. The Committee alleged that the court had misinterpreted the 
provisions of Islamic law relevant to the question of what law should govern the
338 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation o f Malaya, 15th November -  15th 
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capacity of a child to be lawfully married.339 In view of this, officials in the 
Colonial Office and Singapore were instructed to combat the propaganda of 
‘Muslim Extremists’ by giving widespread publicity to the verdicts passed by the 
Singapore High Court. ‘You should, if necessary, emphasise that the issue was 
essentially a legal one and that the appeal to the Privy Council will likewise be 
based purely on points of law.’340
Along with the appeal to the Privy Council, the Security Liaison Officer in 
Singapore listed three other issues that could rekindle ill-feelings towards the 
government in the midst of a progressive dismantling of radical movements in the 
colony. The first was that of the fate of Othman Ghani, whose appeal for 
clemency had been rejected by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.341 
Malay activists were of the opinion that the passing of death sentences upon 
Othman Ghani and several others were colonialist attempts to avenge the brutal 
murders of their servicemen. A Malay political party was reported to have planned 
a major disturbance in the event of the court’s refusal to reduce the death 
sentences to that of imprisonment.342 Prominent Indian Muslims maintained that 
the laws of the country have been violated, as Othman Ghani’s role was only to 
supply food to Muslims who were arrested for rioting. The Special Branch was 
also informed of an Indian Muslim’s visit to Pakistan in an attempt to influence 
government officials in Karachi to protest against the draconian laws used by the
339 ‘D. Macfarlene (Foreign Office) to S.H. Evans (Colonial Office), 31st December, 1951’, FO 
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British to intimidate their subjects.343 Muslim resentment at the continued 
detention of Karim Ghani, purportedly the chief agitator behind the December 
1950 riots, was the second item in the list of issues affecting the security of the 
colony. On top of that, the British were confronted with protests that were 
launched against the screening of a film entitled, David and Bathsheba,344 The 
dynamics of this incident will be revisited in greater depth in Chapter Five of this 
thesis. Suffice it to state at this juncture that the British intelligence services 
maintained that Muslims in Singapore were exploiting ‘every incident such as the 
Hertogh case, the case of those convicted in the subsequent riots and the showing 
of the film David and Bathsheba to move major Muslim pressure upon 
Government policy.’345 Due to such developments, the Singapore Governor was 
advised to further strengthen the Malay-Indonesian Section of the Special 
Branch.346
By February 1952, the danger of Muslim extremism related to the Maria 
Hertogh controversy had abated. The texture of intelligence reports on Muslim 
Affairs was generally positive, and it was even reported that Muslims in 
Singapore no longer saw violence as a means to achieve their political objectives. 
Attended by about one hundred Indians, Pakistanis and Malays, the annual general 
meeting of the Singapore Muslim League came under the control of ‘moderate’
' i A n
leaders who were able to mitigate the pressures of ‘extremist’ elements. M.J 
Namazie was re-elected as the President of the organisation and Karim Ghani was
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reinstated as one of the Patrons. Although Che Sidek, the President of the 
Singapore Malay Union and a Justice of the Peace, was voted in as one of the 
Vice-Presidents, he announced publicly that he would not accept the appointment. 
The British were astonished by Namazie’s ability to control ‘rowdy elements 
among the South Indian supporters of Karim Ghani who had prepared several 
resolutions calling for steps to be taken to obtain his release. The final motions 
were comparatively mild. Karim Ghani now applied to go to India where he was 
bom. Negotiations are in hand.’348
Mansoor Adabi5 s application for leave to appeal was yet again dismissed 
on 22nd Febmary, 1952. Justice Rogers of the Supreme Court maintained that 
there were no valid reasons for the appeal to be brought to Her Majesty in the 
Privy Council.349 As a follow up to this, the Secretary of the Malay Students 
Organisation in Karachi sought the assistance of three of the largest Islamic 
organisations in Pakistan to review the rejection of the appeal. The World Muslim 
Organisation in Pakistan went a step further to debate the issue on 14th and 15th 
March, 1952.350 Nonetheless, Muslim activisms related to the Maria Hertogh 
controversy were centred mainly upon peaceful dialogue rather than militant 
action. In Singapore, Jamiyah had begun extensive preparations for another 
Southeast Asia Missionary Conference towards the end of 1952. It was expected 
that the Maria Hertogh case would not be mentioned, or, if  it was, only in
351passing.
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At this juncture in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots, a change in 
perception and portrayal of Muslims in Singapore was developing within the 
British intelligence circles. Though the strict racial formula of ‘Malay’, ‘Indian’ 
and ‘Arab’ prevailed, a lucid report on Muslim communities in the post-war 
period that will be quoted at length below could also be read as a nuanced attempt 
by the intelligence services to uncover the underlying factors which had resulted 
in the varied forms of resistance which they had encountered thus far. The key 
objective of the document was to make a once-neglected community, ‘legible’.352 
Also, the report exhibited a departure from the assumption that Islam in Singapore 
was entirely non-violent and apolitical. If left unmanaged, the religion could be 
used as a rallying tool to mobilise the masses against colonial state.
The Malay Community of Singapore is depressed and lacks leaders. The atmosphere of 
Singapore is not the best milieu for the Malay ‘adat’ (way of life) and both the local 
Malay and the Indonesian immigrant suffer from the destabilising influences of 
mercantile cosmopolitanism. In these circumstances Indonesian radical influences have 
penetrated and may develop the political potential in these people. As Muslims, they fall 
to some extent under the influence o f the religiously more fanatical and politically more 
active Indian/Pakistani elements.
Islam is the most potent religious force in the region. In Singapore it assumes a political 
character in that South Indian Muslim elements seek to influence policy by playing upon 
Muslim susceptibilities but are held in check by Arab and Malay moderation and 
orthodoxy.
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The Indian sub-continent has a long tradition of connection with the region. The local 
community resulting there from is the most politically conscious group in Singapore. The 
partition of their homeland following religious division and the present political situation 
there enhances the possibility o f local communal disturbances but generally the political 
assertiveness o f the Indo-Pakistani character find expression in local politics which it 
aspires to take the lead [italics mine].353
• CONCLUSION -  NEW THREATS AND OLD ENEMIES
By 1953, the spectres of the Maria Hertogh case had slowly yet painfully 
faded from the Singapore Muslim community’s collective psyche. Different it was 
in the case of the British who were still haunted by vivid memories of the incident. 
In August, the Special Branch was thunderstruck by the news of the conversion of 
a sixteen-year-old Chinese Roman Catholic to Islam and her subsequent marriage 
to a Malay man. The British were anxious that press publicity of a reincarnation of 
the Maria Hertogh case would reawaken Muslim-Christian ill-feeling and 
‘develop into a security danger’.354 Such fear proved to be unwarranted because 
the Muslim public paid no particular attention to the incident.
In the months that ensued, the focus of British intelligence activities 
gradually shifted towards other developments within the local Muslim 
community. Espionage was conducted to obtain information on subversive 
elements within UMNO, the Peninsula Malay Union and other Malay 
organisations, which promoted independence by radical means. These
353 ‘Resume o f the Singapore Political Scene, May 1952’, CO 1022/206. Chinese-Muslims were, 
however, left out o f this report perhaps due to the small number o f registered Chinese converts to 
Islam at that time.
354 ‘Political Report for the period 13th August to 1st September, 1953’, CO 1022/207.
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developments were suspected to have had a strong influence upon Muslim 
military and police officers in Singapore, who had maintained strong networks 
with political activists in the Malayan Federation.355 Beyond the politics of 
independence, the British were also aware of a revival and upsurge of interest in 
the ideology of Pan-Islamism that was enmeshed with the ideals of nationalism. 
Muslim students who returned from their studies and sojourns in Cairo and Mecca 
were active in spreading anti-British and Pan-Islamic ideas in Malaya. Although 
numerically insignificant, such persons were deemed to be potential threats to 
security in Singapore. The British intelligence services also monitored numerous 
visits by Inamullah Khan (President of the Pakistani Youth Movement), which 
were hosted by prominent Muslims in Singapore. Whilst no signs of anti­
colonialist feelings had arisen from these visits, the British did not discount that 
speeches made by such personalities could bring forth sentiments which ‘may be 
latent and could easily be touched off, as was shown in the Hertogh case.’356
To ensure that these negative influences would be swiftly dealt with, the 
British keep a watchful eye on students who had returned from their studies in 
major Muslim countries, as well as radical ulama and renowned personalities who 
converged in Singapore en route to Mecca during the pilgrimage season.357 Yet, 
no untoward incidents related to the Maria Hertogh case were reported towards 
the closing of 1953. Indeed, through a combination of ‘proscription’ and 
‘surveillance’, the British had anticipated and successfully obliterated all forms of
355 ‘Review o f Factors Liable to Affect Internal Security, Singapore, as on 1st October, 1953’, CO 
1022/248.
356 ‘Review of Factors Liable to Affect Internal Security, Singapore, as on 1st October, 1953’, CO 
1022/248.
357 ‘Review o f Factors Liable to Affect Internal Security, Singapore, as on 1st October, 1953’, CO 
1022/248.
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violent and radical opposition arising from tlie Maria Hertogh riots, which had 
previously fuelled racial and religious dissensions. The next chapter of this thesis 
will discuss the process of ‘self-criticism’ as the third strategy which the British 
employed to expose the failures of key personalities during the outbreak of the 
riots. Although an embedded trait of the British Empire, self-criticism, as will be 
shown, was channelled towards insulating the higher echelons of the colonial 
administration from suffering a severe loss of legitimacy.
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Wilfred L. Blythe, Singapore Colonial Secretary 
Source: National Archives of Singapore
Franklin Gimson standing with a Gurkha Police Officer 
Source: National Archives of Singapore
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CHAPTER 5
Self-Criticism
The ability to incessantly engage in self-criticism was, arguably, one of the 
most distinctive features of the British Empire. So pronounced was such trait that 
even the former American Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has recently 
observed that Britain has ‘an amazing capacity for self-criticism, even when the 
Empire was at its height.’358 Motivated by the endeavour to prolong Britain’s hold 
upon its territories, colonial officials from all political leanings would unceasingly 
reproach themselves - above all others - in the event of crises and upheavals. 
Certainly, there were a selected few who resisted the self-criticising trait and, in 
the process, governed despotically. Such dissenters would always be challenged 
by liberal critics within the British and colonized societies.359
This chapter seeks to describe, contextualise and analyse the British 
strategy of ‘self-criticism’ as manifested primarily in the establishment and 
proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry and the disciplinary measures meted 
out to colonial officials accused of mishandling the Maria Hertogh riots. It is my 
contention that whilst the British were self-critical and were generally receptive of 
criticisms launched against them, they ensured that the higher echelons of the state 
machinery were insulated from a severe collapse in their legitimacy in the
358 Donald Rumsfeld quoted in: The Guardian, 2nd June, 2003.
359 Colin Cross, The Fall o f  the British Empire: 1918-1968 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1968), p. 144 and Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made The Modern World (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004), p. xxiv.
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aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. The politics, tensions and anxieties inherent 
within this limited process of self-criticism will be brought forth.
• A WINTER OF DISCONTENT
Public discontent began to mount upon the quelling of the riots, to the 
extent that the American Consul-General predicted that it would precipitate the 
fall from favour of several high-ranking British officials in Singapore.360 Queries 
on the causes and factors that led to the death of British civilians and servicemen 
during the riots were raised in Britain by a whole array of newspaper editorials. At 
the same time, British opposition parties seized upon the opportunity to publish 
commentaries condemning the Home and Singapore governments for the 
breakdown in governance during the riots, and the subsequent delays in the setting 
up of a commission of enquiry.361 It is pertinent to note here that, aside from 
providing updates on the progress of the Malayan Emergency, the British media 
seldom gave extensive coverage of other incidents of violence in Malaya during 
the immediate post-war period. The aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots was 
exceptional in the sense that it became a topic of debate within several leading 
newspapers in Britain.362 The Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph featured 
the riots as a symptom of the Labour government’s growing ineptness in 
managing racial and religious differences in the colonies.363 The Manchester 
Guardian went so far as to aver that the ‘British administration in Singapore is
3fi0 ‘William R. Langdon to Department of State, 15th December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1550, 
NACPM,
361 ‘Franklin Gimson to Oliver Lyttelton , 16th December, 1950’, CO 537/7246.
362 John Michael Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), p. 241.
363 The Daily Telegraph, 13th December, 1950 and The Daily Express, 13th December, 1950.
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never again likely to enjoy the affection of the Malays which it undoubtedly had 
before the war. We must pay for the defect of the post-war emergency 
government.’364 A Singapore Standard editorial declared that the whole episode 
was a ‘blunder’ that revealed an apparent lack of ability on the part of the colonial 
government to identify and address the outstanding socio-political grievances in
3 6 5the colony. To be sure, such voices of opposition towards British administrative 
failures in the colonies were characteristic of the years following the Second 
World War. Frederick Cooper observes that colonial regimes ‘in the 1950s were 
moving targets for criticism, for they sought to reposition themselves in a
' j / /
progress-oriented world.’
In an effort to shore up the growing mood of discontent, on 16th December 
1950, the Singapore Governor declared in public that a full enquiry into the 
circumstances that had led to the riots would be held upon the approval of the 
Home Government.367 Indeed, although the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots 
was only one among many outbreaks of mass violence which the Britain had dealt 
with during the post-war period, colonial officials in London were more than 
convinced that a ‘full-dress enquiry’ needed to be carried out in order to unravel 
the defects of colonial policing in one of its most strategic outposts.368 Still, it was 
the ‘men on the spot’ rather than the metropolitan officials and politicians who 
took on the much of the task of engaging in self-criticism and responding to critics 
of the colonial regime.
364 Manchester Guardian, 13th December, 1950.
365 Singapore Standard, 15th December, 1950.
366 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 2005), p. 37.
367 The Straits Times, 17th December, 1950.
368 Jeffries, The Colonial Police, p. 203.
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In a speech delivered at a Legislative Council meeting, the Singapore 
Governor asserted that ‘as servants of the public, the government gladly accept the 
responsibilities of their public position in the days of bad fortune as well as of 
good and welcome responsible judgment on their administration.’369 Gimson 
further conceded that it was more than appropriate for the government to accept 
criticisms levelled against the police force, for they had been caught off guard by 
the sudden occurrence of mass violence that claimed the lives and property of 
innocent persons. In point of fact, the police force was deemed inefficient, fraught 
with defectors who supported the rioters, and thus an object of ridicule. An 
editorial in the Straits Budget newspaper, as a case in point, even went to the 
extent of labelling it a ‘Sissy Force’. 370 To Gimson, the heavy blame placed on an 
essential part of the colonial administration was unsurprising, as the duty of the 
police force was essentially on the ‘front-line’. The Singapore Governor 
commended the military for restoring order in the colony.371 More worrying, 
however, were stories ‘circulating throughout Singapore but no picture, as yet, can 
be drawn of the situation in the Colony in those dark days of Monday and 
Tuesday.’ Gimson highlighted that rumours and distortion of facts would further 
threaten the volatile relationship between the colonial state and the general public. 
Having invoked the Inquiries Commission Ordinance of 1941, he announced that 
an enquiry would be duly carried out. Close communication had been established 
with the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the composition as well as the 
terms of reference of the enquiry. Some time would elapse to allow for a proper 
selection and for the arrival of the members of the commission of enquiry to
369 ‘Speech by His Excellency the Governor for Legislative Council on Tuesday, 19lh December, 
1950’, CO 953/10/1.
370 The Straits Budget, 21st December, 1950.
371 ‘Speech by His Excellency the Governor for Legislative Council on Tuesday, 19th December, 
1950’, CO 953/10/1.
154
Singapore.372 Reiterating Britain’s role as what Gerold Krozewski had aptly 
tenned as, ‘Gentlemanly Imperialist’373, Gimson ended his speech by stating that 
the ‘prime responsibility lies with the government, and, learning from the past and 
from whatever judgment is passed on us, the government will see the tools are apt 
to the job and the job is done.’374 This was all well said, but what was left to be 
done was more complex than it seemed to be. The time lag in establishing the 
Commission of Enquiry was one the most trying periods for the British colonial 
officials in London and Singapore, given that self-criticism on the part of the 
government did not necessarily appease the outraged and exasperated public.
The first source of criticism emerged from among the members of the 
Singapore Legislative Council. Nazir Mallal reviled the colonial government for 
its poor conduct and inefficiency in the wake of the violence in the colony, and 
blamed the ‘miles of red tape’ that had brought about the rapid spread of riots. 
Questions were posed as to whether the Singapore Colonial Secretary and the 
Commissioner of Police had attended a cocktail party in Johore Bahru during the 
riots, which implied that the two colonial officials had failed to appreciate the 
seriousness of the violence that ensued. Almost immediately, the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary denied all accusations made against him and his subordinate, 
insisting that they were not in Johore Bahru.375 Picking up from his earlier points, 
Nazir Mallal reiterated that, although Muslims were peaceful and law-abiding
372 The Singapore Free Press, 19th December, 1950 and ‘Speech by His Excellency the Governor 
for Legislative Council on Tuesday, 19th December, 1950’, CO 953/10/1.
373 Gerold Krozewski, “Gentlemanly Imperialism and British Empire after 1945”, in Shigeru
Akita, Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global Histoiy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), pp. 83-100.
374 The Singapore Free Press, 19th December, 1950 and “Speech by His Excellency the Governor 
for Legislative Council on Tuesday, 19th December, 1950”, CO 953/10/1.
375 Proceedings o f the First Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 19th December, 1950
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B452-453 and The Singapore Free Press, 15fh 
December, 1950.
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citizens, they would unflinchingly sacrifice their lives and property in the face of 
encroachments by the government upon their religious customs and beliefs. 
‘Could anything’, Nazir Mallal contended,
be more offensive to Muslim feelings than placing the young lady, who, according to the 
Muslims, was a Muslimah (Muslim lady) and will always remain so in their eyes, in a 
Christian Home?...What is the use o f having Advisory Boards if  you do not consult them 
or pay heed to the advice they may give you?...The confidence of the public in our Police 
Force has been completely shattered, and I do not think that this public confidence in the 
police force as at present can ever be restored.’376
A Eurasian member of the Legislative Council, P.F. de Souza, highlighted that the 
general public was still baffled by the placement of Maria Hertogh in a Catholic 
Convent. The Dutch Acting Consul-General should be made to testify as a key 
witness during the course of the enquiry in order to clear up the 
misunderstandings that had arisen. Other members of the Legislative Council, 
such as Tan Chye Cheng, stressed that the Commission of Enquiry should consist 
of individuals who were independent of the government. The candidates should 
also possess credentials that would engender the trust of all communities within 
the Singapore society. Tan also hoped that ‘the Commission of Enquiry will be 
accorded adequate protection, and not be subjected to the indignities suffered by 
our local courts recently.’377 By way of concluding the proceedings, the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary thanked the council members for their assistance in assuaging 
the conflicts that have surfaced since the riots. The Public Relations Office had
376 Proceedings o f the First Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 19th December, 1950, p. 
B471-472.
377 Proceedings o f  the First Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 19th December, 1950, pp. 
B470-473.
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been tasked with responsibility of allaying negative perceptions towards the 
government and its agencies. Blythe acknowledged the call by Sardon Jubir for all 
Muslims and non-Muslims to work together towards alleviating misperceptions 
and a culture of suspicion. The riots would be the last of their kind in the colony. 
All forms of violence directed against the colonial state would be met with severe 
punishments. ‘This is no declaration of war, but a declaration of a determination 
to defend and to maintain the civic peace.’378 Interestingly, no voices of 
opposition were noticeable at this point. Even Malay newspapers, such as Utusan 
Melayu and Melayu Raya, which were active in fuelling anti-colonial feelings in 
the midst of the legal tussle, refrained from commenting on the proceedings of the 
Legislative Council.
The situation was very different in England, which saw the emergence of
another stream of criticism against the British government. One of the British
newspaper commentaries that came to the attention of the Colonial and Foreign
Offices’ concern was entitled ‘Angry Singapore’, written by a reporter based in
Singapore. Published in the Yorkshire Post, J.W. Goodwin wrote that the delay in
investigating the causes of the riots was, in part, a deliberate attempt by the
government to ‘whitewash’ officials in Whitehall and in Singapore, Contrary to
prevailing perceptions, Goodwin maintained that the passiveness of the Malay
Police during the riots was not the result of them having been influenced by
radical ideas. ‘The plain fact is that one group of uniformed Malays under British
officers did its duty, where another group of uniformed Malays refused to obey its
British officers.’ The Commission of Enquiry, Goodwin asserted, ought to address
378 Proceedings o f the First Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 19th December, 1950, p. 
B478. See also, The Singapore Free Press, 20th December, 1950 and The Straits Times, 20th 
December, 1950.
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the reasons for the failure to forewarn the necessary governmental agencies on the 
rising emotions of Muslims many days before the riots. Secondly, it should 
provide a clear account of the failure of the police to disperse the rioters outside 
the Supreme Court and the total collapse of police morale unbeknown to the 
senior officers of the force. The poor recruitment and training procedures as well 
as corrupt practices in the police force was the third important issue that should be 
brought to fore. Next, was the intrinsic weakness of the civil administration in 
Singapore and incompetence of key officials at Whitehall. Goodwin demanded an 
explanation for the delay in sending reinforcements from the military, which had 
offered its services twice during the riots. The government had also deprived the 
media of its right of access to vital sources of information. Army officers were 
given strict orders to avoid communicating with the press, failing that, they would 
be court-martialled. The police force, in turn, was silenced through the agency of 
the Public Relations Office. Goodwin ended his scathing commentary by stating 
that ‘the Colony’s administrators must be glad that they are not Ministers under a 
representative government; they would have been out of office by this time.’379 
Whilst British officials were kept abreast of several important issues arising from 
the plethora of commentaries and critiques published in England, they did not 
seek to respond in kind. Much energy was, however, directed towards hastening 
the selection of the members of the Commission of Enquiry.
379 Yorkshire Post, 1st January, 1951. See also FO 371/84677.
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THE POLITICS OF ENQUIRY
The process of determining the appropriate candidates for the Commission 
of Enquiry was, in essence, problematic. As Micheal Keith has accurately pointed 
out, commissions of enquiry ‘exist in a political environment and are implicated in 
a political strategy from the moment at which they are appointed and their 
personnel selected to the moment in which they report, right on the manner in 
which they are remembered.’ 380 In a telegram sent to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, the Singapore Governor stressed that members of the commission of 
enquiry should be fully aware of the Islamic factor embedded within the Maria 
Hertogh controversy. They should be acquainted with the fact that the riots had 
received widespread publicity and reactions from Muslims in Malaya, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and the Middle East. The Commission of Enquiry should also be 
sensitive to the pervasive perception among Muslims that the judiciary had been 
made subservient to the demands of the Executive. A majority was also of the 
view that the laws of Islam had been insulted upon the annulment by the British 
Court of a marriage performed by a Muslim kathi.m  Restating the views of Tan 
Chye Cheng, Gimson mentioned that the members of the Commission of Enquiry 
should also be free from prior contacts with, or from having familial relations with 
any government officials in Singapore. This was to avoid unnecessary accusations 
regarding the conduct of the investigation. The Chainnan of the Commission 
should be a Legal Officer of high standing, with credentials that ‘command
380 Michael Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society (London: 
UCL Press, 1993), p. 74.
381 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 8th January, 1951’, CO 537/7246.
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attention not only in Singapore but elsewhere and should not be suspect owing to 
the fact that he had previous association with Malaya.’382
Several prominent persons were proposed to be appointed as the Chairman 
of the Commission. James Griffiths recommended Sir Harry Trusted, who had had 
prior experience as the Chairman of the Salaries Commission. John D. Higham of 
the Colonial Office suggested Sir Charles Gerahty, who was a renowned judicial 
officer based in India. Gimson was unimpressed. To him, Trusted was a man who 
lacked vision and was not well-received in Malaya. Geraghty had the advantage of 
an image of impartiality due to his long absence from Malaya. But the general 
public, Gimson argued, was looking forward to the appointment of a person with 
greater legal eminence. The Singapore Governor added that the remaining 
positions within the Commission should consist of persons with strong credentials
-JOT
and prior experience in British colonies.
At this juncture, tensions between the Governor, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and officials at the Colonial Office began to develop. James Griffiths 
held on to the ideal that it was ‘of the greatest importance to the British position in 
the Far East in these troubled times that public opinion should be satisfied, by a 
report of indisputable impartiality and authority, that this whole question has been 
thoroughly and relentlessly investigated.’384 Higham was in full support of 
Griffiths’ notions but was bothered by Gimson’s irresoluteness in selecting the 
proposed candidates for the Commission. Confiding to a fellow official of his 
displeasure towards Singapore Governor, Higham wondered whether Gimson had
382 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 8th January, 1951’, CO 537/7246.
383 ‘John D. Higham to Mr Paskin, 9th January, 1951’, CO 537/7246.
384 ‘James Griffiths to Alderman J.C. Burman, 12th January, 1951’, CO 537/7246.
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in mind a ‘Colonial Chief Justice who is unknown to the people of Singapore (in 
whom familiarity therefore will not have contempt).’385
In truth, the fifty-two year old Gimson was deeply anxious of being 
publicly criticised for poor choices in the selection of the members of the 
Commission of Enquiry. His term as the Singapore Governor had, by far, been 
plagued with successive crises that resulted in a rapid loss of public reverence for 
his office. In April 1950, Gimson narrowly escaped an assassination attempt when 
a grenade struck his leg and rolled about six feet away, where it exploded.386 This 
was succeeded by the Maria Hertogh riots, which exposed serious defects in his 
leadership. The deliberate attempt to influence the selection of candidates could 
thus be seen as part of Gimson’s tactic of preventing further public denigration as 
the date of his retirement drew near.
After much wrangling, on the 16th January, 1951, the press was provided 
with the terms of reference for the Commission of Enquiry: ‘To inquire into and 
report on the recent disorders in Singapore on 11th December, and subsequent 
days, with special reference to the causes of those disorders, and to the measures 
taken to protect life and property and to restore law and order.’387 The Singapore 
Governor emphasized that persons of high credentials and experience had been 
selected, in accordance with the demands of the Singapore populace. The 
committee for the Commission of Enquiry had been given the right to summon 
any person to come before it and to investigate all matters relevant to the enquiry.
385 ‘John D. Higham to Mr Paskin, 9th January, 1951 ’, CO 537/7246.
386 ‘Attempted Assassination of Sir Franklin Gimson, Governor of Singapore’, CO 537/5964.
387 ‘Riots: Singapore; Report of Commission of Enquiry: Leach Report (1951)’, CO 537/7248. See 
also The Straits Times, 17th January, 1951.
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Its key function would be the collection and reporting of facts. The onus was 
placed upon the Executive and Legislative Councils to translate the Commission’s 
recommendations into viable policies. A week later, an announcement was 
made in London in the House of Commons that the committee for the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Maria Hertogh riots would be led by Sir Lionel 
Leach, who was a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and a 
former Chief Justice of Madras. He was to be assisted by Captain H. Studdy (the 
Chief Constable of the West Riding) and J.H. Wenham from the Surrey County 
Council, who was the Chairman of the Police Standing Joint Committee for that 
county. J.R. Williams was appointed as the Secretary of the Commission.389
Together with this was the preparation of the list of persons to be 
interviewed by the Commission of Enquiry. In an endeavour to impress upon the 
public his commitment to governmental impartiality, Gimson assured that no one 
was above the scrutiny of the Commission, with the exception of himself due to 
the British legal concept of sovereign immunity.390 Friends and respected 
colleagues thus became suspects and scapegoats. Even Robert E. Foulger, the 
fifty-two year old Streatham-bom Singapore Commissioner of Police, who had 
retired on November 1950, was made to testify before the Commission. As a 
justification for such a contentious move, Gimson explained to James Griffiths 
that Foulger should be flown from England and provide evidence before the 
Commission ‘both in his own interest and in the interests of the Singapore public.
388 The Straits Times, 17th January, 1951.
389 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797.
390 See John Roland Braddell, The Law o f  the Straits Settlements: A Commentary (Singapore: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1932), pp. 98-101.
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In fact there will almost certainly be public criticism if he fails to do so.’391 On the 
same week, Foulger’s impending appointment as the Deputy Inspector-General 
for the Colonial Police was abruptly postponed due to the Home government’s 
fear of negative repercussions arising from the report of the enquiry.392 Such a 
stratagem on Gimson’s part is a vivid example of how colonial officials had so 
often turned the tables against their close subordinates when the need arose. 
Barely a month prior to the riots, Gimson had praised Foulger for the
arduous task which you undertook when you re-established the Police Force which had 
been severely disorganised as a result o f the Japanese Occupation and which had 
deteriorated almost beyond recognition from the fine Force which the people of 
Singapore remembered in the pre-war days....Your name will be remembered with 
affection and with admiration not only among the Police Force o f Singapore but among 
all law-abiding citizens of this Colony as one who by his vigour and promptness and 
considerable initiative made the Singapore Police Force’s second to none in the Colonial 
Empire...It is through your guidance and encouragement that such progressive 
innovations as the use o f radio cars, the introduction of Women Police, the advancement 
and promotion of Asian officers to higher ranks and to courses in the United Kingdom, 
and more important still, the introduction of a policy of assimilating Chinese into the 
Police Force have been successfully adopted.393
Even Major-General Dunlop, the ‘celebrated hero’ who had commanded 
the troops which quelled the riots, acknowledged Foulger’s abilities and admitted 
that he ‘could not have found a better Commissioner or a firmer friend.’394 Yet 
the pertinent issue at stake transcended past acquaintances and friendships. A
391 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 13Ul January, 1951’, CO 537/7245.
392 ‘Secretary of State for the Colonies to Robert E. Foulger, 16th January, 1951’, CO 537/7245.
393 ‘Franklin Gimson to Robert E. Foulger, 17,h November, 1950’, CO 537/7245.
394 ‘Major-General D. Dunlop to Robert E. Foulger, 7th November, 1950’, CO 537/7245.
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high-ranking British official would have to shoulder much of the blame for 
mishandling the two dreadful days in December. The question that lingered at the 
back of everyone’s mind then was, ‘Who?’
In the meantime, newspaper editorials, both in Singapore and in Britain 
continued their censure of the government. The Straits Budget expressed its 
scepticism of the Commission’s ability to comprehensively reconstruct the causes 
and events that led to the riots. The failure of the government before and during 
the riots, which should be the core subject of investigation, would most certainly 
be neglected, if not, blanked out. The government could now use the Commission 
as a tool to evade crucial questions from the public as ‘it can say nothing for fear 
of prejudicing the Commission’s work.’395 In England, The Times newspaper 
stated that the formalisation of the Commission of Enquiry had not alleviated the 
sense of danger and fear among Europeans and Eurasians living in Singapore. 
Close and continued cooperation with the Malays and other Muslim communities 
had been shattered and the enquiry could not reverse such phenomena.396
The Commission of Enquiry held its opening session 011 14th February, 
1951. The first witness was G.R. Livett, the Deputy Commissioner of Police who, 
in his testimony, acknowledged the embedded weaknesses of the police force. 
Livett was of the view that the riots would not have spread beyond the vicinity of 
the Sultan Mosque if a policy of patience and restraint had been implemented. He 
blamed the military forces for attacking the crowd, inducing widespread acts of
395 Straits Budget, 18 th January, 1951.
396 The Times, 23rd January, 1951.
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* 3 9 7violence. Greatly disturbed by the self-defeating effects of Livett’s testimony, 
the newly appointed Commissioner of Police, John P. Pennefather-Evans, 
arranged for an informal meeting with members of the Commission. He proposed 
that police officers be represented by civilian lawyers during the course of the 
enquiry. Gimson was taken aback. ‘I fear however,’ repeating the issue twice over 
in a single telegram to John Higham, ‘that a private lawyer would not have that 
sense of restraint and regal'd for the general interests of the public which are 
necessary in this very delicate investigation.’ To counter Pennefather-Evans’ 
proposition, the Attorney-General was asked to arrange for an urgent meeting with 
members of the Commission. A suggestion was mooted that the Crown Counsel, 
rather than a private lawyer, should be employed for the purposes of protecting the 
interests of police officers testifying before the Commission.398 The Singapore 
Governor’s strategy gained the upper hand. In a follow-up telegram, Gimson 
admitted that he would have asked the Colonial Office ‘to interfere in this matter’ 
had the ploy failed.399 The politics of the Commission of Enquiry had gained full 
momentum.
Livett’s testimony and that of several other officers reinforced the 
established notion that the Malay policemen, who constituted a majority in the 
Singapore Police Force, had failed in their task to ensure the enforcement of law 
and order during the riots. The chief underlying reason for the Malay policemen’s 
ineffectiveness was their deep sympathy towards the resentment felt by their co­
religionists. Another plausible reason was the lack of coordination between police 
officers that were deployed in crisis-stricken areas with those stationed at the
397 ‘G. R. Livett’s Commission of Inquiry Testimony’, CO 953/46.
398 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 15th February, 1951’, CO 953/10/1.
399 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 15th February, 1951’, CO 953/10/1.
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Police Headquarters. The police were also faced with overwhelming difficulties in 
handling the rioters encountered in various parts of the city.400
On 19th February 1951, Nigel Morris, the Assistant Commissioner of 
Police in charge of the CID, delivered the first wrenching blow to the integrity and 
image of selected civilian officials. Morris testified before the Commission that he 
had insisted on the transfer of Maria Hertogh to a Social Welfare Home several 
days before the riots. This was based upon feedback received from Special Branch 
officers who had observed the growing Muslim hostility arising from Maria 
Hertogh’s placement at the Convent of the Good Shepherd. The Singapore 
Colonial Secretary had, however, consistently rejected his advice. For that reason, 
Morris sought the cooperation of other high-ranking civilian officials but all to no 
avail401 Morris’ account was supported by the testimony of A.E.G. Blades (the 
Assistant Commissioner of Special Branch) and retired Assistant Superintendent 
Mahmood Abdul Wahab, who repeatedly emphasized their role in urging the 
removal of Maria Hertogh from the Catholic Convent, with the sole intent of 
mollifying the opinion of Muslims in the colony.402 Their recommendations were 
rejected by Blythe who insisted that the placement of Maria at the Convent ‘was a 
very reasonable thing to do’ and that he did not see the need to consult Muslim 
leaders on the matter.403
400 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, February 1951 CO 537/6797 and The Straits 
Times, 14 th February, 1951.
401 ‘Nigel Morris’ Commission of Inquiry Testimony’, CO 953/46 and The Straits Times, 20th 
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The second exposure of the failure of civilian officials in the performance 
of their duties came from the former Acting Commissioner of Police, R.C.B. 
Wiltshire, who took the stand to testify on 23ld February, 1951. Wiltshire had 
submitted his letter of resignation several days before the commencement of the 
Commission of Enquiry to enable himself to testify without having being bound 
by the code of ethics of a police officer and a servant of the colonial state. The 
Singapore Governor saw through cleverly crafted scheme and bluntly rejected the 
resignation.404 During the two days of intense questioning, Wiltshire confessed 
that he was acting under the direct orders of the Singapore Colonial Secretary 
during the worst days of the riots. The Singapore Colonial Secretary, Wiltshire 
explained, had been tasked to manage the violence that had erupted in Singapore 
from the time when the Governor was at the Commissioner-General’s residence in 
Johor Bahru. No reasons were given for the delay on the part of the governor in 
returning to Singapore on the second day of the riots. The Chairman of the 
Commission then asked whether such a procedure was appropriate in the 
circumstances. Wiltshire replied, T think so, Sir.’405 Wiltshire later divulged that 
he had also refused the military assistance that was offered on two occasions by 
Major-General Dunlop on the second day of the riots.406
The last, yet not least, damaging evidence came from Foulger who shed 
light on corruption that was rampant in the police force due to low pay and long 
working hours. These problems, along with internal rivalry and poor coordination 
between the higher echelons of the police force, had been brought to the attention
404 ‘Transmitting General Conditions Report for the Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang 
consular districts for the period February 1-15,1951’, RG 59, 746F.00/2-2851, NACPM.
405 The Straits Times, 24n February, 1951.
406 Singapore Standard, 27th February, 1951.
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of the Singapore Colonial Secretary prior to Foulger’s departure from the force. 
Although several reforms had been proposed and initiated, the process was 
severely hampered by a lack of support from civilian officials.407
The Commission then proceeded to St. John’s Island to obtain the 
testimony of six Muslim detainees who were alleged to have inflamed Muslim 
feelings prior and during the riots. All except for Karim Ghani agreed to testify. 
Their statements were recorded on camera and none admitted to the charge that 
they were proponents of violence and disorder. Foreign observers in the colony 
were bewildered by the Commission’s attempt at obtaining crucial information 
from detainees who had not been given a fair trial by a British court. ‘Did this 
action in any way imply a criticism of the authorities for detaining these persons 
so long without trial? Or did it merely mean that the Commission desired the 
testimony of these important witnesses in order to complete their picture of the 
events which led to the disorders in December?’408 The answers to such pertinent 
questions were never found.
In England, newspaper coverage of the testimony of leading officials in 
Singapore provided politicians from the Conservative Party with the pretext to 
find fault with the Labour government’s management of the colonies. During a 
House of Commons debate, Frederick Burden questioned the late deployment of 
military troops to quell the riots in their early stages. Burden demanded an 
assurance from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that military forces would
407 Singapore Standard, 27th February, 1951 and ‘Robert E. Foulger to Thomas Lloyd, May 26th, 
1951’, CO 537/7245.
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be promptly activated in the event of another major riot. Another Conservative 
Member of Parliament, Arthur Harvey, asked for the earliest date by which the 
investigation of the Commission of Enquiry would be completed. James Griffiths 
explained that the causes and factors that led to the riots had yet to be fully 
uncovered. The government would not commit itself to Burden’s proposition. In 
response to Harvey, Griffiths wryly noted that the ‘gallant Gentleman will have 
seen from Press reports, the Commission have begun their work and are taking 
evidence.’409
The Commission of Enquiry held its last session on 9th March, 1951. All in 
all, a total of 136 police officers, government servants, Muslim elites and 
members of the public had been interviewed. Investigative tours were conducted 
in the areas where the riots had taken place. Several films of riot incidents and an 
anti-riot drill were also assessed. Members of the Commission arrived in England 
on 6th April and completed their report on the first week of May 410 The Straits 
Times noted that the enquiry was ‘a demonstration of the public’s rights and of the 
duty of government to account for its action, it is a profound tribute to an 
administrative system which is more often abused than praised.’411 The American 
Consul-General thought otherwise. In his view, the Commission had failed to 
obtain fundamental facts from the Singapore Governor who, as the most 
prominent figure in the Colony, could not be placed under oath because of the 
legal principle that ‘the King can do no wrong’412 Likewise, the Acting Australian
409 Hansard, Vol. 482, 21st February, 1951, pp. 1276-1277.
410 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation o f Malaya, April -  May 1951’, CO 
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411 The Straits Times, 3rd March, 1951
412 ‘Singapore Riots Inquiry: A Study in Responsible Government’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1951, 
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Commissioner for Malaya, L.R. McIntyre, remarked that the Commission had 
concentrated mainly on its second term of reference, that is, ‘the measures taken 
to protect life and property and restore law and order.’ It was more than certain 
that the failure of the police force would constitute a large portion of the final 
report. Much blame for the riots, in McIntyre’s view, should have been attributed 
to the inefficiency and political oversight of the civilian officials in Singapore. 
Not a single one of those officials had considered seeking the help of Muslim 
leaders to defuse Muslim ill-feelings towards the government, which had 
developed many months before the riots. The government had also ‘no proper 
plan ready for meeting an emergency of this sort.’413
Unsure yet concerned with the likely texture of the report, Griffiths, 
Higham and Gimson maintained regular correspondence with members of the 
Commission as the writing proceeded. When advance copies of the document 
were sent to the Colonial Office, Griffiths and Higham maintained that the future 
of Blythe was ‘rather black’ and that ‘there is nothing in the conclusions which 
would prima facie reflect on the Governor (except possibly paragraph 21, by 
implication).’414 On 17th May 1951, the report was flown to Singapore.415 Gimson 
received prior information that he was free from blame, but he remained 
apprehensive of indirect references to his poor leadership during the riots. None 
was to be found. Confident of the fact that he had now been absolved of blame for 
the riots, Gimson sought to challenge various parts of the report which exposed 
the ineffectiveness of those under his charge. Selected personalities whom the
413 ‘L.R. McIntyre to The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 20th March 1951’, 
A1838/283.
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Singapore Governor had hoped to protect were thus provided with copies of the 
report for the purposes of exposing misinformation in the document, and to offer 
alternative viewpoints. Two copies of the document were delivered to Malcolm 
Macdonald and Henry Gumey for their perusal.416 A battle of words and wits 
within the colonial officialdom had begun.
• THE BATTLE OF WORDS AND WITS
The most vitriolic critique of the report came from Wiltshire, who sent a 
long memorandum to officials in Singapore and Britain in defense of the measures 
that he and senior officers in the Police Force had undertaken during the riots. 
Wiltshire asserted that the members of the Commission were not perceptive of the 
manifold dilemmas faced by police officers when confronted with unruly mobs. 
The main aim was to limit the scale of collateral damage. Seen in this light, the 
police force had performed to their fullest abilities. At the end of his abjuration of 
the document, Wiltshire recommended that public access to the defective enquiry 
report be restricted.417 Upon assessing Wilshire’s critiques, Higham opined that 
the memorandum would contribute nothing to the more urgent process of refining 
the Commission’s report. ‘I think it is only charitable to consider some passages 
of it as a product of an overwrought mind! ’418
From June 1951 onwards, a series of amendments were made arising from 
comments and criticisms within governmental circles. Representatives from the
416 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 26th May, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
417 ‘Copy of Memorandum dated 2nd July, 1951 addressed, under secret cover, to James Griffiths 
on the Invitation to make representations on the Report of the Leach Commission dated 17th May, 
1951’, CO 537/7247.
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military, for example, requested that the words ‘General Headquarters is not in 
Federation’, an expression that would have made them appear unprofessional, be 
changed to ‘He telephoned to General Headquarters and asked Headquarters 
Malaya District, in the Federation, to send et seq.’419 The Commission acquiesced 
to the proposed amendment. Although he had anticipated criticisms from the press 
should the publication of the report be delayed, the Singapore Governor was 
unable to accept more than twenty points ‘inclusive and which follow 
immediately after paragraph 176 thereof7, which he felt, would further diminish 
public confidence in a number of civilian and uniformed officials 420 Gimson 
rejected the suggestion that the Singapore Colonial Secretary was to be publicly 
censured for having failed to take heed of the advice given by the police force. 
The exercise of power to remove Maria Hertogh from the Convent of the Good 
Shepherd was dependent upon the authorisation of the civil court. Such power was 
not conferred upon the Singapore Colonial Secretary and the Commission of 
Enquiry had completely misjudged Wilshire’s ‘undoubted sincerity.’421 The 
second line of contention was that K.L. Johnson (the Acting Vice-Commissioner 
of Police) was not to be held responsible for what was purported to be an 
ineffective deployment of the Gurkha contingent. To the contrary, Johnson 
ensured that the Gurkhas were deployed at crucial points adjacent to the Sultan 
Mosque, which was the best course of action in such circumstances 422 Thirdly, 
Gimson disputed the assertion that the CID ‘erred in failing to make an early 
search of the Mosque which was the focal point of the rioting throughout.’ The 
task of clearing the streets of rioters was the duty of uniformed policemen, not the
419 ‘Franklin Higham to James Griffiths, 1st June, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
420 ‘Statement on the Singapore Riots Enquiry Commission, 1st June, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
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CID. The C.I.D had, however, taken on a more logical move by seeking the 
support and co-operation of Muslim leaders to disperse the crowds. In connection 
with this, the Commission was wrong to assert that the Sultan Mosque was the 
focal point of the rioting. The throwing of bottles and other small-scale violence at 
the mosque on the evening of 12th December was insignificant when compared 
with attacks on civilians and damage to property in other parts of the island. A 
notable case in point was the riots in Geylang which proved to be more fatal than 
those in other areas. It was spurious, Gimson argued, to posit that the Japanese 
Occupation had had an adverse effect on governmental officials, resulting in their 
inability to effectively manage cases of mass violence.423 Reforms at all levels had 
been implemented since the liberation of Singapore in 1945, which had brought 
about the restoration of efficiency and discipline within the Civil Service. To drive 
home his points, Gimson requested that his disassociation from selected contents 
of the report was to be published simultaneously with the final version of the 
document.424 Having studied Gimson’s contentions, coupled with the Maria 
Hertogh appeal case pending in the months that followed, the Colonial Office 
postponed the publication of the report.425
The announcement of the delay in publication led to tangled debates and 
wild speculations over the report’s contents and reliability. Reporters from leading 
newspapers in Singapore tried to obtain inside information on the contents of the 
report but were frustrated by the colonial state’s effective measures in limiting all
423 Even Higham. noted that “ ...I dislike very much the conclusion 21 on page 46 of the Report 
about die effects of Japanese occupation; but here again the way in which the adverse effects of 
this conclusion are to be offset is a question for the Governor to consider in die first.” See ‘John D. 
Higham to Thomas Lloyd, 26th May, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
424 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 1st June, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
425 Montiily Political Intelligence Reports: Federation of Malaya, June -  July, 1951’, CO 537/7343.
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discussion of the report to closed circles. It was predicted that the report would 
emerge as a ‘best seller’. To make matters worse, rumours were circulating that 
the failings of some prominent British officials would be exposed.426 One 
uninformed observer suggested that the Singapore Governor had been severely 
reviled and, hence, was manipulating parts of the report which exposed his poor 
leadership. In a meeting that was attended by community leaders in Singapore, Dr. 
C.H. Withers-Payne (the President of the Singapore Association) called for the 
immediate publication of the report. Withers-Payne remarked that the ‘tardiness in 
placing the commission’s findings before the public is not in the public
A f}  n
interest.’ Even the members of the House of Commons in Britain were 
oblivious of the internal debates pertaining to the findings of the Commission of 
Enquiiy. When asked by Niall Macpherson from the Conservative Party when was 
the earliest date on which the report would be published, James Griffiths 
responded that the onus was placed upon the Singapore Governor to examine the 
report and decide on the appropriate date for publication 428
Meanwhile, tensions between British officials in Britain and the Singapore 
Governor became more intense, due to the latter’s agitation for further 
amendments to be made to the report. Thomas Lloyd (the Permanent Under­
secretary of State at the Colonial Office) went to the extent of reminding Gimson 
that, whilst he was aware that the Governor was the best judge of the anticipated 
public reaction to the report, Gimson should also take into consideration that 
reports of a quasi-judicial nature were usually accepted by ministers in Britain
426 The Straits Times, 29nd May, 1951. ‘Singapore Riots Inquiry: A Study in Responsible 
Government’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1951, NACPM.
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without comment. Correspondingly, Higham highlighted that any departures from 
the findings of the Commission should he limited to matters that were pertinent. 
Trivialities, such as the use of certain terminologies and sentence structures, 
should be avoided.429 Sir Lionel Leach, the Chairman of the Commission, who 
was evidently upset with the scores of criticisms levelled thus far, defended the 
report in its entirety. He stressed that there was ‘abundant evidence to support 
every finding of fact made by the Commission and its primary duty was fact 
finding.”430
Gimson was not deterred from pursuing his line of arguments. He 
admonished the Secretary of State for the Colonies that
the public generally will, I feel sure, be as disappointed as I am with the Report. My 
immediate advisers agree with me that the Report* discloses that the enquiry was 
superficial in character, that no real attempt was made to investigate deficiencies of the 
police force or emergency organisation, and that too much attention was paid to almost 
irrelevant issues. Nor has it brought to light anything o f which the Government was not 
aware before the Commission began its enquiries.431
In a follow-up telegram to Thomas Lloyd, Gimson strove to set aright what he 
saw as the erroneous claims made by Foulger in a letter sent to the Colonial 
Office. Foulger, according to Gimson, had wrongly assumed that the riots were 
the product of a shortage of well-trained senior officers and constables in the 
police force. The number of officers in the police force was more than sufficient 
for the management of law and order in the colony and it was Foulger who
429 ‘James Griffiths to Franklin Gimson, 19th June, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
430 ‘Note by Sir Lionel Leach’, CO 537/7247.
431 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 21st June, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
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‘appears to be suffering under a delusion in this connection.’432 Gimson repeated 
his request to make further alterations in the report, so as to insulate several men 
under his charge from public censure. After a heated debate between Higham, 
Griffiths, Lloyd, Leach and Gimson, the report was reworded and distilled, though 
the core conclusions remained intact. The Singapore Governor was permitted to 
publish his personal disagreements to be included as part of the report’s 
appendices 433
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry, popularly known as the ‘Leach 
Report’, was published on 7th August, 1951. Having been modified in accordance 
to the politics of the time, it is unsurprising that Leach Report failed to provide a 
balanced or definitive account of the causes and events that led to the outbreak of 
the Maria Hertogh riots. The central purpose of the Leach Report, Mary Kilcline 
Cody suggests, ‘seems more didactic than investigatory and it may be seen as a 
lesson for colonial governments rather than an attempt to establish the causes of 
the riots.’ 434 Going beyond this, I would argue that the Commission of Enquiry 
had failed to pose a basic yet crucial question: Why did the riots occur in some 
localities, yet not in others? Due to such oversight, the Leach Report made no 
reference to the socio-economic marginalization, deprivation, alienation and 
grievances of the Malays and other communities, which could well explain the 
mass participation and rapid spread of the riots in the villages, ghettos and other 
suburban parts of Singapore. It is noteworthy to highlight that such social 
problems have already been made apparent by an influential Malay newspaper, 
the Utusan Melayu, some few months before the commencement of the
432 ‘Franklin Gimson to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 26th June, 1951’, CO 537/7246.
433 ‘Riots: Singapore; Report of Commission o f Enquiry: Leach Report (1951)’, CO 537/7248.
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176
Commission of Enquiry. According to the newspaper editorial, a large number of 
youths who participated in the riots originated from slums and dilapidated 
kampongs, which revealed that the outbreak of violence was closely linked to the 
social conditions of the Malays and the inadequacy of governmental policies 
towards them.435 Indeed, the British were oblivious of the correlation between 
mass violence and the socio-economic marginalization of the local community. 
They had only become aware of the predicament during a Governors’ Conference 
which was held in the following year, when issues pertaining to Muslims in 
Singapore were deliberated at length.436 In corroboration with the analysis of 
Utusan Melayu, Stanley Lieberson and Arnold Silverman state that riots were 
prevalent in major cities of the post-war period especially ‘when social institutions 
function inadequately, or when grievances are not resolved under the existing 
institutional arrangements. Populations are predisposed or prone to riot; they are 
not simply neutral aggregates transformed into a violent mob by the agitation or 
charisma of individuals. Indeed, the immediate precipitant simply ignites prior 
community tensions revolving around basic institutional difficulties.’
The Leach Report attributed the outbreak of the riots to a few key factors. 
Foremost among them was the intense feeling which developed within the Muslim 
community in Singapore arising from the court verdict regarding the custody of 
Maria Hertogh. Another aggravating factor was Maria Hertogh’s stay at a Roman 
Catholic Convent, which heightened suspicions that there had been prior plans 
forcibly to convert the girl to Christianity. The third cause was the publicity given
435 Utusan Melayu, 20th and 21st December, 1950.
436 ‘Extract o f Minutes o f Malaya/Bomeo Governors’ Conference, 15th January, 1952’, CO 
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by the press on the legal case and Maria Hertogh’s life at the Convent. Muslim 
hatred of the Europeans and Eurasians in the colony was further intensified by 
public statements and speeches made by the ‘Nadra Action Committee’, whose 
chief members were Karim Ghani, Dr. Burhanuddin, Mohammed Taha bin Kalu, 
Syed Ali Al-Attas, Darus Shariff and Mohammed Mustaza. A large portion of the 
document was devoted to providing intimate details on the role of the police force. 
The report ascribed the riots to the failure of the Malay police in particular and to 
the police force as a whole for having failed to anticipate the possibility of an 
outbreak of mass violence and to employ necessary force at an early stage. This 
prompted the rioters ‘to take it as a sign of weakness’ which resulted in the spread 
of riots from the area just outside the Supreme Court to other parts of the city. 
Comprehensive reforms were recommended to remedy the problems of weak 
leadership, corruption, poor discipline, disorganisation and low morale within the 
police force.438
• VILLAINS AND SCAPEGOATS
Crucial parts of the Leach Report were published verbatim by newspapers 
in Singapore. Along with headlines such as ‘4 Top Officers Blamed’ were pictures 
of R.C.B. Wiltshire, G.R. Livett, K.L. Johnson and W.J. Parks. In opposition to 
these negative portrayals, Major-General Dunlop was praised for his foresight and 
command of the military during the riots.439 Two leading Chinese newspapers, 
Nanyang Siang Pao and Sin Chew Jit Poh, both commended the report for its 
impartiality. The Utusan Melayu refrained from issuing any comments, aside from
438 ‘Riots: Singapore; Report o f Commission o f Enquiry: Leach Report (1951)’, CO 537/7248.
439 The Straits Times, 7,h August, 1951.
178
reporting the essential findings of the Commission.440 In Britain, the Leach Report 
was published on the front pages of the Manchester Guardian, the News 
Chronicle, the Daily Mail and the Daily Herald. Replicating the views of most 
newspapers in the country, the Manchester Guardian depicted the document as 
‘devastating’ and ‘extraordinary’ because ‘there was hardly a branch of the 
administration in which the commission had not unearthed failures.’441
When viewed from the perspective of the senior police officers, the 
summer of 1951 coincided with the beginnings of their struggle for self- 
preservation. Having risked their lives in the line of duty and, on many occasions, 
been decorated with medals attesting to their bravery and good conduct, their 
heroic status had been called to question. Instead, they were portrayed as ‘villains’ 
for having failed to perform the duties expected of them in the course of the riots. 
The first victim of the colonial administration’s endeavour to preserve the 
legitimacy of its higher command was Foulger. He was denied his anticipated 
promotion to the post of a Deputy Inspector-General of the Colonial Police. The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies maintained that ‘Foulger’s advice in this 
capacity would not be immediately and readily acceptable to other Police Forces, 
particularly those in the Far East.’ Faithful to his oath to the British Empire and, in 
part, determined to redeem his honour, Foulger requested a re-appointment as the 
Commissioner of Police in Singapore.442 Gimson was unwilling to accept what 
seemed to him as an outlandish and impractical proposition. Although he 
acknowledged Foulger’s past contribution in re-establishing the Singapore Police 
Force following the Japanese Occupation, Gimson maintained that Foulger’s re­
440 Utusan Melayu, 7th August, 1951.
441 Manchester Guardian, 7th August, 1951.
442 ‘Thomas Lloyd to Franklin Gimson, 9th June, 1951’, CO 537/7245.
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appointment would stifle the rapid progress of reforms arising from the plans that 
had been laid by Pennefather-Evans. Moreover, Pennefather-Evans had regained 
the respect and trust of the Malay rank and file, which had deteriorated upon the 
outbreak of the riots. ‘Whether Foulger could possibly rejoin the police after the 
departure of Pennefather-Evans must depend to a large extent on public reception 
of the conclusions of the Riot Enquiry Commission.’443 In point of fact, Foulger 
was barred from holding any position in the Singapore Police Force by order of 
the Colonial Office. He was offered a minor post in Tanganyika ‘to remove any 
feeling that he has been harshly treated.’444 Subsequently, Gimson took it upon 
himself to publicly criticise the former Acting Commissioner of Police. Wiltshire 
was alleged to have failed to relay crucial information needed in order for the 
Singapore Colonial Secretary to come to a firm decision on the first day of the 
riots.
This marked the start of the melee between uniformed and non-unifoimed 
officials of the colonial administration as well as members of the general public. 
In an interview with a The Straits Times correspondent in London, Wiltshire 
commented sarcastically that ‘[n]inety-eight pages and a mention of Wiltshire on 
nearly every one.. .1 only wish I could state my case at the same time as this report 
- 1 know places where they will be lapping it all up - but I am still in the Force and 
cannot say a thing.’446 Pennefather-Evans joined in the debacle by stating that any 
actions by police officers in the event of riots and other acts of violence were 
‘liable to be censured later. He is liable to be blamed for using too little force or
443 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 26th June, 1951’, CO 537/7245.
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too much.’447 In the same week, several notable elites from the European and 
Eurasian communities in Singapore stressed that the report had wrongfully blamed 
police officers who were placed in near-death circumstances when confronted 
with the armed rioters.448 Prominent Chinese leaders also expressed their 
unhappiness at the report’s censure of Wiltshire, contending that former Acting 
Commissioner of Police had been made ‘a scapegoat’ to cover up the misdeeds of 
higher-ranking British officials in the colony. An anonymous member of the 
public wrote that the government could not escape ‘from the fact’ that during the 
opening stages of the riots, ‘the government never took any leading part.’449
Against all odds, Gimson remained adamant in defending Wilfred Blythe 
by stating explicitly his disagreement with the Leach Report’s censure of the 
civilian official under his charge. Blythe’s responsibility for the mishandling the 
riots, according to Gimson, was still ‘open to interpretation.’450 At the same time, 
the Singapore Colonial Secretary provided the Home government with his version 
of the episode, alleging that newspaper reports on his role in placing Maria 
Hertogh in the Catholic Convent were no less than false. Rather, it was the Dutch 
Acting Consul-General, Jacob van der Gaag, who declined his appeal to remove 
Maria Hertogh from the Convent.451 Van der Gaag had also refused the 
application for an interview with the Commission of Enquiry, giving the excuse 
that representatives ‘of a foreign government would act correctly by not meddling
447 The Straits Times, 9th August, 1951.
448 The Singapore Free Press, 7th August, 1951.
449 The Straits Times, 8th August, 1951.
450 The Straits Times, 7th August, 1951,
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with any domestic affairs unless he would receive an explicit and formal request 
to do so.’452
Discussions on the contents of the Leach Report and the subsequent 
disciplinary measures meted out to four senior police officers were deliberated 
upon in the Legislative Council on 21st August, 1951. Gimson anticipated dissent 
but the reverse held true.453 It was probably one of the most sober sessions since 
the Council was established in 1948. Four motions were proposed by the 
Singapore Governor:
‘(1) That this Council having read and considered the Report of the Singapore Riots 
Inquiry Commission 1951 accepts the findings of fact made by the Commission except in 
cases where evidence was not available to or was not placed before the Commission and 
now requests the Government to take such further action against the Government Officers 
and servants inculpated by the said Report as may be necessary and proper,
(2) That this Council, as representing the people of the Colony o f Singapore, tenders to 
Major General Dunlop and to the officers and men under his command its heartiest thanks 
for restoring law and order in Singapore on the 11th and 12th December 1950, during the 
partial breakdown of the Civil Government.
(3) That this Council deeply deplores the incidents referred to in Part XXI of the 
Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission Report and particularly in sections 173, 174 and 
175 which are calculated to diminish almost to vanishing point die public confidence in 
the Singapore Police Force and especially its senior ranks.
452 ‘Jacob van der Gaag to Wilfred Blythe, 6th July, 1951’, CO 953/10/6.
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(4)That this Council disassociates itself from the contents of the dispatch o f His 
Excellency the Governor o f Singapore dated the 13til of July, 1951 printed on pages 97 
and 98 of the Singapore Riots Enquiry Commission Report.”454
The first motion received the unanimous approval of the Council. The 
second motion was accepted by all without any division. Several lines 
commending the role of the Volunteer Special Constabulary were added and the 
words ‘partial breakdown of the Civil Government’ was removed. The third 
motion was reworded to:
‘That this Council takes note that the Government intends, in view o f the serious nature of  
the comments on the conduct of all senior officers of the Police Force contained in Part 
XXI o f the Singapore Riots Enquiry Commission Report and particularly, to take action 
to investigate tire said comments with a view to taking such disciplinary action, if  any, 
under Colonial Regulations as may be necessary and proper.’
The last motion was rejected by all members of the Council. Gimson was 
surprised yet pleased that the overall result was in favour of the government. He 
attributed such affirmative reactions to the Council’s appreciation of the various 
difficulties faced by the government and its agencies in the days before and during 
the riots. Members of the Legislative Council were also aware of their shared 
responsibility in facing up to the difficulties and problems posed by the riots, and 
they all agreed that the Leach Report was substandard.455
454 Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 21st August, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. B 194-224.
455 “Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 22nd August, 1951”, CO 537/7247.
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On the other hand, newspapers in Singapore and Britain reacted negatively 
to the Legislative Council proceedings. The Straits Times, the Manchester 
Guardian and The Times editorials described the session as unsatisfactory and ‘a 
sordid victory’ on the part of the government for avoiding an explanation for the 
absence of the Singapore Governor on the first day of the riots. The Leach Report 
was caricatured as a skilled attempt at concealing the truth of the Maria Hertogh 
controversy.456 Celebrated for its lucid criticisms of the government’s policies, the 
Singapore Standard startlingly shared the views of the Chinese press that the 
government should not be faulted for the riots. The editorials of these newspapers 
further emphasised that there were many lessons to be leamt from the incident, 
one of which was the pertinent need for British officials and other elites in the 
colony to maintain closer rapport with the common people. Utusan Melayu 
stressed the need to improve the living conditions and salaries of the police 
officers.457 In response to several misleading comments by the local press and by 
newspapers in the United Kingdom, Gimson announced over the radio his 
assurance that all discussions on the Leach Report had been carried out in a liberal 
way. He warned the press of partisan and one-sided comments which could 
threaten democracy in the colony.458
British officials and local elites in the Malay Peninsula maintained that the 
riots had placed the Singapore Governor and the Colonial Secretary in jeopardy. 
At a tea session with General Harold Briggs (the Director of Operations in 
Malaya), a British colonial officer based in Penang commented: ‘It seems to me
456 The Straits Times, 22nd August, 1951 and Antara, 24th August, 1951.
457 ‘Singapore Political Report for August, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
458 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 8, August 1951’, CO 537/6800 and ‘Singapore 
Political Report for August, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
184
there are two “very frightened men” in Singapore and they are busy looking for 
scapegoats.’ Briggs’ response was swift and telling, ‘Well any intelligent person 
reading the newspapers could only come to that conclusion.’459 In the same way, 
Tan Cheng Lock (President of the Malayan Chinese Association) viewed the 
Singapore Governor and the Colonial Secretary as lacking in initiative and had 
proven to be incompetent in the face of an outbreak of mass violence 460
The political blunders and poor management of the enquiry had also 
provoked much displeasure among the higher echelons of the colonial 
administration. Having been informed that Gimson was rapidly losing the 
confidence of a large portion of the Singapore community, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies maintained that the Singapore Governor should be relieved of his 
post461 Malcolm Macdonald concurred with Griffiths’s observation. In fact, he 
was greatly disturbed by the stream of critiques hurled by local elites at the 
aloofness and arrogance of British officials in Singapore. A Muslim member of 
the Legislative Council, for example, commented that such a poor disposition 
would result in a deterioration of Muslim support towards the British 
government.462 The Commissioner-General found it appalling that, even though 
the Leach Report had insulated the Singapore government from a complete 
collapse of legitimacy, Gimson’s relationship with the local elites in the colony 
had still not improved. There was a serious level of distrust for his governorship 
among ‘die-hard European elements’ in the colony. To Malcolm Macdonald,
459 ‘C.D. Whitehead to Tan Cheng Lock, 5th September, 195T, Folio 5, Tan Cheng Lock papers.
460 ‘Tan Cheng Lock to C.D. Whitehead, 24th January, 1952’, Folio 5, Tan Cheng Lock papers.
461 ‘Thomas Lloyd to Malcolm Macdonald, 23rd August, 1951’, Malcolm Macdonald Papers, 
24/4/28.
462 Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 21st August, 1951, p. 
B221.
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Gimson had ‘retained (unwittingly I think) too much of the superiority complex of 
the old Colonial type of Governor...Over and over again Europeans and Asians 
alike have expressed to me their regret that, though they liked and admired 
Gimson a lot, they could never get on to terms of social equality and close 
personal friendliness with him.’463 There was, at the same time, the problem of 
Blythe’s ineptness in fulfilling the role of Acting Governor should Gimson be 
retired too soon. It was decided that a formal handover was to take place in March 
1952. Johns Feams Nicoll was proposed as the new governor of Singapore.464
The controversies surrounding the Leach Report soon became a topic of 
debate within the British Cabinet. In his report to the Labour Prime Minister, the 
British Minister of Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell, observed that the ‘standard of 
personnel on the higher levels in the Administration and Police in Malaya leaves a 
great deal to be desired and that we must take steps to improve it.’ More 
importantly, the riots were symptomatic of latent inefficiencies in the civil 
administration than of problems in the uniformed service.465 The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies disagreed with Shinwell’s views and defended the Leach 
Report’s findings that the major part of the blame for the riots should be placed 
upon the police force. The debate between the two officials, according to Anthony 
Stockwell, ended in a ‘draw’ 466 Upon considering all contending viewpoints,
463 ‘Thomas Lloyd to Malcolm Macdonald, 28th August, 1951’, Malcolm Macdonald Papers, 
22/4/40.
464 “Malcolm Macdonald to James Griffiths, 28lh August, 1951’, Malcolm Macdonald Papers, 
24/4/42.
465 ‘Emmanuel Shinwell to Clement Atlee, 4th September, 1951’, FO 371/93117.
466 Stockwell, “Imperial Security and Moslem Militancy”, p. 332.
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Clement Atlee concluded that ‘errors had been made but that much had arisen 
from the initial mistake of placing the Hertogh girl in a Convent.’467
On September 1951, a Tribunal Committee was established under Colonial 
Regulation 68(ii) to deliberate upon punitive actions against six senior police 
officers. T.A. Brown (a Judge of the Supreme Court), A.W. Frisby (the Director 
of Education), and Sir Han Hoe Lim (a Member of the Executive Council) were 
nominated as members of the tribunal whose main task was to read out the 
charges laid against the officers concerned and to obtain further evidence of their 
roles during the riots. R.C.B. Wiltshire (former Acting Commissioner of Police), 
K.L. Johnson (a Senior Police Officer) and W.J. Parks (another Senior Police 
Officer) were charged with ‘gross negligence’ in the performance of their duties. 
Six other sub-charges were laid against Wiltshire, which is revealing of the 
government’s persistent attempt to shift most, if not, all of the blame upon him. In 
one of the sub-charges, Wiltshire was held responsible for failing ‘to give to the 
Colonial Secretary full and frank reports of the situation.’468 Three other officers, 
N.G Morris (the Deputy Commissioner of Police, CID), W.G. Watson (a Senior 
Police Officer) and A.H. Frew (another Senior Police Officer) were charged with 
peijury, manipulation of evidence and attempting to mislead the Commission of 
Enquiry. To a lesser degree than Wiltshire, yet no better, Moms had three other 
sub-charges to his name, one of which was the failure ‘to make an early search for 
weapons in the Mosque in North Bridge Road which was known to you to be the
467 ‘Internal Minutes by Ernest Davies, 10th September, 1951’, FO 371/93117.
468 ‘Wiltshire Enquiry, 25th September, 1951’, CO 1022/284. See also, ‘Johnson Enquiry, 25th 
September, 1951’, CO 1022/284 and ‘Parks Enquiry, 25th September, 1951’, CO 1022/284.
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focal point of these disturbances’.469 The officers were allowed to engage their 
personal lawyers, yet none accepted this concession. All of the officers cited their 
inability to pay for the steep legal expenses, but the key underlying reason was a 
conscious realization that their fates were already sealed and their careers as 
police officers had come to a close.
Expectedly, Gimson was troubled with the conduct and the eventual 
outcome of the tribunal’s deliberations, especially on whether to allow public 
access to tribunal sessions or to limit it to governmental circles 470 James Griffiths 
argued that the defendants should be given the prerogative to decide on this point 
and that all sessions should be filmed 471 The Singapore Governor contended that 
a public enquiry would re-ignite the public discontent that was slowly coming to 
pass. Press coverage of the tribunal could also further weaken the morale of the 
police force. Gimson thus recommended that the tribunal report be published at a 
much later date.472
Such suggestions were met with protests from prominent personalities and 
newspaper editorials which continued their defence of the police officers and 
agitated for an open and impartial trial 473 The Straits Budget highlighted that new 
evidence on the riots would emerge from the proceedings. It was thus crucial that 
access to the tribunal report be made public to provide a fuller account of the
469 ‘Morris Enquiry, 24th September, 1951’, CO 1022/284. See also, ‘Watson Enquiry, 24,h 
September, 1951’, CO 1022/284 and ‘Frew Enquiry, 24th Septemmber, 1951’, CO 1022/284.
470 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 21st September, 1951’, CO 953/10/3.
471 ‘Oliver Lyttelton to Franklin Gimson, 22nd September, 195T, CO 953/10/3.
472 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 24th September, 1951’, CO 953/10/3.
473 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 9th October, 1951’, CO 953/10/3.
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events in December 1950.474 The ex-Director of the Special Branch, Rene Onraet, 
criticized the government for absolving the civilian officials of their errors. To 
him, the Leach Report was written by men who were unacquainted with the 
danger at hand. The riots would have become even worse if  the police had 
resorted to the use of force on the crowd. Onraet reasoned that the low morale of 
the police had been over-emphasised in such a way that it risked ‘creating 
something that does not exist’. Moreover, the police force was part of the larger 
governmental machinery. To focus solely upon the weakness of the police force 
meant that other deeper problems in the administration of Singapore were 
conveniently concealed. ‘The Commission’, Onraet remarked cynically, ‘did little 
to enhance our Civil prestige. It did much to kill it.’ 475 In line with Onraet’s 
critique, Gordon Smith, the Chairman of the Public Services Commission, 
accused the government and The Straits Times of suppressing facts and 
manufacturing false accounts in order to ward off criticisms launched against 
them 476 Upon witnessing the objections expressed by the press and other civil 
servants, the Secretary of State for the Colonies decided to allow public access to 
the proceedings of the tribunal and publishing the report at a later date, subjected 
to the approval of the new Governor and the new Secretary of State for the 
Colonies 477
474 Straits Budget, 11th October, 1951.
475 The Straits Times, 1st October, 1951 and British Malaya, September, 1951, pp. 330.
476 ‘Franklin Gimson to James Griffiths, 5th September, 1951s, CO 537/7247.
477 ‘James Griffiths to Franklin Gimson, 17th October, 1951s, CO 953/10/3.
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• CONCLUSION -  SHIFTING FATES, SHATTERED LIVES
The tribunal’s investigations ended in November and a report was sent to 
Whitehall on 11th December 1951.478 At the same time, the Singapore Executive 
Council deliberated on the disciplinary measures to be meted out to the six senior 
police officers. The Executive Council concurred with the tribunal that there was 
no strong evidence to prove that Morris, Parks, Frew and Watson had failed to 
perform their duties or sought to conceal vital information on the circumstances 
that led to the mishandling of the riots. It was recommended that the four police 
officers be acquitted of all charges laid against them, and that all legal expenses 
incurred by Moms be fully refunded. Johnson was to be publicly censured for his 
poor conduct during the riots. He was to be granted retirement with full pension, 
and all legal costs incurred by him would be refunded by the government. 
Likewise, it was proposed that Wiltshire be removed from his post and retired 
with a full pension.479 Living up to its slow-moving and pedantic bureaucratic 
legacy, the Home government announced that all recommendations would be 
studied in full and that no firm decisions could be made till several months later.
In the interim, Winston Churchill (the newly elected Conservative Prime 
Minister), sought the counsel of his advisers in London in regard to the reshuffling 
of key British officials in Malaya. A lengthy letter was sent by Field Marshal 
Bernard Law Montgomery who agitated for the removal of several individuals. 
Malcolm Macdonald was, to Montgomery, a man ‘who talks too much’, driven by 
emotions with no concrete plans. Gimson ‘has now “had it”, and he admits it’.
478 The Straits Times, 12th December, 1951.
479 ‘Franklin Gimson to Oliver Lyttelton, 28th December, 1951’, CO 1022/284.
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The Singapore Colonial Secretary was unfit for the job as shown by his 
indecisiveness during the riots. Inferring from his knowledge of Wiltshire via the 
events that unfolded since the December riots, it was clear to Montgomery that the 
former Commissioner of Police ‘cannot be much good.’ In concluding his letter, 
Montgomery stated that the ‘personalities paint a sorry picture in Malaya and 
Singapore. A complete clean out is wanted.’480 Not all of the Field Marshal’s 
recommendations were taken on board by Churchill. Malcolm Macdonald retained 
his post as the Commissioner-General till 1955 481 Three months later, the new 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, who shared Montgomery’s 
views on an immediate replacement of key officials in Singapore and Malaya, 
announced Gimson’s forthcoming departure as Governor and paid tribute to his 
contributions. The incoming Governor of Singapore was Johns Feams Nicoll, and 
he was to assume office on 1st April, 1952.482 Previously appointed as Chief 
Secretary of Fiji and subsequently Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, Nicoll had 
maintained strong links with Indian merchants and businessmen. He was also a 
popular figure among the Chinese community, due to his friendly disposition and 
his ability to converse in several Chinese dialects. Upon receiving the news of 
Nicoll’s appointment, the spokesman for the Singapore Overseas Importers and 
Exporters Association mentioned that ‘Singapore has a predominantly Chinese 
population and it is far better to have a Governor who has lived among the 
Chinese.’483
480 ‘Appointment o f Templer: Letter from Field Marshal Lord Montgomery to Mr. Churchill. 
Enclosure: ‘Success in Malaya, note by Montgomery, 4th January, 1952’, PREM 11/169.
481 ‘Oliver Lyttelton to Clement Atlee, 3rd November, 1953’, PREM 11/1306.
482 The Straits Times, 16th January, 1952.
488 The Straits Times, 17th January, 1952. See also, “Government Changes in Federation of Malaya 
and Singapore”, A4231.
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By the end of January 1952, the six police officers whose livelihood was 
now dependent upon the outcome of the tribunal were reported to have expressed 
their anxiety at the sluggish decision-making process.484 Pennefather-Evans 
articulated his concern to Gimson on the need for the government to issue a public 
statement that four of the six officers had been found innocent of all charges 485 
The Straits Budget editorial described the delay as ‘shameful’.
If the fault lies with the Colonial Office, which appears to have the right to the last word, 
as usual, then it should realize that its procrastination is bringing the Singapore 
Government into contempt. If publication is delayed much longer it will be reasonable to 
suspect that somebody is writing yet another, and still different, verdict.486
Psychologically disturbed by events that had transpired since the riots, Wiltshire 
wrote a long and heartrending letter to Onraet, a former colleague and confidant 
who stood by him in the worst of times. The former Acting Commissioner of 
Police recollected how colonial administrators in Singapore and Malaya had 
perpetually ignored numerous warnings by the police of an impending upheaval 
which had its roots in the radical elements within Malay society. Yet, when such 
admonitions proved to be far from mere speculations, the police force ironically 
became the scapegoat of the system which it sought to protect. Onraet was in full 
agreement but realised that nothing could reverse Wiltshire’s shattered destiny.487
484 ‘Franklin Gimson to Oliver Lyttelton, 23rd January, 1952’, CO 1022/284.
485 ‘Franklin Gimson to Oliver Lyttelton, 25th January, 1952’, CO 1022/284.
486 Straits Budget, 21st February, 1952.
487 ‘R.C.B Wiltshire to Rene Onraet, 19th February, 1952’, British Association o f Malaysia papers. 
For insights into various attempts by the Special Branch in warning the government o f possible 
threats within the Malay society prior to the riots, see ‘Malayan Security Services, Political 
Intelligence Journals, 1/1948’, John Dailey Papers.
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In London, Lyttleton went to some length to advise Lionel Leach and 
members of the Commission of Enquiry to hold back their strong opposition 
towards the ‘undue leniency’ of the tribunal.488 In the main, British officials in 
Whitehall approved all recommendations brought forth by the Singapore 
Executive Council. They went a step further to veto the public censure of 
Johnson 489 Towards the end of March, the tribunal report was published and 
featured in almost all major newspapers in Singapore and the United Kingdom 490 
During an exclusive interview at his residence in England, Wiltshire declared that 
his career in the Colonial Service was over and he ‘will get down to the work of 
growing cabbages.’ 491 Nine years later, he was re-appointed as the Commissioner 
of Police in Aden 492 Two Singapore Legislative Councillors, Lim Yew Hock and 
Charles Joseph Paglar, expressed their grievances concerning the government’s 
victimization of Wiltshire. The Singapore Standard and Utusan Melayu editorials 
wrote that ‘the grounds used for the retirement of Mr Wiltshire could very well be 
applied to many other officers in the colony’ and urged that the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary be subjected to further inquiry.493 Such resistance from the 
press and prominent personalities in Singapore and England dimmed towards the 
second half of the year.
To a great extent, the strategy of self-criticism which the British employed 
proved to be successful in ensuring that the higher echelons of the colonial state
488 ‘Oliver Lyttelton to Franklin Gimson, 14th March, 1952’, CO 1022/284.
489 ‘Official Letter from Secretary o f State for the Colonies to Sir A. Lionel Leach, 15th March, 
1952’, CO 1022/284.
490 ‘Singapore Political Report for March, 1952’, CO 1022/206. See also, The Report o f the Police 
Disciplinaiy Inquiries 1951, (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952).
491 Singapore Standard, 27th March, 1952.
492 See Anthony Stockwell (ed.), Malaya Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 359, note 6.
493 Singapore Standard, 27th March, 1952 and Utusan Melayu, 27th March, 1952.
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were insulated from a severe collapse of legitimacy in the aftermath of the Maria 
Hertogh riots. The Singapore Governor was left generally unscathed throughout 
the ordeal. Towards the end of 1953, the Singapore Colonial Secretary retired 
honourably from the Malayan Civil Service, and went on to become a renowned 
writer of books about Chinese labour and secret societies in Malaya.494 This was 
in stark contrast to the fates of lower-ranking colonial officials, such as Wiltshire 
and Johnson, as well as the Malay policemen who were made to shoulder much of 
the blame for the riots. Although it has to be admitted that the British were self- 
critical and generally receptive of criticisms launched against them, this 
distinctive feature that characterized the Empire must be seen in the light of actual 
practices that were determined by the realities of the day. Indeed, self-criticism in 
the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots was no less than a complex process of 
restoring the essential integrity and, more importantly, legitimacy of the high 
command of the colonial administration.
494 See Wilfred Blythe, Historical Sketch o f  Chinese Labour- in Malaya (Singapore: Government 
Printing Office, 1953) and Wilfred Blythe, The Impact o f  Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A 
Historical Study {London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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Bashir Mallal and Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui 
Source: Mansoor Adabi Papers and Syed Ali Alsagoff
Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff 
Source: Syed Ali Alsagoff
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Standing on the extreme left: Ahmad Ibrahim at a tea reception organized by 
members of the Indian community. On the far right is Mansoor Adabi 
Source: Mansoor Adabi Papers
Members of the Inter-Religious Organisation 
Seated fourth from left is Malcolm Macdonald 
Source: Syed Ali Alsagoff
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CHAPTER 6 
Reconciliation
In the foregoing chapters, I have elucidated on the strategies of 
proscriptions, surveillance and self-criticism which led to the detection, arrests 
and censure of persons and institutions held responsible for the outbreak of the 
Maria Hertogh riots. Yet, to fully comprehend the dynamics and intricacies of 
British colonialism in post-war Singapore, particularly in the event of mass 
violence, one must not fail to fathom the interplay and manipulation of strategies 
that sought to discipline as well as to reconcile differences with the colonized 
subjects.495 The waning of British primacy in an era of decolonization meant that 
the eradication of threats posed by ‘extremists’ had to be counteracted by the 
maintenance of relationships of close collaboration, with the ‘moderates’ within 
the colonized societies. Pointedly, Frank Heinlein observes that the global 
environment of the post-World War Two period posed an array of serious 
challenges to the relevance of the British Empire. The employment of brute force 
alone in the management of colonies was no longer viable ‘at least if Britain 
wanted to retain the support of its allies.’496 In view of this, the next two chapters 
of this thesis will examine British strategies of reconciliation and reforms which 
were an integral part of the effort to regain their tarnished image and agency.
495 For a discussion o f the British use o f such strategies in the management o f  its colonies in the 
Victorian period, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox o f American Power (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 16 and p. 144.
496 Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the 
Official Mind (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 107. See also: Harper, The End o f  Empire and the 
Making o f Malaya, p. 308.
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‘Reconciliation’, which was conceivably a more arduous and convoluted 
undertaking, is the main subject of this chapter.
I argue that the British colonial administration in Singapore and the 
Colonial Office in Britain were faced with a daunting challenge of reconciling the 
interests of multiple parties in the local and international arenas. Three inter­
connected approaches were employed to diffuse the tense atmosphere. First, the 
policy of repression was counterbalanced with the facade that the British were not 
by any means insensitive towards Islam and the immediate concerns of Muslims 
in Singapore. Secondly, the British sought to re-establish cordial relations with 
politicians and administrators in the Netherlands, yet at the same time, allay the 
established perception among Muslims that the British were pro-Dutch. Thirdly, 
intensive measures were undertaken to regain the confidence of the European, 
Eurasian and other communities in Singapore who had been traumatized by the 
spectre of violence and the ineffectiveness of the police force. Indeed, a great 
number of people from various beliefs, ethnicities and classes in the colony were 
plagued by grief and suffering resulting from the loss of human life as well as 
financial losses incurred due to damaged and stolen property.
In other words, the British were confronted with the difficult and 
precarious task of ensuring that no individual, group or institution implicated in 
the Maria Hertogh controversy was given preferential treatment over others. To 
balance and rule, more than to divide and rule, was the British approach to the 
politics of regaining their tarnished image and agency in the aftermath of the riots. 
It is important to point out that, although the colonial state played a key role in the
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complex and intensive process of reconciliation, it did not possess a sole 
monopoly of initiative. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will expound on how 
various individuals and organisations from within the colonized society actively 
contributed to the efforts of mending inter-racial and inter-religious relations that 
had been severely shaken by the riots and providing relief to those who had 
suffered throughout the ordeal.
• RESTORING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
One of the earliest attempts by Singapore Colonial Secretary to be 
reconciled with the distressed members of the public was to make it known that 
law and order had been reinstated two days after the outbreak of violence. During - 
a radio broadcast, Wilfred Blythe announced that government offices would 
resume their daily operations and that ‘this example will be followed by all in 
Singapore.’ Put simply, life would return to normal.497 The Singapore public was 
also furnished with emergency procedures that had been established since the 
quelling of the riots. A coordinated communication network between the Public 
Relations Office, the Executive Council and the police force had been instituted to 
ensure a swift deployment of military and police officers in the face of all fonns 
of widespread disturbances.498 At about the same time, extensive publicity was 
given to a diplomatic visit by two American Senators. Theodore F. Green and 
Homer Ferguson were reported to have walked along North Bridge Road - a site 
where Europeans had been attacked - without police escorts. When interviewed by
497 The Straits Times, 14th December, 1950.
498 The Straits Times, 20th December, 1950 and 29th December, 1950. See also ‘Colonial Political 
Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797 and ‘Appendix to Brief of the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary o f State for the Meeting with the Prime Minister on Monday the 
10th September, 1951’, CO 537/7247.
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a reporter from the Straits Times, the Senators remarked that they ‘were impressed 
by the signs of Singapore’s prosperity.’499
Such shallow propaganda met with a mixed response from newspaper 
editorials in Singapore and England. As the unofficial voice of the UMNO party 
in Malaya, the Majlis newspaper expressed its skepticism towards the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary’s optimistic forecast. The editorial remarked in a satirical way 
that, ‘Belanda makan nangka, British dapat getah ’ which implied that although 
the Dutch had been the instigators, it was the British who were left to shoulder the 
long-term consequences of the riots.500 The editorial highlighted the fact that a 
large number of shops in the riot-stricken areas were still closed, and attendance at 
work had dropped substantially as many workers were apparently injured or 
arrested, or refused to leave their homes in fear of their lives. Such fear was 
compounded by a growing animosity towards Muslims, who were perceived as 
the main culprits behind the riots.501 In parallel with this, the Manchester 
Guardian highlighted the possibility of a major outbreak of violence between 
Malays and Chinese in Singapore. It was claimed that the riots were rooted in the 
entrenched bitterness of Malays towards the political and economic dominance of 
the British and the Chinese in the colony. Race and class differences rather than 
religion were the driving forces behind the riots and many skirmishes to come.502 
These politically-charged comments were widely publicized in the pages of the 
Singapore Standard. Interestingly, the Utusan Melayu denounced what it deemed 
as the erroneous and shallow analyses of the Manchester Guardian. The Malay
499 The Straits Times, 16th December, 1950.
500 A similar English idiom would be that the British had gotten ‘the short end o f the stick.’
501 Majlis, 15th December, 1950.
502 The Singapore Standard, 14,h December, 1950.
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daily maintained that most Malays in Singapore regarded the Chinese as their co­
citizens, and that there had never been a deliberate campaign to uproot the 
Chinese from Malaya.503
Reacting to the seemingly negative portrayals by the press of 
developments in Singapore, representatives from various states and organisations 
in mainland Malaya published their appeals for Muslims to remain calm. They 
expressed the hope that non-violence and the ideology of peace would be upheld 
by all parties.504 Under the chairmanship of Dato Onn bin Jaafar, Muslim elites in 
Singapore in turn encouraged their co-religionists to work towards mending inter­
religious ties that had been severely disrupted by the riots. Among those who 
signed a public statement that was published in all major newspapers in the colony 
were Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, Tuan Haji Ali bin Haji Salleh (the Chief 
Kathi of Singapore) and M. J. Namazie.505 The Singapore Colonial Secretary too 
issued a public statement which stressed the importance of the media in the 
reconciliation process. Editors of newspapers were prompted to seriously ‘reflect 
upon the incidents of the last few weeks, for there is a lesson to be learned here 
too - the lesson that if we are to maintain that harmony for which Singapore has, 
since its foundation, been famed, care must be taken in the presentation of news 
not to offend religious susceptibilities and exacerbate communal differences.’506
Blythe’s tactic of what has been termed ‘blame displacement’507 for the 
outbreak of riots was not left unchallenged. The Straits Budget countered the
503 Utusan Melayu, 19th December, 1950.
504 Utusan Melayu, 14th December, 1950.
505 The Straits Times, 15th December, 1950.
506 The Singapore Free Press, 20th December, 1950.
507 Brass, The Production o f Hindu-Mttsiim Violence in Contemporary India, pp. 305-327.
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Singapore Colonial Secretary’s remarks by publishing several opinion pieces 
which portrayed the British as the chief culprits behind the tensions that had 
developed. A European commented that although the British colonial 
administration in Singapore professed their profound respect for the religion of 
Islam, events that had unfolded in the months prior to the riots revealed that the 
government had failed to live up to its own rhetoric. The outbreak of mass 
violence was a product of British insensitivity and indifference to the demands of 
Muslims.508 The Straits Times, the Singapore Free Press and the Singapore 
Standard reasoned that the blame placed upon the press was based on hindsight 
rather than foresight. No governmental agency had made attempts to play down 
what was alleged to be sensational press coverage of the Maria Hertogh legal case. 
Reflecting on the debate that ensued, John Leslie Micheal Gorrie (the Private 
Secretary to the Singapore Governor) espoused the view that the British 
government should have shouldered much of the blame for the riots. The newly 
established Civil Service was unacquainted with the socio-religious challenges 
and anxieties faced by the Muslim minority community in the immediate post-war 
years. This was made worse by the outright mishandling of various issues that 
were deemed sacred to Muslims. The government rather than the press per se, 
according to Gorrie, was responsible for the attacks launched against Europeans 
during the riots.509 Such observations lent credence to the assertions made by Dato 
Onn a month prior to the outbreak of riots. To the President of UMNO, Malaya 
has been made ‘a dumping ground’ for British officials of inferior quality.510
508 The Straits Budget, 21st December, 1950.
509 “Recorded interview with Mr. John Leslie Micheal Gorrie, 8th October, 1991”, Oral History 
Interview, National Archives o f Singapore (A0001309).
510 “Dato Onn to James Griffiths, 1st November, 1950”, CO 537/6020.
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Standing in between these opposing viewpoints, William Langdon, the 
American Consul-General who was based in Singapore during the same period, 
observed that the press had exacerbated racial and religious antagonisms which, in 
part, precipitated the riots. English and vernacular language newspapers in 
Singapore were sold out in the weeks prior to the riots, due to the extensive and 
lurid coverage of the Maria Hertogh legal case. On several days, even the updates 
on the Korean War were pushed from the front pages by the news of the case.511 
Nevertheless, the newspapers had ‘acquitted themselves well after the outbreak of 
the rioting with good news coverage of the event and restrained criticism of the 
authorities. They must have realized, but they would not think of admitting it; that 
they unwittingly contributed to the outbreak of violence; they subsequently 
cooperated in every way, however, to dissuade rioters from further violence.’512
The Chinese community in Singapore also played an important role in 
promoting dialogue, assuaging tensions and assisting the British in the 
maintenance of public order. The largest Chinese daily newspaper, the Nanyang 
Siang Pao, urged the British to ‘think thrice’ before committing to a legal decision 
in the upcoming appeal trial. The move to restore Maria Hertogh to her foster 
mother and husband would be of no great loss to the Dutch. On the other hand, the 
Malays were an important and integral part of the British Empire. The British 
should therefore ensure the repatriation of Maria Hertogh back to Singapore to 
avoid the violation of the religious rights of the Muslims, which could pave the 
way for further bloodshed and violence. The Guomindang newspaper, Sin Chew
511 ‘William R. Langdon to Department of State, 15th December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-1550, 
NACPM.
512 ‘Press Comments on the Hertogh Case and Singapore Riots’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-2750, 
NACPM.
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Jit Poh, called upon the British, the Dutch and the Muslims to allow Maria 
Hertogh to decide for herself on whether to reside in the Netherlands or Malaya. 
The paper stressed that Netherlands’ diplomatic relations with other Muslim 
countries, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, would most certainly be jeopardized if 
the custody of Maria Hertogh was awarded to her natural parents.513 Another 
observer who identified himself as a ‘Straits Chinese’ expressed his regrets that 
the ‘very good name of the Singapore Malays and Muslims, who are regarded as a 
most law abiding community in the colony has been besmirched.’514 In tandem 
with these commentaries, several well-known Chinese personalities exerted their 
influence over the community by discouraging youths in the villages from 
committing acts of violence.515
Admittedly, such a proactive move by Chinese elites in the colony was not 
entirely motivated by altruism. It was, in some measure, a latent strategy to regain 
the trust of the British which had been blemished by the growing assumption that 
most Chinese supported the communists. The Chinese in Singapore were said to 
be filled with hope and optimism upon the quelling of the riots. Although they 
were sympathetic towards the Europeans and Eurasians who were injured and 
murdered by rioters, Chinese elites were glad that the British had begun to realize 
the flaws embedded within their pro-Malay policy. They hoped that friendship and 
trust would swing back in their favour.516 Beyond the public show of support, the
513 “Press Comments on the Hertogh Case and Singapore Riots”, RG 59, 746F.00/12-2750, 
NACPM.
514 The Straits Times, 17th December, 1950.
515 ‘Transcription o f Interview with Mr. R.H. Barth, 10th February, 1984’, Oral History Intei-view, 
National Archives o f  Singapore (A000392), p. 216 and Singapore Standard, 13th December, 1950.
516 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797 and ‘Political 
Summary-lst December 1950 to 31st January 1951 Part III -  Colonial Territories -  Singapore’, CO 
537/7346.
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prevailing view among the Anglophone Chinese was that the riots ‘served them 
(the British) bloody well right.’517 Rumours with regards to Malcolm Macdonald’s 
ineffectiveness during the riots were also circulating like wild fire within Chinese 
circles. The Commissioner-General was alleged to have been at an antique shop 
with Harold Stassen (the President of the University of Pennsylvania) during the 
riots. They were heavily guarded by several police officers and troops who could 
have been deployed elsewhere,518
Despite the appeals of community leaders, hatred, hostility and distrust 
remained deep-seated and virulent. Muslims in Singapore were committed to the 
perception that the British would not cease to deny their religious rights.519 Those 
of a radical bent were prepared for another violent confrontation in the event of 
any sign of Western prejudice towards Islam and Muslims. In the same way, 
Europeans and Eurasians expressed their lack of confidence in the colonial state’s 
ability to ease the tense situation. On 17th December, an anonymous writer who 
signed off as ‘A European’ wrote a polemical commentary against the police for 
its failure to protect the people during the riots. ‘It is indeed news to learn that the 
police are issued with firearms only to save their own lives. Surely their primary 
purpose is to protect the public whom they serve and to quell riots and other 
dangerous threats to public security? Is it not for this puipose that they are issued 
with weapons?’ On the same day, a satirical cartoon portrayed a man pointing his
517 ‘William R. Langdon (American Consul General in Singapore) to Department of State, 20th 
December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-2050, NACPM.
518 ‘William R. Langdon (American Consul General in Singapore) to Department of State, 20th 
December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-2050, NACPM. For details on the formal arrangements for 
Harold Stassen’s visit to Malaya, see: ‘Malcolm Macdonald to Foreign Office, 27th November, 
1950’, FO 371/81747.
519 ‘Extract fromPM RNo. 12/1950 dated 27/12/1950’, CO 537/7302. See also ‘Colonial Political 
Intelligence Summary No. 2, January 1951’, CO 537/6797.
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fist at a British judge with the caption, ‘Thank God for the Army, but what we 
want to know is why they were called in so late!’520 Such alarmist and negative 
reactions were unsurprising, as the two communities were the main victims of the 
riots. The Europeans were particularly petrified by their unprecedented experience 
of being the primary targets of mass aggression.521 Indeed, women and children 
from the largely expatriate community were haunted by vivid recollections of 
assaults upon their families and friends. A former British colonial official in 
Singapore recounted that it ‘was a nasty time for all of us’. Recalling his 
ambivalence towards a Malay driver at the time of the riots, Lionel Griffith-Jones 
wrote: ‘We could neither be sure whether his Muslim presence with me would 
make it safer for me, or my Christian presence with him makes things 
uncomfortable for him.’522
Unbeknown to the general public, government officials had organized 
several meetings with Europeans and Eurasians to address their anxieties and to 
provide updates on the security measures that had been taken to protect them. In 
one of the meetings, a suggestion was made that Europeans and Eurasians residing 
in areas where fatal attacks had taken place should be provided with revolvers for 
self-defense. But the idea was shelved, as it proved to be problematic at a practical 
level. Rudy Mosbergen, who played an active role in airing his views during the 
meetings, posited that it ‘could well be that the idea was dropped because of all 
kinds of problems that would emerge from such an arrangement.’523 It was feared
520 The Straits Times, 17th December, 1950.
521 Annual Report o f  the Singapore Police Force, 1950, (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1952), p. 1.
522 Griffith-Jones, That’s My Lot, p. 138.
523 “Transcription o f Interview with Mr. Rudy Mosbergen, 26th April, 1994”, Oral History 
Intetyiew, National Archives o f  Singapore (A000510), pp. 113-115.
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that the carrying of firearms would precipitate unintended conflict and violence. 
Moreover, the Eurasians were mindful that Henry L. Velge, the Volunteer.Special 
Constable who fired the first shots during the riots which injured two Malays, was 
a well-respected member of the Eurasian community. Hence, one of the safe 
courses adopted by Europeans and Eurasians in the aftermath of the riots was to 
stay indoors. They were also advised by the police to refrain from visiting areas 
where their safety would likely be compromised. Although an exception to the 
rule, several Eurasian families migrated to Europe and Australia in order to 
remain safe from Muslim aggression.524 A similar policy was adopted by some 
American expatriates in Singapore who, as a precautionary measure, had sent their 
wives and children back to the United States.525
Meanwhile, members of the Muslim Advisory Board stepped up their 
campaign to restore Maria Hertogh to her husband and to agitate for the release of 
detainees who had not participated in the riots. A dialogue session between 
prominent Muslims such as Dato Onn bin Jaafar, M.J. Namazie, Haji Ali, Syed 
Ahmed Alsagoff, Sardon Jubir, Nazir Mallal, Fadlullah Suhaimi, Haji Abu Bakar 
and Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui and the Singapore Governor was held, at 
which, three pertinent demands were put forward. First, the Muslim leaders sought 
an assurance from the British that the Dutch would be informed of the 
appointment of a Muslim who was tasked by the Muslim Advisory Board to 
ascertain ‘the wishes of the said Nadra binte Ma’aroof (Maria Hertogh) as to 
whether she desires to remain in Holland or to be returned to Singapore’. The 
second demand pertained to Maria Hertogh’s return to Singapore during the
524 “Recorded interview with Mr. Joseph Henry Chopard, 1st August, 1985”, Oral History 
Intetyiew, National Archives o f  Singapore (A000561).
525 Antara, 11th January, 1951.
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appeal court hearing. The Muslim deputation hoped that the British would ensure 
the full cooperation of the Dutch in that aspect.526 Finally, a request was made that 
those in police custody be treated in a just way, so as to avoid unnecessary 
afflictions upon the innocent. Sardon Jubir highlighted the need for relief grants to 
the dependents of those who had been arrested during the riots.527 In response, 
Gimson stressed that the British Government viewed the Maria Hertogh case 
purely from a judicial angle and that all decisions would be left to the court’s 
discretion. The Singapore Governor added that the British would maintain the 
fullest respect for the religion of Islam and would safeguard the religious liberties 
of Muslims. He went on to assure them that the first and second demands would 
be brought to the attention of the Home Government. As for the third demand, 
Gimson gave his word that the Social Welfare Department would commit its 
resources towards alleviating all foims of difficulties faced by the families of 
those injured and the many others who had been arrested. The Governor added 
that the screening of detainees would be hastened to weed out innocent persons. 
The meeting went on to discuss various measures to promote the welfare of the 
Muslim community and the protection of Islamic customs in such emotionally 
intense times.528 Acting upon the advice of the Colonial Office, the Governor later 
acceded to the first demand and said that the government would assist to the 
fullest extent in obtaining the cooperation of the Dutch authorities in repatriating 
Maria Hertogh to be present for the appeal.529 At a personal level, however, 
Gimson was apparently shaken by the meeting as it reflected the heightened
526 ‘Franklin Gimson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17th December, 1950’, FO 
371/93114.
527 See ‘Public Relations -  Report’, FO 371/93116 and ‘Open letter to His Excellency Sir Franklin 
Charles Gimson’, FO 371/93116.
528 ‘Franklin Gimson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17th December, 1950’, FO 
371/93114.
529 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 18th December, 1950’, FO 371/93114.
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activism and assertiveness of the Muslim elites. He was certain that the failure to 
respond effectively to Muslim demands would further inflame animosities locally 
and in other parts of the Muslim world.530
Correspondingly, the Singapore Colonial Secretary issued another press 
release which stated that forty-five armed vehicles, fifteen armoured cars and 600 
soldiers and policemen had been deployed throughout Singapore. Blythe reported 
that crowds were seen cheering as the troops passed by their residences. This was 
a clear testimony that a majority of the citizens of Singapore respected the laws of 
the colony and were sanguine that the military would protect their lives and 
property. The Singapore Colonial Secretary also paid tribute to the Volunteer 
Special Constables for their commitment and vigilance in aiding the regular 
policemen.531
In London, colonial officials sought the cooperation of Dutch politicians in 
the Netherlands to mitigate excessive press coverage on Maria Hertogh’s arrival at 
the airport. Muslims in Singapore were attuned to developments in the 
Netherlands and would react violently to the jubilant celebrations which had been 
planned by Catholic activists. Writing to the Colonial Office, Philip Nichols 
(British Ambassador at The Hague) reported that a strict warning had been issued 
to all Dutch newspapers to avoid sensationalism and misreporting. Dozens of 
Christian organisations and parties were also advised to practise moderation in 
cheering for the Hertoghs upon their arrival at the Schiphol airport. Though the 
Dutch authorities were unsuccessful in preventing the cheers of large crowds at
530 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 18th December, 1950’, FO 371/93114.
531 The Singapore Free Press, 19th December, 1950.
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the airport, preemptive measures prevailed on other occasions. At Bergen-op- 
Zoom, where the Hertoghs resided, no extensive celebrations were observed. 
Newspapers in the country covered the story in great detail, yet none highlighted 
the political and religious aspects rooted within the legal case ‘except to say that 
the riots were significant of the present tension between the East and the West. 
Comment in the responsible newspapers were on the lines that unhealthy interest 
was being shown in this little girl and that the sooner the whole story was 
forgotten the better it would be for all concerned. In short, I think the Government 
has not done badly, though for some reason or other something seems to have 
gone wrong at Schipol itself.’532
• PACIFYING THE MUSLIMS
Earlier on, mention has been made about the Southeast Asia Muslim 
Missionary Conference which was held towards the closing of the year. Whilst the 
British intelligence services were concerned with attempts by Muslim leaders to 
harvest support for the Maria Hertogh case, for Malcolm Macdonald, the event 
provided an excellent opportunity to repair the damaged ties with influential 
Muslim leaders in Southeast Asia. Although Malcolm Macdonald was unable to 
deliver the inaugural address at the Conference, he ensured that a carefully-crafted 
speech was sent to the organizers to be read on his behalf.533 Jamiyah was 
commended for taking the lead in strengthening the religious commitment of 
Muslims in Southeast Asia in the midst of an unending battle against secular 
ideologies which promoted violence. Furthermore, Malcolm Macdonald called for
532 ‘Philip Nichols to J.D. Murray, 19"' December, 1950’, FO 371/84677.
533 Ahmad and Wanjor, Report o f the Southeast Asia Muslim Missionaiy Conference, p. 7.
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close cooperation between representatives from different territories to bring about 
a climate of religious fi*eedom and mutual tolerance.534
The Commissioner-GeneraTs critical role in the promotion of religious 
dialogue and understanding did not end there. On his own initiative, he called for 
a meeting with members of Inter-Religious Organisation (I.R.O). Formed only a 
year prior to the riots, the I.R.O. was a brainchild of Maulana Abdul Aleem 
Siddiqui, whose main intent was to establish a religious front against the 
coiTupting influence of communism in Singapore and Malaya. The I.R.O pursued 
three inter-related objectives. First, the organisation hoped to foster friendship and 
goodwill between leaders and representatives of major world religions. Secondly, 
it aimed at promoting a spirit of mutual tolerance, understanding and appreciation 
of different faiths. Thirdly, the I.R.O hoped to foster close cooperation among its 
members for the common good of the community. To achieve these objectives, 
informal activities, regular discussions and annual conferences were organized to 
fortify a common set of values between its members and the general public.535 As 
the patron of I.R.O., Malcolm Macdonald was instrumental in garnering mass 
support for the organisation from its inception. A major setback encountered was 
the failure to obtain the participation of Roman Catholics, who were instructed ‘by 
orders from higher authority outside Malaya5 to play no part in the activities of the 
organisation.536 They were, however, provided with updates of the I.R.0.5s 
resolutions and activities.
534 The Singapore Free Press, 26th December, 1950 and The Straits Times, 20th December, 1950.
535 ‘Inter-Religious Organisation (Singapore and Johore Bahru)’, PRO 23.
536 ‘Malcolm Macdonald to James Griffiths, 14th January, 1951’, CO 537/7302.
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Three weeks after the outbreak of the riots, Malcolm Macdonald called for 
an informal tea session with the executive members of the I.R.O. Distrust and 
disappointment was manifested by those present. The Christians, for that matter, 
were embittered by the lack of compassion shown by Muslim leaders towards 
Christian members of the I.R.O. who had been attacked by rioters. One of the 
worst casualties was a Presbyterian Minister, Robert Greer, who had been beaten 
nearly to death. Muslim members of the I.R.O explained that they were unable to 
reach out to the non-Muslim victims of the riots because they were preoccupied 
with the urgent task of dissuading their co-religionists from engaging in violent 
acts. As the tea session proceeded, Malcolm Macdonald mooted the idea of 
issuing a public statement on the maintenance of religious harmony in Singapore. 
Several members expressed their reservations, but a consensus was reached in that 
the declaration would be ‘simple, sincere and in its way noble statement of the 
unity upon this issue of the leaders of all the religions represented in Singapore 
and Johore. As such, it will have a certain amount of influence on large numbers 
of local followers of all the faiths.’537 The statement was subsequently publicized 
by the media, which described it as a notable effort by religious leaders in the 
colony to reach out to those who were directly or indirectly affected by the riots.538 
Soon after, visits to hospitals were organized and necessary aid was provided to 
numerous persons who had been injured during the riots. It was indeed a crucial 
juncture in the history of the organisation, as it rose to greater prominence in the 
midst of the reconciliation process.539 Although Catholics maintained a guarded
537 ‘Malcolm Macdonald to James Griffiths, 14th January, 1951’, CO 537/7302.
538 Utusan Melayu, 12th January, 1951 and The Straits Times, 12th January, 1951. See also 
‘Statement by George G. Thompson, Public Relations Secretary (Singapore), 22nd February, 1951’, 
CO 953/10/1. See Appendix 1 of this thesis for the Full Statement.
539 “Recorded interview with Mr. Mehervan Singh, 23rd July, 1985”, Oral History Interview, 
National Archives o f  Singapore (A000553).
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distance from the organisation, the I.R.O. played a major role in bridging religious 
boundaries and dispelling misconceptions, both in Singapore and in Malaya, up to 
the advent of the Labour Front government in 1955.540
Towards the end of January 1951, the Muslim Advisory Board conducted 
goodwill sessions in rural areas of Singapore with the object of dispelling 
rumours, providing the true facts of the Maria Hertogh case, and admonishing the 
Muslims to maintain cordial relations with non-Muslims.541 Although most 
Muslims were progressively pacified by such initiatives, remnants of 
dissatisfaction within the community prevailed. A case in point was the demand 
for places of religious instruction by Malay firemen of the Geylang Fire Station. 
Even though the fire station was located adjacent to a mosque, the firemen 
reasoned that no classes could be conducted therein as the mosque was built solely 
for the purposes of prayer and worship. The British saw the issue as one that could 
potentially re-ignite Muslim discontent towards the colonial state. Of particular 
concern was the fact that acquiescing to Muslim demands would set a precedent 
for civil servants of other religious faiths to agitate for similar facilities. The 
Singapore Municipal Commission was tasked to conduct extensive investigations, 
and discussions were held with the firemen. After a long-drawn debate, the 
request was rejected.542
540 ‘Public Relations Officer to the Governor, Singapore’, 16th November, 1955, PRO 19.
541 ‘Extract of Minutes of 21st Meeting held on 12th January 1951, at Kuala Lumpur by Joint 
Information and Propaganda Committee’, CO 537/7302.
542 “Minutes o f Meeting of Estates and Fire Brigade Committee held on Tuesday, 19th December, 
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Subsequently, Muslim writers and newspaper editorials launched a stream 
of polemics against the British and their collaborators. Chief among these was 
Ahmad Lutfi (whose real name was Syed Abdullah bin Abdul Hamid Al-Edrus). 
Born in 1911 to a rich Hadrami family based at Banjarmasin in modem day 
Indonesia, Ahmad Lufti gained fame through publishing and writing novels, 
children’s fiction, language textbooks and political commentaries. His popularity 
peaked towards the end of December 1950, upon the publication of a fictional 
depiction of the Maria Hertogh controversy. The book emerged as a best seller 
throughout Malaya.543 In one of his political commentaries published in the 
January 1951 issue of the Qalam magazine, Ahmad Lutfi highlighted that 
Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives in the event of any encroachment upon 
Islamic laws. He urged the British to display more respect towards Islamic beliefs 
and legal injunctions, especially in the realm of personal laws. This would prevent 
a recurrence of religious riots in Singapore.544 Ahmad Lufti’s critique of the 
British was accentuated by coverage given by the Melayu Raya newspaper to the 
difficulties faced by the wives of six Muslim leaders who were still under 
detention. Bereft of financial support from their husbands, the women were said to 
be suffering from mental depression. The Melayu Raya editorials went on to chide 
Muslim elites in Singapore for their negligence towards the Muslims who had 
suffered during the riots. Thus far, only Mansoor Adabi, Bashir Mallal and Sardon 
Jubir had paid visits and provided necessary aid to the families of those who had 
been detained. Another personality who was eulogized for her philanthropic 
efforts was Che Zaharah, whom along with the members of the Singapore Malay
543 Ahmad Lufti, Anak Angkat (Singapura: Qalam Press, 1950). See also, Talib Samat, Ahmad 
Lutfi: Penults, Penerbit dan Pendalcwah (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2002), pp. 
87-89.
544 Qalam, Bilangan 6, January 1951.
214
Women’s Welfare Association, had distributed food and other basic necessities to 
twenty families.545
The response from Muslim leaders towards Melayu Raya’s accusations 
was swift. On 8th January, Sardon Jubir exhorted members of the public to inform 
him of specific incidences of wrongful abuse by the police during the riots and in 
their aftermath. Simultaneously, the Singapore Malay Union established the 
‘Muslim Welfare Committee’ whose primary task was to assist Muslim and non- 
Muslim families who were in dire straits. A voluntary contribution of $1,173 was 
collected from sympathizers and donors within and outside of Singapore. The 
committee also distributed $20 worth of aid each to more than 70 families, most 
of whom were Malays, Indian Muslims and Eurasians. The number of families in 
crisis as a result of the riots rose rapidly to 145 some few months later. To further 
alleviate the extent of suffering experienced by Muslims, the Singapore Muslim 
League distributed bags of rice and packets of meat to the families of detainees. 
Another relief committee which was presided over by Syed Abdullah bin Yahya 
informed the press that $200 had been raised and that only thirty-seven pieces of 
clothing had been distributed. An appeal was made for members of the public to 
contribute generously to its cause. In unison with this, the Muslim Advisory Board 
stepped up its visits to the homes of crisis-stricken families.546
As expected, the Singapore Governor built upon the efforts to pacify 
Muslims in Singapore and, at his own discretion, reiterated the benevolent nature
545 Melayu Raya, 3rd - 6th January, 1951.
546 The Straits Times, 13th - 22nd January, 1951; Melayu Raya, 8th January, 1951; ‘Minutes of 
Singapore Muslim League Committee Meeting, 20th June, 1951’, Mansoor Adabi Private Papers 
and ‘Mohd Salleh (Secretary of Kesatuan Melayu Singapura) to Bashir Mallal, 31st December, 
1950’, Mansoor Adabi Private Papers.
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of Britain’s role of the colony. During a tea party at the Raffles Hotel attended by 
representatives of religious faiths, Gimson spoke about the impartiality and 
independence of British courts. He stressed that the maintenance of law and order 
was of ‘prime importance to all those who wish to worship in a country of more 
than one religion.’ Members of all religions should work hand in hand with the 
government to prevent disorder and chaos. ‘Muslim subjects of the King’, said the 
Governor, ‘have always held a high place in His Majesty’s regard and have 
always been considered as among his most loyal supporters. The Muslim 
community in Singapore has, therefore, a high reputation to maintain and I hope 
that they will do nothing to besmirch this reputation and so to bring themselves 
and their religion into disrepute.’547 At this juncture, it is worthwhile to restate that 
Gimson’s discourse on governmental non-interference in legislative processes in 
Singapore was far from truthful. As seen in Chapter Four, the Singapore Governor 
had taken the proactive move to conduct secret negotiations with the aim of 
inducing Mansoor Adabi to dissolve his marriage with Maria Hertogh in 
accordance with the laws of Islam. Several well-respected Muslims had also come 
in support of the British but all in vain.548 Mansoor Adabi was more than 
convinced in pursuing his appeal at the Singapore High Court.
Efforts at reconciliation were also directed towards compensating those 
who had sustained injuries or had lost property during the riots. An announcement 
was made pertaining to the disbursement of claims to be considered on an ex- 
gratia basis. ‘Compensation will be met for injury (including fatal injury), 
damage, thefts or destruction of property in the riots. No compensation will be
547 Utusan Melayu, 13th January, 1951 and The Straits Times, 13,k January, 1951.
548 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 1st February, 1951’, FO 371/93116.
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paid to anyone who was a party or accessory to the riots. Claims should be sent to 
the Colonial Secretary’s Office before February 28.’549 Expressions of both 
sarcasm and praise from various community leaders in the colony ensued upon 
governmental declaration of committing itself to a compensation scheme. Nazir 
Mallal told The Straits Times that the scheme did not come as a surprise to many, 
given that the British has already revealed their plans to implement it at an earlier 
date. Thio Chan Bee, a nominated member of the Legislative Council, remarked 
that c[u]sually Government machinery works slowly, but in this instance it has 
worked fast.’550 There was however the problem of determining the appropriate 
amount of compensation to be disbursed. A segment within the Singapore 
populace argued that they should be compensated for ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’. There 
were others who contended that inflationary rates should be factored into the 
compensation scheme, as the price of cars has risen rapidly since the riots. To 
address such ambiguities, a tribunal was established to consider all cases. In the 
meantime, the Social Welfare Department obtained updates and rendered financial 
assistance to more than 140 riot victims. The Singapore Municipal Commission 
followed suit by paying for the damages to property incurred by civil servants. 
One of the cases that had been brought to light was that of a European officer 
whose car had been damaged by rioters. He was compensated in accordance to 
guidelines provided by the government.551
Partly due to the influence of Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff and Dato 
Onn, a British political report observed that Muslims in Singapore were slowly
549 The Straits Times, 24th January, 1951. See The Straits Times, 18th December, 1950.
550 The Straits Times, 24th January, 1951.
551 Utusan Melayu, 26th January, 1951 and The Singapore Free Press, 2nd and 8th February, 1951.
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'  • • * ^ C O  t  §regaining their trust in the British. Even so, Muslim elites advocated for victims 
of rioting, as well as Muslim women who had been widowed or whose husbands 
had been detained, to be provided with monetary and other forms of aid by the 
government. The release of those innocent of the charges of rioting should also be 
expedited to dispel allegations of abuses of justice. Gimson and the Singapore 
Colonial Secretary assured the public that the government would protect the rights 
of the innocent.553
• THREE KEY CHALLENGES IN RECONCILIATION
The months that followed were devoted to contending with three key 
challenges which could either redeem or disrupt the colonial administration’s 
efforts to reconcile different parties in both the local and the international arenas. 
The first challenge was the establishment of an impartial tribunal to compensate 
various parties who had suffered from the loss of kin and property during the riots. 
To avoid mismanagement in that regard, the Colonial Office instructed Gimson to 
obtain and study several reports of tribunals that were conducted in the Gold 
Coast, Aden and Uganda.554 Three distinguished persons, Sir Han Hoe Lim (a 
Medical Practitioner and a Member of Executive Council), S.C. Leech (the 
General Manager of Boustead & Co) and L. Cresson (a Local Businessman who 
was well-known for his public service) was selected as members of the Tribunal
552 ‘Singapore Political Report for January, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
553 Proceedings o f the First Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 16th Februaiy, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. B78.
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Committee upon the invitation of the Singapore Colonial Secretary.555 The 
Tribunal was provided with the following terms of reference:-
1. To inquire into any claims received from any person, other than a person who was a 
party or accessory to rioting, for compensation for injury (including in the case of 
fatal injuiy claims by dependants for compensation), damage, theft, or destruction of 
property arising directly out of riots in Singapore on die 11th and 12th December, 
1950;
2. To assess in the case o f damage to property the financial loss suffered in each case on 
die basis of value at the time of the loss and in the case of personal injuries 
appropriate compensation; and
3. To recommend to Government, in cases where the claimant shows diat he or she has 
suffered or will suffer hardship, an amount to be paid ex-gratia from Government 
funds.556
Theoretically, such terms of reference seemed ideal and achievable. The 
practice was altogether different. Recalling his role in considering hundreds of 
appeals for compensation, Richard Middleton-Smith asserted that the tribunal was 
unprejudiced in its disbursement of funds.557 Such a claim exposes the problems 
of validity and reliability of oral sources. In his oft-cited essay on oral history 
methodology, Alessandro Portelli posits that oral testimonies are, more often than 
not, fraught with ‘errors, inventions and myths’, tainting facts beyond their actual 
motifs.558 The task of a historian is thus to interrogate and expose prejudiced
555 The Singapore Free Press, 22nd May, 1951.
556 ‘Report of the Proceedings of the Riots Claims Tribunal, 19th June, 1951’, CO 953/10/2.
557 ‘Recorded interview with Mr. Richard Middleton-Smith, 27th September, 1999’, Oral Histoiy 
Interview, National Archives o f  Singapore (A000215).
558 Alessandro Portelli, The Death o f  Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History (Albany: Suny Press, 1991), p. 2.
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representations embedded in oral accounts by cross-examining it with alternative 
sources in order to arrive, as close as possible, at historical truths.
A close examination of the documents relating to the inner mechanics of 
the tribunal demystifies the rhetoric of impartiality which Middleton-Smith had 
asserted. In actual fact, the eventual ex-gratia payments were governed by 
political considerations and bias on the part of the Tribunal Committee. For 
example, full payment was made for all claims that had been submitted by the 
Dutch-Consulate.559 The tribunal reported that, although the application in respect 
to the damages incurred by the Dutch Consulate was not supported by sufficient 
evidence, ‘in this case, diplomatic courtesy woidd apply [italics mine].’ Similar 
applications by other foreign government agencies were, however, rejected on the 
grounds that they had presented their claims simultaneously to insurance
' 560 * •agencies. Partiality was also displayed towards relatives of Europeans and 
Eurasians who were injured or killed during the riots. All applications for 
compensation from civilians belonging from these two ethnic groups were 
approved and widows of servicemen were endowed with pension and monetary 
awards ranging from $10,000 to $20,000.561 It was different in the case of Asians. 
Only the dependents of twenty-seven-year-old Indian Police Inspector A. 
Ratnasingham, who was killed near the Joo Chiat police station amidst an attempt 
to save the life of a Dutch girl, were compensated with a sum of $2,280 and a 
pension.562 The claims of the dependents of five Chinese men who died during the
559 ‘Richard Middleton-Smith (Riots Claims Tribunal) to the Colonial Secretary, 6th April, 1951’, 
CO 953/10/2.
560 ‘Report of the Proceedings of the Riots Claims Tribunal, 19th June, 195T, CO 953/10/2.
561 ‘Casualties arising from the Riots in Singapore in December, 1950 (Ministry o f Pensions), 22 
May, 1951’, CO 953/10/2.
562 The Straits Times, 15th June, 1951.
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riots were categorically rejected. This was contended by a member of the tribunal 
committee. He was overruled by two other members who provided with evidences 
from coroner’s reports that the five deceased men had died of bullet wounds. It 
was thus assumed that the five men were rioters who confronted the military. The 
tribunal report was also silent about applications from dependents of Malays who 
were killed during the riots, as they were generally perceived as perpetrators of 
violence and thus undeserving of compensation. $93,000 was handed out to the 
dependents of seven persons who were killed, $28,491.50 for 29 persons who 
were injured, $16,774 for damage to personal property and $71,995.57 for the 116 
vehicles which were wrecked by the rioters. The total amount of money disbursed 
was $210, 261.07.563 Fully aware of biases inherent within the compensation 
process, the government ensured that the full details of the tribunal report were 
never made public. The Singapore Colonial Secretary proclaimed that it was ‘not 
considered to be in the public interest’ for the report to be published verbatim.564
The second diplomatic challenge which the British were confronted with 
was that of Maria Hertogh’s domicile. British officials in the Colonial and Foreign 
Offices were particularly anxious that poor management in that respect would 
further destabilize ties with the Netherlands and the wider Muslim world. 
Concurring with the advice of the Muslim Advisory Board, Gimson admonished 
officials in Whitehall to leave the final decision to Maria Hertogh, that is, to either 
reside with her family in the Netherlands or to be repatriated to Singapore in the 
custody of Che Aminah. Public opinion in Singapore, according to Gimson, 
‘would be very strongly opposed to any attempt to force the child back to
563 ‘Report of the Proceedings o f the Riots Claims Tribunal, 19th June, 1951’, CO 953/10/2.
564 Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 21st August, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B183.
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Singapore against her will whatever the Courts might decide on the point of 
law.’565 Whitehall officials were unsure of the implications arising from Gimson’s 
suggestion. A British diplomat was dispatched to convince politicians in the 
Netherlands to support the proposition that Maria Hertogh be given the 
prerogative to decide on her preferred domicile pending the appeal case in the 
Singapore High Court. The strategy failed. Having signed a bond of $7500 on the 
undertaking that Maria Hertogh would be promptly sent back to Singapore during 
the appeal hearing in March, the Dutch authorities displayed much reluctance, as 
the Roman Catholic lobby in the country would not agree to any form of friendly 
negotiations with Muslims.566
It is pertinent to note that such deep-seated animosities did not reflect the 
overall views of Dutch society. In fact, several Dutch personalities had gone to the 
extent of advocating Maria Hertogh’s repatriation to Malaya. Three Dutch- 
Muslim organisations, namely the Association of Islamic Students, the Moslem 
Mission in Holland and the Islam Union, made a public declaration that Maria 
Hertogh’s repatriation to Malaya would remedy the distrust that had developed 
among Muslim leaders towards the Netherlands.567 Several other newspapers in 
the Netherlands reported on the difficulties encountered by the girl in adjusting to 
the European way of life.568
The problem of language further complicated the already complex state of 
affairs. Having been nurtured and cared for by Che Aminah, Maria Hertogh was
565 ‘Sir Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 16th January, 1951’, FO 371/93114.
566 ‘Consulate General o f the Netherlands, December 1950’, CO 953/10/6.
567 Antara, 7th February, 1951.
568 ‘Transmitting General Conditions Report for the Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang 
consular districts for the period February 1-15, 1951’, RG 59, 746F.00/2-2851, NACPM.
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only fluent in the Malay language. To address such linguistic barriers, the Muslim 
Advisory Board nominated a senior member of the organisation to conduct the 
interview with Maria Hertogh. The British, however, foresaw the danger of being 
accused of siding with the Muslims. It was anticipated that the Dutch in turn 
would request for a Roman Catholic representative to be present during the 
interview, and this would provide the basis for protests by Muslims throughout 
Malaya. After much deliberation, a well-respected Pakistani Charge d’Affaires, 
who was conversant in both the English and Malay languages was selected to 
conduct the interview with Maria Hertogh. He would be accompanied by a Dutch
5 6 9interpreter. An unofficial Catholic representative was allowed to attend and the 
press was to be denied access to the interview.570 In August 1951, the Singapore 
Supreme Court rejected Mansoor Adabi’s appeal against the annulment of his 
marriage, and granted Maria Hertogh’s parents full custody of their child. The 
scheduled interview with Maria Hertogh was called off.571 To cushion the impact 
of the legal verdict upon Muslim public opinion, Gimson suggested that a study 
scholarship be awarded to Mansoor Adabi. Higham argued against this suggestion 
for it would be perceived by Muslims as ‘hush money’.572 The idea was 
subsequently dropped.
The third challenge to the colonial state’s attempt at reconciliation was to
be found in the residual grievances arising from comments made by several local
Anglophone and European leaders. Malays in Malaya were peeved by Dato Onn’s 
critique of their innate tendency to act in a rash manner, as seen from the riots.
569 ‘JohnD. Higham to J.D. Murray, 19th February, 1951s, FO 371/93116.
570 ‘J.D. Murray (Foreign Office) to B.O.B. Gidden (Colonial Office), 21st May, 1951’, FO 
371/93116.
571 ‘JohnD. Higham to Franklin Gimson, 10th September, 1951s, CO 953/10/6.
572 ‘John D. Higham to Franklin Gimson, 10th September, 1951s, CO 953/10/6.
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‘Not only the administration’, Dato Onn remarked, ‘but 80 per cent of Singapore 
residents lost confidence in us because of the action of a comparative few’. 
UMNO members were also advised to steer clear of destructive acts, which would 
disrupt the notable efforts of Malays in governmental agencies. Peace and 
freedom of the country must be upheld.573 Reflecting upon the incident, Tengku 
Abdul Rahman highlighted that it marked his ‘first disagreement with Dato 
Onn.’574 Muslim and non-Muslim elites in Singapore and Malaya voiced their 
fundamental disagreement with Dato Onn’s negative portrayal of the Malays. A 
joint statement by the Singapore Muslim League, the Hindu Board, the Malayan 
Chinese Association (M.C.A.) and the Straits Chinese British Association 
(S.C.B.A.) stated that it was erroneous to place the entire blame upon all members 
of the Malay community for the wrongdoings of opportunists and irresponsible 
persons in the course of the riots. In actuality, a majority of Malays in Singapore 
had displayed courage in sheltering Europeans and Eurasians who may otherwise 
have been mauled by the rioters.575
Almost a month later, another disturbing comment was made by the 
chairman of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. A. F. Taylor told The Straits 
Times that the British should act swiftly and ruthlessly in the face of those who 
sought to take the law in its own hands. Only then could the possibility of another 
outbreak of violence be prevented,576 The British abstained from siding with either 
contending parties. Such a policy of inaction provided non-state organisations the 
crucial space for activism and social change. The Hindu Association, for example,
573 ‘Reuter, 25th February, 1951s, CO 537/7297, Majlis, 26th February, 1951 and The Straits Times, 
26th February, 1951.
574 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Looking Back, p. 190.
575 Utusan Melayu, 28th February, 1951
576 The Straits Times, 31st March, 1951.
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formed an inter-communal body to consider aid to innocent persons tried after the 
December riots. The body also aided in the process of fostering harmony and 
goodwill between Muslims and non-Muslims in Singapore, whose relations had 
been undermined by the riots.577
In an attempt to further rectify the relationship between Muslims and the 
colonial state, the British acquiesced to their religious demands and paid tribute to 
the contribution of the minority community in the development of Singapore and 
Malaya. The Municipal Commission assented to various requests by both Muslim 
and non-Muslim civil servants to be relieved of performing tasks that were 
contrary to their religious beliefs. Such a shift in policy stemmed from the 
demands of a nurse who applied for an exemption from family planning 
campaigns. The nurse argued that the campaigns were in opposition to her 
religious beliefs.578 This period also saw the expansion of the eighteen-member 
Muslim Advisory Board through the incorporation of three prominent 
personalities: Mahmood bin Abdul Wahab (a former Police Inspector), Syed 
Abdullah bin Yahya (the President of the Singapore Arab Union) and Haji Jubir 
Haji Amin (a committee member of Jamiyah).519
During the launch of the first comprehensive Malay Arts and Crafts 
Exhibition, Malcolm Macdonald capitalized upon the opportune moment to argue 
against the ‘completely mistaken theory that Malays were an inferior people who 
needed special protection in their own country.’ Rather, the Malays had been as 
successful as the Indians and the Chinese in the economic and artistic spheres.
577 The Straits Times, 23rd February, 1951.
578 The Straits Times, 21st July, 1951.
579 Government Gazette, No. 66, Vol. VI, May 1951.
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Another area, in which Malays had excelled, was in the field of politics and 
governance. Malcolm Macdonald cited the names of several Malay politicians 
who had gained the respect of all communities in Malaya.580 To a great extent, 
Malcolm Macdonald’s portrayal of the Malays destabilizes Edward Said’s 
essentialist notions that the British and the West in general had consistently 
upheld denigrating representations of the Orient in the postwar era.581 Conversely, 
in an age of decolonization, the Orient had in many instances been appropriated as 
an equal, if not, dominant partner in an East-West relationship.
• THE MARTYR AND THE PROPHET OF ISLAM
16th October 1951 was a day of tragedy for Pakistanis and Muslims 
globally. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, was shot twice by a 
gunman whilst addressing a crowd at Rawalpindi. Muslims in Singapore, 
especially those of Indian origins, were saddened by the murder of a man who 
held the title of Quciid-i Millat (the Leader of the Nation). Liaquat had, in fact, 
played a crucial role in the Maria Hertogh controversy as seen through his public 
statement that the marriage of a thirteen-year old woman was valid from the
5 8 2perspective of Islam, with or without the consent of her non-Muslim parents. 
His sudden demise was followed by the closing of all shops and offices owned by 
Indian Muslims. A mass rally, attended by more than 800 persons, was held at the 
Jamiyah building, with speeches denouncing the assassin. Letters from several 
Muslim organisations in Singapore were also sent to Karachi expressing a deep
580 The Straits Times, 11th July, 1951.
581 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 255-283.
582 ‘Commonwealth Relations Office to U.K. High Commissioner in Pakistan, 1st February, 1951’, 
CO537/7302. See also ‘British Embassy (The Hague) to Foreign Office, 16th January, 1951’, FO 
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sense of sorrow and condolences for Liaquat, who was regarded as a shahid (or 
martyr) for having died in the war against extremism.583 At the Sultan Mosque, 
prayers for the deceased were read for three days on end, and food was distributed 
to the poor and orphans.584 Ironically, the assassination of the fifty-six-year old 
Prime Minister provided a pretext for a public show of British commitment to the 
protection of and concern for the Muslims of Singapore. As a symbol of grief, the 
Union Jack was flown at half-mast at the Government House. Gimson seized upon 
the catastrophic incident to be reconciled with the Muslims in the colony, by 
attending a mass meeting at the Geylang Stadium, which was attended by 1200 
Muslim representatives from local organisations. During his speech, the Singapore 
Governor expressed his commiseration on the loss of a great leader among 
Muslims. ‘The cause of freedom and of liberty has lost one of its staunchest 
supporters, and the British Commonwealth of Nations a strong supporter of the 
tradition for which it stands.’585
Muslim leaders in Singapore were generally appeased by the Governor’s 
increasing sensitivity towards issues involving the Muslim community. Their 
positive feelings towards the colonial regime were cemented by the lifting of 
restrictions on the celebration of the Maulidul Rasul (Prophet Muhammad’s 
Birthday) despite the ongoing Malayan Emergency. On 12th and 13th December, 
shops and business firms owned by Muslims were closed as many had spent their 
days in the mosques to recite the Quran and give alms to the needy.586 A mass 
meeting led by Ahmad Ibrahim was held at the Madrasah Aljunied Islamic
583 ‘MJ. Namazie to Ghulam Mohammad (Governor-General of Pakistan), 23rd October, 1951, 
Mansoor Adabi Papers.
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School. Attended by more than 500 children from eighteen religious schools, the 
event saw the presence of Christian priests and members of the I.R.O., such as Dr. 
H.B. Amstutz, who were invited to deliver goodwill speeches. Amstutz stressed 
that the citizens of Singapore were ‘facing a new way of life; an ideology which 
does not know God. We must come closer together to establish in the hearts of our 
people the worship of God.’587 Less than two weeks later, the ideology of 
ungodliness which Amstutz had shunned emerged in the form of a film entitled 
David and Bathsheba which triggered another cycle of protest.
Opening in Singapore on Christmas Day, David and Bathsheba was based 
on the Old Testament depiction of King David, laced with fictional elements. It 
was screened at all local cinemas, one of which was the famous Alhambra Theatre 
at Beach Road, 40,000 tickets were sold in just the first week after its release, 
setting a new record for the highest ticket sales since August 1945. Although 
controversial, the film had been scrutinized and approved by the Federation 
Cinematographic Appeal Committee, which consisted of representatives from the 
Muslim, Christian and other major religious faiths in the colony. In spite of that, 
Muslims in Singapore were displeased by selected scenes in the film. They 
contended that a prophet of Islam had been wrongly portrayed as hedonistic and 
susceptible to sexual overtures. Three days after the screening of the film, Ahmad 
Ibrahim told the Melayu Raya newspaper that a beloved prophet of Islam had been 
depicted as a tyrant. This was in opposition to the teachings of the Quran which 
states ‘that the Prophet Daud (David) is a man of justice and there were in him all 
forms of goodness till the traits of arrogance in oneself would be cleansed through
587 The Straits Times, 13th December, 1951 and Utusan Melayu, 13th December, 1951.
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repentance and the seeking of forgiveness.’588 He called for the film to be banned 
because it was no less than an insult to Islam and Muslims. Linked to this was a 
petition sent by the Muslim Advisory Board and Jamiyah urging the immediate 
withdrawal of the film. Several other Muslim leaders and organisations threatened 
to boycott businesses and organise protest meetings. The main line of objection 
voiced by all dissenters was that it was against Quranic precepts to portray visual 
representations of David and to claim that he had committed adultery.589 British 
intelligence observed that a small yet politically-oriented group of South Indian 
Muslims were the chief instigators of the protest. They were described as being 
‘guided by the heart not the head’ and had planned to use the film as a catalyst to 
re-ignite Muslim interest in the Maria Hertogh case.590
Europeans, Eurasians and adherents of the Christian faith in Singapore and 
Malaya displayed diverse reactions towards the protests. A Christian priest in 
Malacca dissented against the screening of the film and all posters which sought 
to promote it, for the reason that much emphasis was placed upon David’s 
failings. This was a divergence to the true spirit of Christianity. Catholics in 
Singapore took on a less aggressive stance and recommended that some parts of 
film be censored to avoid further controversies.591 Although the atmosphere of 
fear and suspicion was gradually subsiding, Europeans and Eurasians in Singapore 
were reported to be perturbed by Muslim protest against the film.592 In an initial 
response to the protests and statements made by Christian leaders, the Cathay
588Melayu Raya, 28th December, 1951.
589 ‘Muslim Affairs in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, 1952’, CO 1022/434.
590 ‘Singapore Political Report for January 1952’, CO 1022/206.
591 Melayu Raya, 5th January, 1952.
592 ‘Annual Reports for British Territories in S.E.A., 1951’, A1838/280.
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Organisation stated that the film had prior approval from the Censorship Board 
and that none of its Malay viewers have expressed disapproval since its release.593
The British were thus caught in a dilemma over whether to uphold their 
liberal policies relating to films or to submit to the conservative demands of their 
Muslim subjects. The first tactic was to garner the support of Muslim leaders in 
the Federation to endorse the continual screening of the film. Through this, the 
British hoped that inflamed feelings among Muslims in Singapore would slowly 
subside. Quite the contrary, the Qalam magazine singled out Dato Onn as a 
‘lackey’ in cahoots with the British in regard to the film and other issues 
concerning Islam. The President of UMNO was described as 'mengutamakan 
maslahat dirinya scthcija (concerned with his own well-being).’ Qalam went on to 
highlight British tactlessness at a time when they needed the help of Muslims in 
the fight against the spread of communism.594
To circumvent an escalation of emotions surrounding the issue, Jack Evans 
of the Singapore Film Censorship Board announced that the film had been 
withdrawn from all cinemas. According to the manager of the Alhambra Theatre, 
the film would have been featured for another week had it not been for the 
withdrawal imposed by the government. David and Bathsheba was subsequently 
sent for review by the Film Appeals Board.595 Rajabali Jumabhoy and Ahmed 
Ibrahim were nominated to represent the Muslims of Singapore.596 In Malaya, a
593 Utusan Melayu, 5th January, 1952,
594 ‘Singapore Political Report for January 1952’, CO 1022/206. See Qalam, Bilangan 19, 
February, 1952.
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well-respected nationalist and literary figure, Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad (Za’ba), 
was appointed to be a part of the review committee. Za’ba too was troubled by the 
negative ways in which the Prophet David had been portrayed in the film.597 By 
mid-January, the film, along with all forms of advertising related to it, was banned 
in Singapore. Such developments within the Malay-Muslim community in 
Singapore dominated the Governors’ Conference in Malaya which was held on 
the same month. Along with other pertinent issues, the Singapore Governor 
mentioned that:
During the last year, the susceptibilities o f the Muslim population in Singapore have 
shown to be very easily aroused. Representation have been made in the local press on a 
number of incidents, perhaps some o f them minor in themselves but which have definitely 
shown that the Muslim community is very sensitive to its position in Singapore. The 
latest agitation about the ‘David and Bathsheba’ film is a case in point and I am sure that 
the wise counsels o f the more responsible members of the Muslim Advisory Board would 
have been followed if  there had not been below the surface this readiness to take offence 
at any imagined slight to Islam. I think the position must be carefully watched and it is 
imperative to have someone like Che Abu Bakar who can exercise an important influence 
both in any position in the Public Relations Dept and as Secretary o f the Muslim 
Advisoiy Board...There appears to be necessity therefore to restore the confidence of the 
Malay community in Singapore and in approaching Muslim problems this attitude must 
be bome in mind. 598
British officials who were present at the meeting were convinced that the roots of 
Muslim rage lay in the fact that they were a socially marginalized and 
economically depressed community. To alleviate such strains, a resolution was
597 ‘Za’ba to Mohd Yusof, 18th January, 1952’, Surat-Surat Za’ba Kepada Mohd Yusof.
598 ‘Extract o f Minutes o f Malaya/Borneo Governors’ Conference, 15th January, 1952’, CO 
1022/429.
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passed to the effect that a Secretariat of Malay Affairs consisting of two British 
and a Malay official would be formed. The Secretariat’s main task was to provide 
more well-grounded insights and solutions to the challenges faced by the 
Malays.599
As the ire of Singapore Muslims subsided, the Sultan of Kedah decided to 
ban the screening and sale of David and Bathsheba on the grounds that it ‘will 
create a religious controversy in the country.’600 In May 1952, another minor 
protest was launched by Muslims in Singapore over the publication of a picture of 
Prophet Muhammad in the May issue of Newsweek. Fully aware that Muslims 
were opposed to all pictorial representations of Muhammad, the British ensured 
that the magazine was kept out of circulation in the colony.601 Another preemptive 
measure that was undertaken was to delimit the activities of Roman Catholic 
missionaries on the island. Selected pastors and priests that were brought to 
Malaya after having been deported from China were advised to concentrate their 
energies on converting the Chinese. This was to ‘avoid offending Muslim 
susceptibilities among Malay, Indian and Indonesian elements in Singapore. We 
(the British) have had experience in the Hertogh riots in the inflammatory 
possibilities which exist between Muslim and Roman Catholics and therefore 
Muslim religious leaders must be given no cause to allege that prosetylizing of 
Muslims is being given.’602 The Muslim community was also pleased by the 
release of six prominent leaders who had been arrested for the part they had
599 ‘Extract o f Minutes o f Malaya/Bomeo Governors’ Conference, 15th January, 1952’, CO 
1022/429.
600 Straits Budget, 13th March 1952.
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played in the riots of December 1950 and the pardoning of those sentenced to 
death. To further reclaim support for the colonial administration, Muslims were 
permitted to organize island-wide celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday in November 1952.603
• CONCLUSION -  THE RETURN TO NORMALCY
In conclusion, the David and Bathsheba episode was the final hurdle 
which the British had to overcome in their efforts to reconcile the colonial state 
with various parties in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. By the end of 
1952, a shift in attitudes among Muslims in Singapore was palpable yet it is 
misleading to assert that the entrenched feelings against the British as rulers had 
been fully assuaged. Realising the futility of engaging in violent acts to achieve 
their objectives, Muslim trade union activists, journalists, teachers, writers and 
middle-class professionals became deeply involved in party politics to advance 
their religious and social interests. At a meeting held within Jamiyah"s premises, 
Singapore UMNO (or SUMNO) was formalized as a section of UMNO’s branch 
in Johore. More than fifty Malays and Arabs registered themselves as members of 
the new political party. Syed Ahmad bin Mohammed Alsagoff was elected to be 
its first President. Ahmad Ibrahim and Dams Shariff, two personalities who had 
played crucial roles and had gained widespread popularity in the midst of the 
Maria Hertogh controversy, were elected as Vice-President and Secretary 
respectively.604 The party’s membership increased steadily in the months that 
followed, with a strong following among servicemen in the Navy, the Army and
603 ‘Political Report for the period 1st to 15th November, 1952’, CO 1022/207.
604 Utusan Melayu, 31st December, 1951 and The Straits Times, 31st December, 1951.
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the Police Force. In July 1953, a motion was passed by the UMNO Central Branch 
in Kuala Lumpur for SUMNO to participate in the Singapore elections in alliance 
with the Singapore branch of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).605 Three 
months later, SUMNO members publicized an appeal for unity between the 
Malays and Indonesians in Singapore and declared ‘that the time has arrived for 
the two races to expel the imperialists.’606
In the realm of diplomacy, relations between the British and the Dutch 
had been restored. The Dutch, to be sure, saw themselves as victors in the entire 
controversy after having won the custody of Maria Hertogh to her natural parents 
and after having been awarded compensation for losses incurred during the riots. 
Friendly interactions between Europeans and Eurasians and Malays in particular 
and Muslims in general returned to normal towards the end of 1953. In his highly 
acclaimed travel book, Voices o f Asia, the famous American novelist and travel- 
writer, James Albert Michener, wrote about a Caucasian man who, although 
beaten to near death during the riots, had subsequently decided ‘to turn my back 
upon Christianity, confess my sins and become a complete Malay Muslim. I 
believe now that my future lies with the Malays.’607 This is a somewhat 
exaggerated account of Muslim-Christian relations in Singapore, but there is a 
grain of truth in it. Although marriages between Catholics and Muslims were 
regarded as socially taboo, such practice was not uncommon in the ensuing
605 ‘Political Report for the period 29th July to 12th August, 1953’, CO 1022/207.
606 ‘Political Report for the period 2nd to 18th September, 1953’, CO 1022/207.
607 James Albert Michener, Voices o f Asia (Seeker & Warburg, 1952), p. 131.
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Installation Ceremony of Sir John F. Nicoll as Governor of Singapore 
Source: National Archives of Singapore
Opening Ceremony of the Muslim College at Klang, Selangor 
Source: Syed Ali Alsagoff
Singapore when the riots broke out and was married to a Malay-Muslim in the late 1950s. Hedwig 
was the first Singaporean Director o f the National Library, from 1965 to 1988.
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CHAPTER 7 
Reform
Having identified the structural weaknesses of the colonial state during the 
riots, the British were set firmly upon the path of reform. The police force, 
education, marriage and child adoption policies were areas in which rapid 
transformation were set in motion. Still, the initiative for reforms was not left 
unchallenged, for the British were faced with indifference, disdain and the 
counter-propositions of local elites in Singapore. At several crucial junctures, the 
British had the upper hand. There were, inevitably, occasions when compromises 
had to be made in favour of views from ‘below’.
This chapter will examine in detail the processes of reforms in the 
aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. I shall demonstrate that although the British 
engendered changes in the existing legal and administrative structures, they 
sought to preserve the integrity of the colonial bureaucracy. The underlying goal 
was not only to transform institutions and laws, but also to ensure a tighter grip on 
the colonized people and enhance the power of the colonizers. Unlike previous 
chapters, this chapter will be divided into four sub-sections, which provide critical 
expositions of the evolution of four areas of reforms that the British sought to 
initiate as well as the resistance and challenges encountered.
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• THE POLICE FORCE
David M. Anderson and David Killingray aptly argue that ‘as the most 
visible symbol of colonial rule, in daily contact with the population and enforcing 
codes of law that upheld colonial authority, the colonial policeman -  be he a 
European officer or a local native recruit — stood at the cutting edge of colonial 
rule.’609 In light of this observation, it is of no surprise that the colonial 
administration’s reformist strategy was directed largely towards the police force 
which, as discussed in earlier chapters, had proved to be ineffective in dealing 
with the Maria Hertogh riots. Reforms of the Singapore police force were focused 
upon four vital areas. The first was in the realm of manpower, where 
improvements were instituted within the existing leadership structure, the rapport 
within the rank and file, the training of existing staff, the revision of salary scales 
and the introduction of new welfare benefits. Intensive recruitment programmes 
were also devised to attract young men from different ethnic and educational 
backgrounds into the police force. The second area of reform was focused on the 
decentralization of the organisation to ensure a smooth internal and external 
coordination between the police and other sectors of the colonial administration. 
Thirdly, new weaponry and other forms of technologies were purchased to deal 
more swiftly with riots and disturbances in the colony. Last of all, the British 
attempted to re-establish the trust between the police and the public by reshaping 
the repressive image of the organisation to one more accommodative and friendly.
609 David M. Anderson and David Killingray, “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing 
the Empire, 1830-1940”, in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1991), pp. 1-2.
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The first step undertaken by the British was to assign the Hong Kong 
Commissioner of Police, Duncan W. Macintosh, to conduct a preliminary study of 
the Singapore police force. His main tasks were to identify the fault lines and 
suggest ways of developing a more robust police force, so as to ensure a tighter 
enforcement of the colony’s laws. Proposals that were regarded as ‘urgent’ in 
nature would be promptly implemented whilst awaiting the findings of the 
Commission of Enquiry.610 At the same time, feedback was solicited from 
experienced police chiefs, such as Stanley Grisewood Taylor (an ex-Inspector- 
General of Police in Bengal).611 This was followed by the re-appointment of sixty 
Harbour Board Auxiliary police lieutenants, who had been scheduled for 
disbandment at the end of the year. Appointed for a period of six months, the 
police lieutenants were to come to the aid of the regular police pending the 
recruitment of new constables into the force.
One of the predicaments faced by the British was the overwhelming 
number of Malay constables in the Singapore police force. In a report submitted
fli
on 27 December 1950, Macintosh highlighted that the organisation had placed 
itself in a precarious position by having relied upon the services of the Malays, 
who were a minority ethnic group within a predominantly Chinese colony. This 
was compounded by the fact that the Malay police officers had shown much 
reluctance in dissuading and arresting their co-religionists during the Maria 
Hertogh riots. A three-prong solution was proposed to overcome the quandary.
610 Proceedings o f the First Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 19th December, 1950 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B443 and The Singapore Free Press, 20th 
December, 1950.
611 ‘Colonial Political Intelligence Summary No. 12, December 1950’, CO 537/ 5311. See also 
‘Malaya: Monthly Political Intelligence Report (1950), reported on 28th December, 1950’, CO 
825/82/3.
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The first was to entice able-bodied men from the Chinese, Eurasian, European and 
Indian communities in Singapore into becoming an integral part of the force 
through a modified terms of employment. The Gurkha contingent was to be 
expanded and salary-scales as well as other welfare benefits have had to be 
radically revised. Such changes, according to Macintosh, would lure the Chinese 
in particular to consider the police force as a lifetime career.612
Campaigning in parallel to these proposed reforms, members of the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce appealed to the Chinese in Malaya to 
consider the police force as a viable employment option.613 An announcement was 
also made in regard to the formation of a Volunteer Special Constabulary 
Emergency Squad. No age limit was imposed, though all appointments were 
temporary. Selected candidates would undergo basic police training to assist the 
Singapore Police Force in the course of its ongoing reforms.614 The Straits 
Chinese British Association (or S.C.B.A.), in turn, nominated Ong Tiang Wee (the 
President of the S.C.B.A) and Goh Hood Kiat (a Municipal Commissioner and a 
member of the S.C.B.A) to serve on the newly established Police Advisory 
Committee. Consisting of six members from the various ethnic groups of 
Singapore, the committee’s essential task was to provide in-depth advice on 
recruitment matters and strategies to mend the declining public confidence 
towards the police force.615 The Annual Report o f the Singapore Police Force, 
1951 states that the Advisory Committee proved to be ‘of great assistance to the
612 ‘Executive Council Minutes of Meeting, 28th December, 1950’, CO 940/56.
613 The Straits Times, 22th December, 1950.
614 The Singapore Free Press, 20th December, 1950.
615 The Singapore Free Press, 27th December, 1950.
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Commissioner.’616 Nonetheless, the drive to entice Chinese in Singapore to join 
the police force was a resounding failure, as many were unreceptive to the 
recruitment campaigns.
The chief underlying cause of such indifferent attitudes is to be found in 
the stereotypical assumptions held by the British which determined their policies 
towards the Chinese in Singapore. Perceived as a group of individuals who were 
motivated by personal greed and financial gain, the British erroneously assumed 
that the Chinese could be easily enticed into the police fraternity should there be 
improvements in terms of wages and other financial benefits. Closely linked to 
this was the culture of fear that developed amidst the communist insurgency 
which provided the crucial reason for the Chinese refusal to join the police force. 
The Chinese were troubled by the prospect of reprisals and persecution of 
relatives and friends by the communists in Malaya and China in the event of open 
collaboration with the British.617 Furthermore, there was the practical 
consideration that, should the communists emerge victorious in the long-drawn 
battle with the British, they would be placed in a disadvantageous position after 
having sided with the colonial regime. The fourth reason was a result of historical 
processes. The painful experiences of wars, rebellions and corrupt policing in 
mainland China gave rise to an invented tradition of detesting all forms of 
soldiering and policing among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.618
616 Annual Report o f the Singapore Police Force, 1951, p. 3.
517 Anthony J. Stockwell, ‘Policing during the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960: Communism, 
Communalism and Decolonisation’, in David Killingray and David M. Anderson (eds.), Policing 
and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and The Police, 1917-1965 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992), p, 117 (pp. 105-126).
618 ‘William R. Langdon to Department of State, 20th December, 1950’, RG 59, 746F.00/12-2050, 
NACPM and ‘Singapore Political Report for February, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
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On the eve of the year 1950, the CID declared its move to decentralize 
investigatory operations by establishing sub-branches in the Northern and 
Southern parts of Singapore. In allaying public suspicions towards the 
government, CID spokesman emphasized that decentralization was not a 
consequence of the Maria Hertogh riots. Plans had been laid out several months 
prior to the riots in line with developments in England.619 This was not the whole 
truth of the matter. As seen from Chapters Three and Four, the plans for 
decentralization corresponded with the rigorous surveillance and arrests of 
suspected protagonists in the aftermath of the riots. In line with this, the Gurkha 
contingent was expanded to include thirty new highly-trained officers. This was 
the first of several other batches of Gurkha officers which arrived in Singapore in 
the months that followed.620 In an interview with The Straits Times, W.J Parks 
(the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police) stated that the number of officers in 
the Gurkha contingent was projected to increase to a grand total of 500.621 Riot 
drills involving the Gurkha troops, Malay policemen and the military were also 
staged in public for three days on end as part of the police force’s efforts to regain 
the confidence of the masses and to demonstrate the formidable nature of the 
newly-reformed force. Termed ‘Operation Popper’, the drills exhibited the use of 
tear gas and improved communications in the event of mass violence.622
A paramount issue facing the Singapore Governor and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies during this period was the appointment of a competent 
successor to R.C.B. Wiltshire. The new Commissioner of Police, Gimson wrote in
619 The Straits Times, 27th December, 1950.
620 The Straits Times, 17th January, 1951,
621 The Straits Times, 24th January, 1951.
622 Utusan Melayu, 30th January, 1951 and The Straits Times, 30th January, 1951.
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a telegram to James Griffiths, should manifest a commanding personality. He 
should also demonstrate an ability to restore the shattered morale of the police 
force. Another important trait was the aptitude to put an end to the factionalism 
which had resulted in the breakdown of internal coordination during the riots. 
Gimson opined that the most suitable person for such a Herculean task was John 
P. Pennefather-Evans. Bom in 1894, Pennefather-Evans had served for more than 
twenty-seven years in the Malayan Police. In 1941, he was appointed as the 
Commissioner of Police in Hong Kong and was instrumental in drafting plans for 
the re-organisation of the force. Spending much of the period of Japanese 
occupation in the Stanley Internment Camp, upon the Allied victory, he returned 
to Britain for early retirement due to poor health. To Gimson, Pennefather-Evans 
has had the advantage of being able to speak the Chinese and Malay dialects 
which would enable him not only to communicate with the men within the rank 
and file but also to enhance the effectiveness of the police in assessing the threats 
arising from communist propaganda.623 Pennefather-Evans was thus appointed on 
a one year contract which began in February, 1951.
The new Commissioner of Police’s foremost initiative upon assuming the 
post was to conduct visits to all police divisions in Singapore. Discussions were 
held with inspectors and staff sergeants in the force to uncover their grievances 
and restore morale which was at its lowest ebb.624 Similar sessions with lower- 
ranking Malay constables were organized with the presence of the members of the 
Muslim Advisory Board. In assuaging widespread perceptions among the Muslim
623 ‘Franklin Gimson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8th January, 1951 ’, CO 537/7245.
624 ‘Appendix to Brief o f the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Meeting with the 
Prime Minsiter on Monday the 10th September’, CO 537/7247.
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policemen that they had transgressed religious limits by arresting fellow Muslims 
during and in the aftermath of the riots, particular emphasis was given to 
highlighting that justice was above colour, race or religion. Pennefather-Evans’ 
also stressed that the policemen’s substandard performance during the riots was a 
thing of the past.625
In spite of these efforts, the political report for the month of February 1951 
revealed that the testimonies of senior police officers to the Commission of 
Inquiry had revived the lack of public confidence in the police force.626 Insurance 
companies, as a case in point, doubled their premiums after having assessed the 
reliability of the police force in dealing with civil disorders.627 The situation was 
made worse by press cynicism concerning the reforms made within the police 
force. The Singapore Free Press, for example, highlighted the need for ‘a gentler 
Police’ to counter-balance the ‘tough’ image which had been propounded for 
many decades. The editorial went on to argue that public confidence in the police 
had not improved since the outbreak of the riots. Moreover, ignorance with 
regards to the organisation and functions of the police force pervaded the psyche 
of the masses. An established perception among the men of the street was an 
image of police officers who accepted bribes and performed poorly during the 
riots. ‘The ordinary man must realize that to hold important information 
concerning peace-breakers indirectly jeopardizes his own safety. On the other 
hand, the police should make an effort to establish more cordial relations with the
625 Annual Report o f  the Singapore Police Force, 1951, (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1952), p. 1 and Proceedings o f the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 16th 
October, 1951 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. B306.
626 ‘Singapore Political Report for February, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
627 ‘Transmitting General Conditions Report for the Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang 
consular districts for the period February 1-15, 1951’, RG 59, 746F.OO/12-2851, NACPM.
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people whose servants they are.’628 Several other newspapers highlighted the 
pervasive public opinion that Malay policemen would not be effective in dealing 
with criminal activities within a Chinese-dominated colony.629
Largely due to such criticisms, the morale within the police force in 
Singapore was said to have ‘improved superficially at any rate’. In a noble attempt 
to improve tarnished relations between the Malay policemen and the civil 
authorities, leaders of the UMNO party called for the institutionalization of 
religious classes in the police force so as to inculcate Islamic values such as 
loyalty and commitment within the organisation.630 The colonial administration 
was ambivalent about the idea, for the fear of accusations of outright favouritism 
towards a particular religious group in the force. The suggestion was thus shelved. 
Nor did the British respond to the plethora of critiques launched by the press. 
However, much energy and resources were devoted towards a rapid effort to 
enhance the image of the police, coordination and equipment needed to quell any 
future riots.
At a meeting with the British Cabinet, General John Harding noted that the 
establishment of Joint Operations Rooms at Fort Canning and other districts in 
Singapore had improved communication and coordination between the Military, 
the Police and the civil administration. There was still much to be done to 
augment the low morale of military and police officers who had been prisoners of
628 The Singapore Free Press, 7th February, 1951.
629 The Straits Times, 30,k March, 1951 and “Extract from PMR 2/1951”, CO 537/7302.
630 ‘Monthly Political Intelligence Reports: Federation of Malaya, March -  April, 195T, CO 
537/7343.
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war during the Japanese Occupation.631 To offset the problems of morale and 
recruitment, new anti-riot technologies were thus introduced to enhance the 
efficacy of the Singapore police force. The most potent among these was the 
‘triple-chaser’. As the name suggests, these enhanced special tear gas grenades 
were designed to split open in mid-air and spread gas over a wide area. Their sole 
purpose was to inflict terror and confusion upon rioters. Thirty-six gas guns, 800 
tear gas shells, 200 smoke bombs and 250 smoke grenades for training purposes 
were purchased upon the approval of the Singapore Legislative Council. The total 
cost of all equipment purchases since the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots 
amounted to $76,000.632 In July 1951, an announcement was made by 
Pennefather-Evans that the salaries, accommodation and promotional prospects of 
the existing police officers would be substantially revised. At the same time, the 
British government increased the frequency of anti-riot drills by conducting them 
on a bi-monthly basis with the joint cooperation of the military.633
Writing in the Qalam magazine, a retired Malay Superintendent of the 
Police force, in turn, highlighted the continual importance of the Malay police in 
curbing the rise of criminal activities in the colony. He explained that the Malay 
policemen should maintain their fullest loyalty to the colonial state on the 
condition that they must not be coerced to comply with tasks that were contrary to 
their religious beliefs. Abdul Wahab contended that the Maria Hertogh riots were 
a clear case in which the Malay policemen had to face up with acts of violence by
631 ‘Cabinet: Malaya -  Note by the Joint Secretaries, 9th March 1951 [GEN. 345/7] \  CAB130/65.
632 The Straits Times, 25,k May, 1951.
633 The Straits Times, 13th June, 1951, The Singapore Free Press, 23rd July, 1951 and The Straits 
Times, 24lllJuly, 1951.
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hooligans who were not defenders of Islam.634 Publicity was also given to several 
officers who were awarded medals for their bravery during the riots. One of the 
recipients was Corporal Wan Ishak bin Abdullah from the Army Depot Police 
who was presented with a King’s Commission for courage shown during the first 
day of the riots. Wan Ishak had rescued Mrs Crowley, Mrs Taylor and her small 
son from a mob that was attacking them. He escorted the three Europeans to a safe 
place and, with aid of the military, transported the injured persons to a police 
station.635
Mention has been made of the Leach Report’s diagnoses of the factors that 
had led to the riots, the censure of several senior police offices and the reforms 
that were proposed. While the report exposed the failure of the Malay police 
officers in the fulfilment of their duties, it was stated that ‘this failure should not 
be given a significance beyond the context of the specific situation in which it 
occurred. They (the Malay police) possess sterling qualities and are capable of 
fulfilling their duty in an emergency, provided that they are contented and are 
properly led, as their brothers in the Army have shown.’636 In an interview two 
days after the publication of the Leach Report, Pennefather-Evans stressed that the 
police force would soon put its crisis-stricken past behind it provided that the 
plans which he had laid down were implemented thoroughly. ‘I want to make my 
organisation more of a police force and less of a military one - a force for the 
ordinary policing of the city. I want to get an educated police force - that is a force 
of men to look after and protect the public in the same way as the police in other
634 Qalam, Bilangan 12, July 1951.
635 The Singapore Free Press, 6th June, 1951.
636 “Riots: Singapore; Report of Commission of Enquiry: Leach Report (1951), p. 67”, CO 
537/7248.
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democratic countries.’ The Commissioner also hoped to train his men along the 
standards that had been defined in England, that is, to be capable of handling 
dangerous situations without resorting to violence.637 A new cohort of Malay 
Assistant Superintendents would also be recruited to ensure the development of a 
more co-coordinated and cohesive organisation. A major challenge faced was the 
lack of educational qualifications among the Malays within the rank and file in 
particular, and the colony in general. As a short term measure, several existing 
officers would be promoted to the required positions and were expected to 
perform their duties in accordance to the standards placed upon them.638
A final judgment on the Maria Hertogh Appeal case was delivered on 30th 
August, 1951, in an atmosphere of unexpected calmness. With the exception of 
several incidences of verbal remarks made against the court’s decision, there were 
no other signs of protest from the Malay police officers. The morale of the police 
rank and file was said to have progressed, albeit at a very slow pace.639 To 
enhance public confidence in the police force, a number of reforms that had been 
set in motion were continually publicised. In the realm of coordination and 
management, the Commissioner of Police was provided with a secretary from the 
Inspectorate. A Deputy Commissioner was appointed, along with several other 
Assistant Commissioners who were stationed at major branches around the island. 
The Assistant Commissioners were each endowed with authority over one or two 
police stations. They were also tasked to conduct regular meetings with the men 
under their charge, in order to ensure closer cooperation. Besides that, direct
637 The Singapore Free Press, 9th August, 1951.
638 The Straits Times, 17th August, 1951.
639 ‘Monthly Report for the Month of August, 1951’, CO 717/194/12 and ‘Singapore Political 
Report for August, 1951’, CO 537/7342.
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telephone lines were installed to correct the problems of poor radio 
communications and poor coordination of road blocks, as seen during the 
December riots. The riot drill manual was revised and complemented by an 
intensive training programme for all officers on the island. A Riot Squad was 
established similar to that of the Shanghai Riot Unit which quelled more than 
1,000 riots without firing a shot. The founder of the Shanghai Riot Unit, 
Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Fairbaim was seconded to Singapore for three months to 
train the squad.640
To counter-balance policing through the use force with that of consent, 
officers were made to patrol on foot at all times. Wired fences at police stations 
would be kept open at night so as to convey a more ‘open’ and less ‘self- 
protective’ outlook. The use of police cars was restricted to emergency operations, 
and light armoured cars would only be deployed in the face of widespread riots. 
Obsolete equipment, which had resulted in high numbers of police and civilian 
casualties during riots, were replaced with enhanced technologies such as police 
helmets ‘one and a half pounds lighter than the Standard Army steel helmets’ and 
D.N. Smoke Shells, more commonly known as ‘vomit gas’.641 Closer cooperation 
with the Public Relations Department had also been forged to ensure an 
immediate enlistment of the services of highly qualified civil government 
officials, trained in methods of restoring public confidence in times of crisis.642
640 ‘Malaya - Monthly Political Intelligence Report -  15,k June-15th July, 1952’, CO 1022/208 and 
The Straits Times, 14th September, 1951.
641 The Straits Times, 14th November, 1951 and “Monthly Report for the Month o f August, 1951”, 
CO 717/194/12.
642 ‘Appendix to Brief o f the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Meeting with the 
Prime Minsiter on Monday the 10th September, 1951”’, CO 537/7247.
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In the area of welfare and personnel management, reforms were made in 
terms of the working hours. The gruelling twelve-hour shift was reduced to eight 
hours. A rest day in every week was made compulsory for all police officers. 
Educational programmes, refresher and post-training courses were delineated for 
officers pending promotion. A selected group of senior officers was sent to the 
joint Federation/Singapore Police College in Malaya to pursue advanced training 
courses. Pensions and gratuities to dependents of officers who were killed during 
the riots and in other acts of violence thereafter were swiftly disbursed. Bonuses 
were also paid out to officers who displayed especially good performance and 
courage in the line of duty. The 200-man Volunteer Special Constabulary, which 
proved to be crucial in aiding the police force, saw a dramatic increase in 
personnel. According to Victor Seah, who was a Lieutenant in the Volunteer 
Special Constabulary during that period, recruits ‘came from all walks of life — 
fishermen, taxi drivers, shopkeepers, salesmen, white-collar workers, technicians, 
teachers, corporate managers and professionals from private as well as the public 
sectors.’643 It was forecasted that the numbers would reach a grand total of 1,500 
by the end of the year.644
Partly due to the reforms that had been implemented, police effectiveness 
in the clearing of small scale riots and other forms of unlawful assemblies 
improved significantly.645 ‘I don’t wish to say by any means that all is well’, said 
Gimson in his letter to John Higham, ‘but the prospects are brighter, possibly, than
643 Seah, A Life Worth Reliving, pp. 133-134.
644 ‘Appendix to letter from Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 12th September, 1951’, CO 
717/194/12.
645 Annual Report o f the Singapore Police Force, 1957, p. 27.
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they have been for some time.’646 The prospects for recruiting Chinese and 
members of other ethnic groups into the force were, however, not at all bright. 
Thus far, recruitment strategies had been focused upon attracting Chinese recruits 
who were residing in Singapore and the neighbouring islands, and not those in 
mainland Malaya. Hence, only six Chinese, two Indians and two Eurasians were 
selected out of a small number who responded to the allure of higher wages and 
other benefits.647
Pennefather-Evans ’ contract with the Singapore Police Force was coming 
to a close at the end of February 1952. Although he had served for merely a year, 
the Commissioner’s popularity was growing rapidly among members of the police 
fraternity. Personal charm, the ability to foster a sense of camaraderie and the will 
to implement radical reforms within the once fragmented organisation were the 
key factors which could have well accounted for his prominence.648 Even so, the 
civil administration was apprehensive about lengthening Pennefather-Evans’ 
contract with the police force. The implicit reasons for such a contradiction in 
policy are shrouded in mystery due to the paucity of historical sources. One 
possible reason would be that there was a need to appoint a new Commissioner in 
conjunction with the arrival of the new Governor, John F. Nicoll. The other 
possible explanation lay in the politics of the Commission of Enquiry. There was 
too much of a typical policeman’s attitude in Pennefather-Evans to the extent that 
he had defended men under his charge who were accused by civil officials of an 
outright failure in the performance of their basic duties. Such an outlook on the
646 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 28th September, 1951’, CO 717/194/12.
647 Annual Report o f  the Singapore Police Force, 1951, p. 7.
648 The Straits Times, 4lh January, 1952.
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part of Pennefather-Evans may have been objectionable to Gimson and other 
higher-ranking officials within the civil administration.
The selection of a credible successor was far more complex than expected. 
Two candidates - Nigel Moms and W.D. Robinson - were considered. General 
Gerald Templer, the successor to Henry Gurney as High Commissioner of 
Malaya, had a low opinion of Robinson, whom he labelled as ‘uncooperative’. 
Similarly, Wilfred Blythe was not particularly impressed with Robinson’s 
disposition as a would-be Commissioner. The newly appointed Singapore 
Governor, John Nicoll, was concerned with ‘stop-gap appointments’, preferring 
instead a long-term appointment for the prospective Commissioner. In Nicoll’s 
perspective, Moms had an edge over Robinson, due to the respect and trust which 
he had established with senior officers in the police force. Although Morris was 
‘still under cloud’ due to the riots and the findings of the Leach report, Nicoll’s 
personal discussions with influential personalities from Singapore and Malaya 
revealed that a majority were either neutral or in support of Morris’s appointment 
as Commissioner.649 The President of Malayan Chinese Association, Dato Tan 
Cheng Lock, went so far as to send a telegram to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in London in support of Morris’ appointment. Tan Cheng Lock wrote 
that Monis was the ‘right person for the post being well liked and respected by all 
in Singapore and Federation. Besides he is one of the few remaining experienced 
officers who understand problems of this country particularly the Chinese. 
Singapore has fared well under his direction during the Emergency. Consider 
continuity of leadership highly desirable at this crucial stage. I am expressing
649 ‘John F. Nicoll to John D. Higham, 21st May, 1952’, CO 1022/167. See also, ‘Department of  
the Army (Singapore) to Washington D.C., 3rd March, 1952’, RG 59, 746F.00/3-352, NACPM.
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considered opinion of majority here.’650 Upon the formal declaration of Morris’ 
appointment, the Colonial Office dispatched an official to investigate the reactions 
of the Malayan police officers who were then attending a course at Ryton-on- 
Dunsmore in Warwickshire. A majority expressed their strong support for Nigel 
Monis.651
In the interim, more plans were devised to recruit non-English speaking 
Chinese into the police force. The intensive efforts to entice English-educated 
Chinese into the organisation had failed tremendously to the point that, by the end 
of 1952, there were only 294 Chinese out of a force of 3,350 policemen. By virtue 
of their higher educational background, Chinese officers were mostly inspectors. 
Only a handful was of the lower ranks. For that reason, Nigel Morris highlighted 
the need to train the existing staff in the Chinese, Malay and the English 
languages, so as to avoid the rise of alienation, miscommunication and lack of 
coordination within the police force upon the entiy of a new batch of non-English
• 652 • * *speaking officers. A representative of the Singapore Police Force was sent to 
Hong Kong to study the conduct of courses and the establishment of a training 
unit for Chinese recruits.
After two years of active campaigning, Muslim police officers were elated 
when the Police Muslim Benevolent Association saw the light of the day in 1953. 
Established as an independent body, the association’s sole objective was to 
advance the religious and cultural interests of the Muslim members of the Force.
650 ‘Tan Cheng Lock to Oliver Lyttelton, 7th April, 1952’, Folio 5, Tan Cheng Lock papers.
651 ‘John D. Higham to John F. Nicoll, 21st June, 1952’, CO 1022/167.
652 The Straits Budget, 8th May, 1952.
653 ‘Extract from ‘Malayan Bulletin No. 65, 25th May, 1952’, CO 1022/167 and Annual Report o f  
the Singapore Police Force, 1952, (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 1.
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Partly due to a whole array of charitable efforts that had been carried out in the 
previous years, the Association’s funds amounted to $17,923.654 Another positive 
development was the appointment of two Muslim religious teachers who 
conducted classes so as to deter policemen from the lure of vice. Lectures were 
conducted twice daily in two police divisions.655
To sum up, whereas the Maria Hertogh riots had tarnished the image of the 
police force, reforms in the aftermath proved crucial in the restoration and 
enhancement of the police force’s ability to handle routine violence that 
characterized the colony. The budget allocation for the Police Force escalated 
rapidly from $9.3 million in 1950 to $25.5 million in 1952, the highest total 
budget when compared with other British colonies in the same period.656 The 
Anti-Corruption Branch, which was deemed to be inefficient in addressing the 
problem of bribery in the police force, was replaced by the establishment of the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 1952. This may partly explain 
the relatively small increase in manpower as officers who were found guilty of 
committing graft were more severely punished in contrast to the preceding
f i c n
years. Consecutively, the Riot Squad was renamed as the Police Reserve Unit,
654 Annual Report o f the Singapore Police Force, 1953, (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 
1954), p. 11.
655 The Straits Times, 4th November, 1952 and Annual Report o f the Singapore Police Force, 1953,
p. 11.
656 Annual Report o f  the Singapore Police Force, 1950, p. 12; Annual Report o f  the Singapore 
Police Force, 1953, p. 40 and David M. Anderson and David Killingray, “An orderly retreat? 
Policing the end o f empire”, in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.), Policing and 
Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1992), p. 15.
657 Jon S.T. Quah, “Wielding the Bureaucracy for Results: An Analysis of Singapore’s Experience 
in Administrative Reform”, Asian Review o f Public Administration, 8, 1, (1996), p. 3.
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whose functions were expanded to include the control of labour unrest and 
violence perpetrated by secret societies.658
In the years that ensued, rapid improvements and modernization were 
sustained along similar lines to those that have been discussed above. Recounting 
his role within the reform process, Nigel Monis held the view that the aftennath 
of the riots saw the breaking down of perceptual barriers between the police and 
the Muslims in Singapore, a religious grouping with had not been treated with 
empathy by the colonial administration.659 Indeed, for more than four years after 
December 1950, Singapore remained free from major outbreaks of violence. The 
next serious riot was on 13th May 1954, when Chinese students took to the streets 
to protest against the National Service Ordinance. The rioters were effectively 
crushed by scores of policemen who were criticized for their indiscriminate 
employment of ‘excessive force’.660
• EDUCATION
Whilst the police force underwent swift and comprehensive reforms 
shortly after the quelling of the riots, reforms in education, marriage and child 
adoption policies experienced a time lag. One compelling factor that resulted to 
this delay was an urgent need on the part of the British administration to restore its 
authority which had been seriously undermined by the riots. The maintenance of 
law and order by an enhanced policing body was given the highest priority in
658 John Drysdale, In the Sen>ice o f the Nation (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1985), p. 18.
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realizing this goal. The British were also cognizant that reforms made to marriage 
policies, education and child adoption necessitated the support of local elites on 
the island, who were already embittered by earlier attempts at reforms. 
Gradualism was thus seen as the best course of action. On that note, this section 
will examine British efforts at reforming educational policies in Singapore in the 
aftermath of the riots.
‘Education’, as Ranajit Guha explains, ‘had always ranked high on the 
agenda of colonialism.’661 The need to enhance the colonial educational agenda 
became all the more pertinent amidst the Maria Hertogh controversy. Relatively 
neglected for many years, the full-time madrasahs (Islamic religious schools) and 
other Malay language schools were perceived by the British and Muslim elites in 
Singapore as potential hotbeds of dissent, traditionalism, communalism and 
fanaticism. Aljunied and Dayang have argued that the years following the Second 
World War saw an increase in the enrolment of Muslim children into Malay 
language schools and madrasahs in Singapore. One of the factors which could 
account for such developments was the lack of governmental regulation in 
determining the choices of educational instruction for the Malays. Prior to the 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya, the colonial state had maintained a laissez faire 
policy whereby private schools - madrasahs being one among an array of 
religious and vernacular-based schools - were given the prerogative to formally 
establish themselves as educational institutions and enrol as many students as they 
deem fit. As a result, in the years following the Japanese surrender, private 
schools became entrenched as the preferred educational institutions for most
661 Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, p. 81.
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parents who held particular religious, communal and/or ideological inclinations. 
Secondly, there was a widespread and unfounded anxiety among Muslim parents 
with regards to the growing influence of Christian missionary activities within 
English-based schools. Press sensationalism around the Maria Hertogh case 
portrayed as a battle between Islam and Christianity worsened the situation, in that 
it heightened Muslim suspicion of all efforts by the British to initiate 
improvements in the education of Muslims in Singapore. Due to these factors, 
madrasahs and other Malay-language schools in Singapore flourished in a socio- 
historical context in which the English language and education were perceived as 
a colonizing and missionizing tool of the kafirun (or unbelievers).662
Hence, by the end of 1951, it was reported that the total number of 
students in the six full-time madrasahs in Singapore had increased to 947 from 
700 in the previous year. Even the modernist-oriented Malay Women’s Welfare 
Association expressed its concern about the lack of available places for Muslim 
girls to attend religious schools.664 In point of fact, the madrasahs avoided all 
forms of collaboration with the British and the Anglophone Muslim elites. Owned 
by philanthropists fi*om Hadrami and Javanese families namely, Wak Tanjong, Al- 
Sagoff, Al-Junied, Al-Kaff and Bamadhaj, the administrators of the madrasahs 
regarded the institution as the last surviving bastion of Islamic knowledge and a 
bulwark against the corrupting influences of modernisation. They were thus 
adverse to the incorporation of non-religious subjects, such as English and
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Mathematics and devoted much of their curriculum to the study of the Quran, the 
Hadith (the Islamic Traditions), the Arabic language, Islamic History and 
Jurisprudence. Moreover, a large number of the teachers were ex-students of the 
madrasahs, with only a handful who were educated in universities in the Middle 
East.665
Fully aware of such prevailing attitudes, Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, 
Ahmad Ibrahim and Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff were resolved that the enhancement 
of Islamic knowledge in the full-time madrasahs and the Malay language schools 
must begin with the creation of a whole new generation of qualified teachers, who 
would be well equipped with both religious and secular fields of knowledge, as 
well as a deep awareness of the challenges confronting Muslims. Discussions on 
the concept of a proposed Muslim College, whose sole objective would be to train 
religious teachers with modem pedagogical methods, had begun as early as 1948. 
Yet, owing to the lack of funds and support from the British government, the idea 
of a Muslim College did not go beyond piles of written proposals. The British 
monitored all meetings related to the establishment of the College, and declined 
repeated appeals for financial support, as they saw no real benefits in sponsoring 
an institution for teachers who would render their services to private schools, 
rather than for the schools that had been built by the colonial state.666 Such stance 
shifted upon the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots.
During a Legislative Council meeting on 22nd May, 1951, Ahmad Ibrahim
highlighted the danger of the ‘insidious propaganda and wiles of anti-religious and
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anti-moral movements’ that had sowed the seeds of dissension between various 
communities in Singapore. To arrest such negative influences, he stressed the 
importance of fostering moral and spiritual values in schools, particularly in 
Malay schools. Ahmad reiterated his appeal for governmental support for the 
establishment of a Muslim College which would train teachers to impart such 
values to their students.667 The Singapore Colonial Secretary responded by stating 
that Ahmad ‘has raised the rather thorny point of religious education in our 
schools in Singapore.’ The matter was subsequently brought to the attention of 
educational advisers in the colony.668
Due largely to the relentless activism of Jamiyah, support from Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities in Singapore and Malaya for the establishment of 
the Muslim College swelled in the following months. Consequently, the British in 
Singapore and Malaya were swayed in a similar direction. Several members of the 
Malay royal families of the states of the Malay Peninsula as well as other 
grassroots organisations pledged their financial aid, along with other facilities. A 
generous sum of $10,000 was donated by the Johore Government to the Muslim 
College Fund. Other state governments responded with pledges that amounted to 
tens of thousands of dollars.669 When interviewed by the local press on the 
establishment of a Muslim College, Reverend Robert Greer of the Presbyterian 
Church in Singapore mentioned that religious dignitaries of Islam ‘occupy a very 
important place in the life of the Muslim community. It should accordingly be the 
duty of that community to establish every facility for the provision of sound
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education and training for its future religious leaders.’ Likewise, Reverend Tracey 
K. Jones of Wesley Church asserted that the ‘principle of freedom of thought and 
freedom of operation in higher education is a sound Clnistian principle. A 
Christian should recognize this for all forms of higher education.’ 670 In July, 
1953, a survey on the conditions in religious schools throughout Malaya and 
Singapore was earned out by the Federation of Malay Students’ Organisation. 
Information was collected on the welfare, curriculum, pedagogical methods, 
facilities and financial challenges faced by these schools. The report and the 
recommendations of the survey were discussed and later submitted to the 
government for consideration.671
Newspapers such as The Straits Times also helped to accelerate the change 
in governmental mindset by highlighting the benefits of British cooperation with 
Muslim organisations in Singapore towards remedying the weaknesses of Islamic 
education on the island. In an editorial comment 011 12th February 1953, it was 
mentioned that a majority of Muslim teachers in Singapore and Malaya had 
obtained Islamic knowledge in Egypt, Mecca 01* Pakistan. Although these teachers 
had played a satisfactory role in the existing religious schools, more could be 
achieved if a similar institution of religious education was established in 
Malaya.672 Admittedly, the British too had developed deep concerns towards the 
inflow of revivalist and militant ideologies, brought into Malaya and Singapore by 
students who had pursued religious studies in South Asia and the Middle East.673 
As these threats became more apparent, the establishment a Muslim College was
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seen as a necessity, as it could assist in preventing the growth of anti-colonial 
ideologies from the ranks of Muslim teachers and educators.
By the end of 1953, efforts towards enhancing the dismal state of full-time 
madrasahs in Singapore and the establishment of the Muslim College had gained 
the full support of the British. At a Legislative Council meeting on 15th December 
1953, Ahmad Ibrahim highlighted that madrasahs should be treated on the same 
footing as the other vernacular schools and therefore provided with the necessary 
financial support.674 The response by D. McLellan (the acting Director of 
Education) was a stark departure from the official position held two years earlier: 
‘I see no reason why we should not include Arabic schools in this Scheme.’675 The 
British had also come to the decision that the Muslim College was to be built at 
Klang in Selangor. The college started its first lessons on 24th February 1955, with 
a batch of 55 students from various states in Singapore and Malaya. It was 
officially opened by the Sultan of Selangor, Sir Hishamuddin al-Haj Alam Shah, 
on 8th April 1955.676 Along with the establishment of the Islamic Studies 
Department in the University of Malaya in 1959, there was ‘a general realisation 
in the madrasahs of the need to improve their standards of Islamic education and 
to tailor the graduate to the requirements of the Muslim College in the interest of 
their own survival.’677
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Together with this, the colonial administration also sought to introduce 
what was called the ‘Reorientation Plan’, which was to take effect from 1st 
January, 1952. Through the plan, the British hoped to equip students in the sixty 
Malay language schools with the knowledge of the English language and other 
necessary knowledge and skills so as to enable them to cope with the rapid 
changes of the post-war years. The colonial administration envisioned that the 
plan would open up a wider range of career choices for the Malays in order to help 
them to compete successfully with other ethnic groups on the island. Under the 
Plan, the Malay language was to he employed as the language of instruction 
during the first three years of schooling. The English language would be taught 
concurrently in the first year. From the fourth to seventh year of primary 
education, all subjects would be in taught in English, with the exception of Malay 
Literature. In this way, the Malays would be better prepared for secondary school 
education, in order to qualify for the Cambridge School Certificate.678
Though well intended, the Reorientation Plan was introduced at an 
inopportune time, that is, in the midst of the development of a culture of suspicion 
between Muslims and the colonial regime. In an attempt to gain public approval 
for the plan, the Singapore Governor announced that the idea was supported by 
Malay teachers and a large number of Malay parents.679 Malay elites in Singapore 
were not at all convinced. They protested against what was seen as a sinister plot 
by the British to dilute the attachment of Malays to Islam and the adat (the local
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custom). Representatives of a dozen of Malay organisations maintained that the 
plan had been conceived without prior consultation. The most vehement resistance 
came from members of the Singapore Malay Teachers’ Union who were 
concerned with their decreasing relevance in the colony and inevitable 
unemployment in the years to come.
Though a minority, several prominent Malays in Singapore were 
supportive of the plan at the initial stages. An example of such counter-reaction 
was the Singapore Malay Union, which criticized the Malays for their chauvinistic 
approach towards education. The organisation campaigned for the importance of 
learning the English language. Pamphlets were distributed to villages and 
kampongs in the colony and the neighbouring islands, urging the Malays to work 
towards the attainment of university degrees, both locally and in England.680 Such 
efforts were, however, cut short by the mounting resistance to the government’s 
proposal, which became particularly acute upon the formation of the Malay 
Education Council (or MEC, known in Malay as Majlis Pelajaran Melayu 
[MPM]). Consisting of fifty-two Malay/Muslim organisations in Singapore, the 
MEC issued petitions and public protests against the plan. Their efforts received 
full support from all leading Malay newspapers and organisations on the island.681 
The British were left with no alternative. Towards the end of 1955, the 
Reorientation Plan was abandoned to make way for the enhancement of Malay 
language education on the island.682
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• MARRIAGE POLICIES
The movement towards instituting a proper system of recording and 
arbitration of marital conflicts among Muslims in the colony has been pursued by 
the Muslim Advisory Board in Singapore some few years prior to the December 
riots. The Board was however faced with lukewarm responses from the colonial 
authorities who did not recognize the crucial need to address high rates of divorce, 
unreported marriages and the seeking of services from unqualified kathis. Such 
apathy on the part of the British had also resulted in a delay in the appointment of 
a mufti (a Muslim scholar who interprets the laws of Islam) whose expertise could 
have been sought in order to mitigate the occurrences of marriages like that of 
Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi.
To address such impediment, Ahmad Ibrahim appealed to the Singapore 
Governor for the latter5 s endorsement of a scheduled executive meeting to decide 
on a suitable candidate for the post of mufti. The task of the mufti would be to 
organize regular meetings with all kathis in Singapore so as to impart the 
knowledge of secular as well as Islamic laws. The mufti would also ensure that the 
kathis were guided by clear procedures and ethical codes. 4 If they violate any of 
the code, they will be punished and asked to resign. Unfortunately, we do not have 
a Department in Singapore. If we have such organisation here, I am sure in future 
there will be no misunderstanding and confusion about what is Muslim law and 
what is the Colony law, and the laws of the countiy and the Muslim laws will be 
properly classified once and for all, so that we shall have peace and prosperity
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again and forever.’683 Gimson thanked Ahmad for his insights, but was reticent 
about the appointment of a mufti.
The members of the Muslim Advisory Board were not deterred by the 
Governor’s indecisiveness. Rather, in a private meeting with Gimson, Syed 
Ibrahim (Chairman of the Muslim Advisory Board), seized upon the opportunity 
to highlight the high prevalence of child marriages between Malays and Chinese 
girls in the colony, insinuating the similar nature of the case of the marriage 
between Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi. Chinese girls would, ‘to the 
consternation of their parents or guardians, appeal* before a kathi and state they 
had been converted to Islam. Thereupon the kathi, without further ado, would 
perform the marriage ceremony.’684 Relating his visit to the Al-Azhar University 
in Cairo, Syed Ibrahim infonned the Governor of Islamic edicts (or fatwa) that 
had been issued in other British colonies to curb the practice of child marriages. 
Muftis in these colonies had admonished kathis to disregard the conversion and 
matrimony of Muslim men with children who had not obtained prior approval 
from their parents. Details of the conversation between Gimson and Syed 
Ibrahim were made known to officials in London. Almost immediately, officials 
at the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office were instructed to 
conduct a thorough search for documents pointing towards the implementation of 
the above-mentioned fatwa. None was found. Realizing the positive implications 
of the fatwa upon British relations with Muslim subjects within Britain’s post-war 
empire, John Higham at the Colonial Office sought the assistance of the Foreign
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December 1950, p. 477’, CO 537/7302 and Straits Times, 20th December 1950.
684 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 15th January, 1951’, CO 953/10/6. See also, The Straits 
Times, 13th January, 1951.
685 ‘Franklin Gimson to John D. Higham, 15th January, 1951’, CO 953/10/6.
264
Office to conduct a meticulous search of their archives. He was later informed by 
legal advisers of the futility of the search.686
By early February 1951, debates regarding the marriage patterns of 
Muslims in Singapore were gaining momentum. One of the key issues that 
attracted media attention was the high rates of divorce among the Malays. Female 
Muslim activists such as Che Zaharah, agitated for the establishment of a Syariah 
(Islamic Law) Court, which was to be endowed with the power to deter men from 
divorcing their wives without valid reasons and to curtail the widespread practise 
of secretly keeping ‘another wife in town or in some other part of the Colony.’ 
Unsympathetic to the radical activism of the Singapore Malay Women’s Welfare 
Association led by Che Zaharah, male Muslim elites in Singapore sought to re­
assert their place as the rightful leaders of the Muslim community by forming a 
sub-committee to assess and suggest necessary changes to the existing legislation 
pertaining to Muslim marriages. A month later, the issue of divorce and 
uncontrolled marriages were brought forth to the Singapore Legislative Council. 
Hindu and Sikh members of the Council expressed their full support for a review 
of the laws pertaining to marriage, as the challenges faced by Muslims were 
analogous to those in their own communities. A British member of the Council, 
John Laycock, reiterated the need to implement the defunct Maniage Age Bill, 
which would invalidate all maniages of children under the age of sixteen. 
Unsurprisingly, Muslims in the colony expressed their outright opposition to the 
Bill. Laycock later stated that Muslims would be excluded from the provisions of 
the bill. Such a hasty retraction was met with criticism from other members of the
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Council. Balwant Singh, for example, questioned: ‘Why was the bill, when first 
presented to the Council, not excluded [sic] Muslims from its provisions? Why 
did Laycock do this a month after? Could it be that the storm of Muslim protest 
that lashed at this Bill gave the veteran politician an inkling of what was going to 
happen in the coming Legislative Council Elections?’688
After two months of heated exchanges, representatives of the Hindu and 
Sikh communities took exception to the provisions of the Laycock Bill. The 
British consented to the demands of the minority communities in a conscious 
attempt to limit public dissensions against the colonial state. Yet such a non­
interventionist policy in the realms of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh affairs mutated 
into intervention by other means, that is, by amending the Civil Marriage 
Ordinance (No. 9, 1940) and the Christian Marriage Ordinance (No. 10 of
/• O Q
1940). Speaking in defense of the proposed changes, during the second reading 
of the bill, John Laycock argued that he had hoped ‘that a measure of this kind 
would be regarded as a social reform, which indeed it truly is, and that it would be 
treated on that basis only, instead of involving religious discussion or argument at 
all. Unfortunately that was not possible. I then indicated that I was prepared to 
move an exemption excluding Muslims from the operation of the Bill...Now, I 
cannot see why the law which is good in England is not good here in Singapore. I 
regard it solely as a measure of social reform.’690
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Laycock’s statements led to widespread resistance from Christian groups 
in the colony, which were particularly incensed by the high-handed 
implementation of the reforms. A representative of Protestant Bishops in 
Singapore disputed Laycock’s rationale and, as an alternative, propounded an 
environmentally deterministic theory, which stated that children reach maturity at 
an earlier age in Asia than in Europe. Hence, the age limit of sixteen to be 
imposed by the bill was impractical for an Asian colony. Another Christian priest 
urged Laycock to withdraw the bill, claiming that Christians saw the bill as an 
infringement of their religious rights. The priest went on to state that the bill 
would ‘militate against’ one of the most organized religious groups on the 
island.691
Coming in between the two opposing parties, Legislative Councillor P.F.
de Souza highlighted that the negative reactions from leaders of various Christian 
churches in the colony had arose from the lack of empathy on the side of the 
colonial state. The objection against the bill, de Souza added,
is not against the age limit imposed. The objection is that if  this age limit is approved, it 
would be hardship on the few cases that crop up now and then, particularly o f girls being 
pregnant under age of sixteen, who would perhaps, not be in a position to marry during 
their pregnancy, and would consequently bring into the world bastard children.. .Now 
pastors of the various denominations are experienced in worldly affairs, and they weigh 
up the pros and cons of every particular case and sometimes do come to the conclusion
691 Proceedings o f the Second Legislative Council', Colony o f Singapore, 17th July, 1951, p. B164- 
165.
267
that marriage would be die lesser of two evils.. ..I move to an amendment that this Bill be
referred to a Select Committee with quorum of diree.692
P.F. de Souza’s proposal was seconded by Nazir Mallal and agreed upon by the 
Council. The Select Committee would consist of three members of the Legislative 
Council. Feedback would be sought from the Right Reverend Bishop of Singapore 
on behalf of the Anglican Church, the Right Reverend Bishop of Malacca on 
behalf of the Catholic Church, and the Right Reverend Archer of the Methodist 
Church.693
Still, protests from Christians in Singapore remained unabated. The Right 
Reverend Henry Wolfe Baines (the Anglican Bishop of Singapore) sent an open 
letter to John Laycock stating that representatives of the various Christian 
churches had not been appropriately consulted on the amendments to the Christian 
Marriage Ordinance and that the Christian populace was offended by Laycock’s 
disregard of their views. Catholics in Singapore, Bishop Baines contended, were 
unwilling to acquiesce to governmental policies limiting the age of marriage to 
sixteen years. ‘Let me repeat that, though I am uncertain whether the method you 
have chosen will by itself achieve the reform you have had the courage to promote 
and in which I hope all right-minded citizens will follow you, and though I regret 
the fact that your failure to consult the Christian leaders has put them in an 
ambiguous position.’694 Such polemics persisted for three months and despite the
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united opposition from the heads of churches in Singapore, the amendments to the 
Civil Marriage and Christian Marriage Ordinances were pushed through.
The Select Committee report, which was presented at the Legislative 
Council meeting in December 1951, highlighted the resistance from members of 
the Christian minority community in Singapore (see Appendix 2). P.F. de Souza, 
who was a member of the Select Committee, supported the amendment to the 
Civil Marriage Ordinance but recorded his disagreement with the enactment of a 
revised Christian Marriage Ordinance, He criticized the government for 
contradicting its policy of religious freedom. Several churches in Singapore joined 
in the fray by stating that such hasty reforms by the Government would not 
change the current practices and ‘that education in the matter should come before 
legislation.’695 British officials were dispatched to organise meetings with 
Christian leaders in the colony, to give them more detailed explanations on the 
rationale behind the revision of the Christian Marriage Ordinance. Christian 
leaders were not at all persuaded. On 17th June, 1952, the Laycock Marriage Bill 
was passed by the Legislative Council.696 The episode is an excellent example of 
how the British enactment of several policies in a colonial setting had the reverse 
effect of that intended, dispossessing minorities in Southeast Asia of their 
religious rights.697
It is pertinent to note, however, that such interventionist measures towards 
the Christian marital policies were an exceptional case in which the British had
695 The Straits Times, 19,h December, 1951.
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ignored all forms of resistance from the minority community and imposed policies 
in accordance with their intended motives. In fact, a policy of non-interference 
was sustained as seen from Muslim efforts to establish a Syciriah court. As it 
happens, the Muslims were radically divided on the issue of the roles and 
functions of the proposed court. Much time, for example, were devoted to 
debating the choice of which school of Islamic jurisprudence would serve as the 
ideological basis of the court.698 A majority among the Arabs and the Malays 
subscribed to the Shafi’i school and maintained strong reservations about the 
acceptability of the Hanafi interpretation of marriage laws that was followed by 
most Indian Muslims in Singapore. Prominent Muslim leaders belonging to the 
Shiite sect were in support of the practice of muta ’ah (or temporary marriage)699, 
which was deemed by the Sunni majority as fornication, adultery, and prostitution 
that was garbed with Islamic rhetoric. Divisions were even more disparate 
between the defenders of traditionalist interpretations of laws, as opposed to those 
who subscribed to a modernist mode of Islamic thought. A case in point was that 
of the members and sympathizers of the Malay Women Welfare Association, who 
although fully aware of the likely reactions of religious elites in Singapore and 
Malaya, stepped up their demands for legislation that would curb the practice of 
polygyny among Muslims in Singapore and Malaya. Muslim men were chided for 
their dishonourable practice of adopting non-Muslim daughters for the purposes of 
marriage. Male religious leaders responded indignantly to what seemed to them to 
be an irreligious stance and ineffective way of reforming an established marital 
culture. In their eyes, Che Zaharah and her supporters had succumbed to western 
influences and were corrupting Islam from within. Muslim women, they argued,
698 Utusan Melayu, 14th January, 1952 and The Straits Times, 14th January, 1952.
699 For a detailed study o f the origins and practise o f mut'ah, see Shahla Haeri, Law o f  Desire: 
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should know their appropriate place in society. They should refrain from all fonns 
of political activities and agitation towards social reform, which was essentially a 
male domain.700
Statistics of the day leaned towards reforms that were proposed by the 
women activists. Research on the marital culture among Muslims in Singapore 
revealed that there were 2091 reported marriages and 1119 divorces from January 
till September 1952. 127 couples remarried after having been counselled by local 
kathis. For that reason, the Muslim Advisory Board accepted Che Zaharah’s 
proposal on the need to amend the Mahomedan Marriage Ordinance, which was 
enacted in 1936.701 Although the term ‘Mahomedan’ had been substituted with 
‘Muslim’ by a bill that was passed some months earlier702, it took the colonial 
administration more than nine months to publicise a newly revised ordinance that 
would address the high divorce rates among Muslims.703 Beyond the expectations 
of the British, such a delay brought Muslim organisations in Singapore to a 
consensus on the functions and roles of the Syariah court. Singapore UMNO and 
the Singapore Malay Union sent several letters to the newly appointed Singapore 
Colonial Secretary, William Goode, to hasten the establishment of the court.704 
The Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung in turn called for a conference of all Malay 
organisations in Singapore to deliberate on the establishment of the Syariah court 
and other matters pertaining to Muslim affairs.705 By November 1953, a detailed
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blueprint of the Syariah Court and the management of the kathis had been
70 f tforwarded to the government by the Muslim Advisory Board.
It is significant to highlight that the kathis later became highly 
professionalized and regulated as a result of Muslim activism and the support that 
came from the colonial state.707 In 1957, the scope of the Muslim Ordinance was 
widened to include the registration of marriage, the regulation of the Syariah 
Court, property matters and other miscellaneous issues. The Ordinance also 
transferred a variety of issues pertaining to Muslim personal laws to the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.708 In the following year, the Syariah Court was 
instituted. Its effectiveness in addressing the problems of polygyny and divorce 
was far-reaching. By 1964, the rate of divorce among Muslims in Singapore had 
plunged to 17.5% from 51.7% in 1957. The practice of uncontrolled marriages 
was also successfully constrained through legislation.709 By an unintended irony 
of history, such rapid socio-religious transformations and positive developments 
within the Muslim community in Singapore had their roots in the Maria Hertogh 
controversy and the riots that had tom families apart.
• CHILD ADOPTION
Closely related to marriage policies was the practice of unregulated child 
adoption in Singapore. This was yet another predicament with which the British
705 The Straits Times, 9th November, 1953.
707 Annual Report - State o f  Singapore: 1957 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1958), p.
183.
708 M.B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 
102-103.
709 Ahmad Ibrahim, “Developments in the Marriage Laws in Singapore since 1959”, in Malayan 
Law Journal, (June 1979), p. 39.
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government had to contend in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. In 
reforming laws governing this aspect of the lives of the common people, the 
British did not encounter any form of overt resistance from local organisations and 
leading personalities on the island. This was due partly to the growing awareness 
of exploitative acts and excesses committed by parents who had adopted children 
on an informal basis. To be sure, the Maria Hertogh appeal proceedings had 
exposed the problem of forceful conversions of adopted children and of marriages 
below the age of puberty. To ensure the support of the leaders of the Chinese, 
Muslim, Sikh and Hindu communities, multiple meetings and discussions were 
organized to address the issue of child adoption. Studies on adoption practises 
were also carried out by the colonial administration before the passing of new 
laws and the implementation of new policies.
Judith Djamour notes that the institution of adoption was particularly 
widespread among the Malays and Chinese in Singapore in the 1950s. Although 
most Malays belonged to the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence, they did not 
necessarily confonn to selected laws and rulings that have been stipulated. This 
could be clearly seen in the norm of declaring their adopted children as natural 
children and the placing of the name of the foster father along with the state- 
registered name of the child. For example, instead of naming an adopted Chinese 
child, Fatimah binte Abdullah - ‘Abdullah’ connotes ‘the servant of Allah’ and not 
a particular person, which was in line with Shafi’ite teachings - most Malays 
would name the child, Fatimah binte Kassim, Kassim was the name of the foster 
father. Another divergence from Shafi’ite teachings was that the adoption process 
was often informal, reliant upon mutual trust between parties involved and were
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lacking in proper documentation. A child would be handed over to adoptive 
parents in exchange for a bottle of wine, a fowl and a nominal cash gift ranging 
from $5 to $50.710
A survey conducted by the Social Welfare Department in the first half of 
1951 revealed that sixty children had been given up for adoption. By the end of 
the year, the numbers had peaked at 1,031. These figures were based on formal 
registration by parents who had sought the assistance of the Department. The 
cases of undeclared adoption must have been, without a doubt, much larger. It was 
found that a large proportion of parents had given up their children for adoption 
because of economic hardship arising from having more than nine or ten children. 
Some informants mentioned that their decision was contingent upon the advice of 
fortune-tellers who predicted that a given child would bring misfortune to the 
natural parents. Connected to this was the stigma of having too many daughters. 
The Chinese, for that matter, tended to view girls as a burden and a waste of 
financial resources because they would contribute more to housework upon 
marriage. Above all, the breakdown of families due to separation or death of a 
parent contributed to the high adoption rates in Singapore. Prospective adoptive 
parents of children from crisis-stricken families revealed that they were more 
inclined to undergo the legal process rather than by traditional methods. Even so, 
ignorance with regards to legal procedures for adoption as well as avenues in 
obtaining information on family planning was pervasive.711
710 Dj amour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, pp. 92-100.
711 The Singapore Free Press, 1st June, 1951 and Report o f  the Social Welfare Department, 1951 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 9.
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To alleviate the recurrence of high numbers of undeclared adoptions and 
other related problems, a bill was passed in 1952 to repeal the Adoption of 
Children Ordinance of 1939. The sole objective of the bill was to refonn ‘the law 
of adoption of children with the modem view that an adopted child should be 
place on an equal footing as a natural and lawful child, and also to remove the 
present restrictions contained in the Principal Ordinance on adoption.’712 The new 
Bill had three main clauses. First, earlier restrictions which permitted only British 
subjects to be adopted and only persons domiciled in the Colony to be legal 
adopters were removed. Instead, any person in the colony was allowed to adopt if 
he or she fulfils several of the criteria laid down in the Ordinance. Second, all 
adopted children were to be regarded as the lawful children of the adopter. The 
rights of the natural parents would dissolve immediately upon the handing over of 
the child to the adopters. This was in line with the Adoption Act of 1950 in the 
United Kingdom. Third, the date of birth and name of adopted children were to be 
registered into the Adopted Children Register.713 The bill along with the legal 
procedures for child adoption was subsequently publicised in newspapers and 
other media.
The Annual Report o f the State o f Singapore o f 1953 stated that there was 
an exponential increase in the number of persons filing adoption appeals through 
formal procedures. Tripling the numbers two years earlier, the Civil District Court 
dealt with 186 cases of adoption in 1953. In the same way, the Singapore High 
Court handled sixty-seven petitions from prospective adoptive parents. This figure
712 Proceedings o f  the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f  Singapore, 14th October, 1952 
(Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. B339-340.
713 Proceedings o f the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore, 14th October, 1952y pp. 
B339-340.
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was in stark contrast to that in 1951 when only eleven petitions were filed.714 Such 
was, however, a partial reflection of the social realities of the time. A majority 
among the Chinese, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu communities in Singapore were 
resistant to the new adoption legislation that had been put in place, citing the cost 
of legal fees and the unwillingness to wait for long periods to obtain rights to the 
desired children. Others were averse to the idea of a new Birth Certificate that had 
the word ‘Adopted’ stamped on it. In sum, the newly amended Adoption 
Ordinance did not have a significant effect in limiting customary practices of 
adoption that characterized the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. A key 
underlying reason for this failure was that informal adoption was not, by any 
means, declared illegal. No reports were found with regards to marriages with 
underage adopted children though it can be sunnised that the practice was 
effectively curbed with the advent of the newly elected government led by the 
People’s Action Party in 1959.715
CONCLUSION -  IN RESTROSPECT
In retrospect, British reformative strategy in the aftermath of the Maria 
Hertogh riots were focused upon the police force, education, marriage and child 
adoption policies. While the police force had undergone comprehensive changes, 
British efforts in recruiting the Chinese were, however, dampened by the latter’s
714 Annual Report -  State o f  Singapore: 1953 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 
123.
715 Ahmad bin Mohammed Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaya (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological 
Research Institute, 1965), p. 240; Ong Kah-kok, “The Practice of Adoption within and as Between 
Different Communities in this Country, the Policy of the Government and the Extent and 
Effectiveness o f its Intervention” (Unpublished Academic Exercise submitted to the Department of 
Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1954), pp. 69-70 and Hoe Wye-nee, “Adoption and The 
Natural Mother” (Unpublished Academic Exercise submitted to the Department o f Social Studies, 
University o f Malaya, 1960).
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refusal to partake in the policing of the colony. In the realm of education, the 
British did not achieve their intended objectives. They had to accede to the 
demands of Muslims in preserving Malay language education as opposed to an 
English-based one. The madrasahs were eventually provided with financial 
support and the same held true for the Muslim College, which the British hoped 
could affect changes in the texture of Islamic education in the colony and 
throughout Malaya. The prospects were much brighter in the realm of marriage 
policies. High rates of child marriages, easy divorce and uncontrolled polygyny 
among the Muslims were effectively reduced. The colonial state had also paved 
the way towards the establishment of the Syariah court. New ordinances were set 
in place to reduce the practise of marriages between under-age Christians with 
persons of other faiths. The British were, however, unable to affect significant 
changes upon the established practise of infonnal adoption within the Malay, 
Chinese and Indian communities, even after the introduction of a new bill. All in 
all, through the symbiosis of reform and the four other strategies discussed in the 
preceding chapters, it can be argued that the British had, in the years from 1950 to 
1953, redeemed their tarnished image and position, while they mitigated the wide- 
ranging ramifications of the riots as well as anticipated similar outbreaks arising 
from racial and religious dissensions.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis began by stressing the significance of the Maria Hertogh 
controversy in the history of modem Singapore. For the first time in more than a 
century of British colonial rule on the island, Malay-Muslims who were 
previously regarded as peaceful and loyal servants of the Crown had taken it upon 
themselves to commit serious acts of aggression against Europeans and Eurasians. 
The seeds of such rage had germinated from the British failure to address the 
influence of radical ideas, the effects of socio-economic marginalisation, press 
sensationalisation of the legal controversy and the ineffectiveness of the police 
force which shaped the Singapore Muslim community’s attitudes towards the 
colonial regime. Compounded by circumstances that led to the shooting of two 
Malay men, the colony witnessed the outbreak of one of the bloodiest in a series 
of mass violence. Innocent lives were lost and large amounts of property fell in 
mins. Although the riots were quelled within two days, the legitimacy of British 
rule was put into question.
With that in mind, I have sought to traverse beyond the uncovering of the 
contributing factors of the riots and how they were suppressed, and to explore 
instead the lesser known terrain of the various strategies which the British had 
employed in the riots’ aftermath. As has been shown, resistance towards the 
British colonial administration remained intense upon the quelling of the riots, and 
was manifested in various forms within the colonized society and in Britain itself. 
Discord, tensions and anxieties characterised the interactions within and between 
colonial officials of the Empire. Even so, the British were quick to recognize the
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challenges and predicaments that lay before them, and sought to amend their 
embedded weaknesses. It was the recognition of the need to reform, adapt and 
react swiftly to the crisis through a combination of proscriptions, surveillance, 
self-criticism, reconciliation and reforms that enabled the British to deal 
effectively with the changing conditions on the ground in the aftermath of the 
Maria Hertogh riots.
Whilst proscriptions had the effect of keeping potential instigators of 
violence at bay, the British were able to anticipate and eventually deal with 
selected opposing elements through intense surveillance. By way of judicious self- 
criticism, the higher echelons of the colonial administration were shielded from 
public scrutiny, which would otherwise have had an adverse impact upon the 
legitimacy of British colonial rule. Through reconciliation, the British colonial 
administration regained the trust of its subjects and diplomatic partners. Reforms 
that were initiated addressed the weaknesses of various aspects of the 
administration of Singapore. Underlying these five strategies were the crucial 
roles played by selected officials and politicians in London and the outlying 
colonies, who provided guidance, insights and expertise arising from their 
experience as servants of the Empire. The British had also gained the support of 
various personalities and organizations, which aided in the process of recovery, 
conciliation as well as averting resistance in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh 
riots. Certainly, without indigenous collaboration and mediation, the colonial 
regime could not have remained firmly ensconced in Singapore.716
716 See David B. Abemethy, The Dynamics o f Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 
1415-1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 301 and Ronald Robinson, “Non- 
European Foundations o f European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration”, in Roger
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In the light of the above argument, it may be useful then to consider the 
short-term and long-term effectiveness of British strategies in the aftermath of the 
Maria Hertogh riots. Viewed from a short-term perspective, I concur with Frank 
Furedi’s assertion that the Britain was able to deal effectively with threats of 
disorder in her colonies during the post-war era or ‘at the very least able to 
influence, and sometimes even shape, the political complexion of its
7 1 7opponents.’ Due partly to the short-term effectiveness of British strategies in 
the aftermath of the riots, Muslims in Singapore were diverted from resorting to 
violence, and instead pursued independence through constitutional means. The 
Singapore Police Force was transformed into a more efficient instrument of the 
state. Various legal measures were introduced by the colonial administration to 
minimize the recurrence of child marriages between Muslim and Christian 
minorities on the island. No other major outbreaks of violence were reported 
within the time frame of this study. Indeed, the British successfully redeemed their 
tarnished image and position, mitigated the wide-ranging ramifications of the riots 
and anticipated similar outbreaks arising from racial and religious tensions. Such 
findings reinforce the proposition advanced by Theda Skocpol that even ‘after 
great loss of legitimacy has occurred, a state can remain stable - and certainly 
invulnerable to internal mass-based revolts - especially if its coercive 
organizations remain coherent and effective.’718
Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theoiy o f Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), p. 
120 .
717 Frank Furedi, “Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial 
Emergencies”, Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, 21, 3, (1993), pp. 94-104. Furedi 
maintained a similar argument in his book, Colonial Wars and the Politics o f  Third World 
Nationalism, pp. 264-274.
718 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f  France, Russia, and 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 32.
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Nonetheless, from the long-run point of view, Furedi’s argument loses its 
validity. Though no religious or racial riots occurred in the remaining years of the 
colonial era in Singapore after the Maria Hertogh incident, from 1954 onwards 
Singapore remained plagued with incidents of mass violence. The Chinese Middle 
School students riots, the Hock Lee Bus riots and the anti-National Service riots 
which broke out in the mid-1950s, to name a few, reflected not only the increased 
activism among opponents of colonialism, but also the debility of British 
strategies in annihilating the sustained and violent opposition from communists, 
ultra-nationalists, fundamentalists, communalists and opportunists. Revisionist 
histories of the causes and the aftermath of each of these riots are long overdue. A 
possible explanation for the persistent occurrence of such riots was the failure on 
the part of the British and Labour Front governments in dispersing various ethnic 
enclaves in Singapore which, as seen during the Maria Hertogh riots, were 
hotbeds of radicalism.
Such a non-interventionist attitude towards reconfiguring the social 
geography of Singapore characterized the political strategy of the Peoples’ Action 
Party (or PAP) upon its electoral triumph in 1959. Having faced with the 
unprecedented plot by two Malay/Muslim underground organizations known as 
Sunting (BLOSSOM) and Angkatan Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapura (ARTIS, 
Singapore Islamic Revolutionary League) to topple the Singapore Government 
and the subsequent eruption of riots between Malays and Chinese in 1964 which 
claimed thirty-six lives, the PAP was compelled to abandon their previous
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stance.719 From then on, quotas on the percentage of various ethnic groups 
residing in a given area were imposed by the Housing Development Board 
(HDB).720 Power bases were diffused and ethnic enclaves were transformed into 
multi-racial constituencies. Riots in Singapore were relegated to the past.
But that is not all. Deeply affected by the jury’s decision to acquit four of 
his clients who were responsible for the murder of a Royal Air Force officer in the 
midst of the Maria Hertogh riots, upon his election as Prime Minister of Singapore 
in 1959, Lee Kuan Yew sought to abolish the British jury system for all cases 
except murder. Ten years later, following heated debates, particularly between 
Lee Kuan Yew and David Marshall (a renowned lawyer and ex-Chief Minister of 
Singapore), the Criminal Procedure Code Act 1969 was amended. The British jury 
system in Singapore was brought to an end.721
More to the point, in the long run, the British policy of ensuring a slow 
progress towards independence for Malaya and Singapore was ironically lost in 
the hands of Malay activists and politicians, who seized upon the sensibilities of 
the masses. The years following the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots, as Joel 
Kahn rightly observed, marked ‘the coming to maturity of modern Malay 
nationalism, the creation of a coherent narrative of the coming-to-nationhood of
719 ‘Special Branch Intelligence Summary for May 1960 (No.5/60)5; ‘Special Branch Intelligence 
Summary for January 1961 (No.1/61)’, FO 1091/107 and ‘Activities o f ARTIS (Angkatan 
Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapura - Singapore Islamic Revolutionary League)’, CO 1030/1193.
720 Chua Beng Huat, Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in Singapore (New York: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 142-145.
721 Chan Wing Cheong and Andrew B.L. Phang, “The Development o f Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice”, in Kevin Y.L. Tan (ed.), Essays in Singapore Legal History (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish Academic, 2005), p. 269.
282
the Malay peoples and its “implanting” in the broader popular consciousness.. .’722 
Although he was abhorred by the British when compared to Dato Onn, the 
aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots witnessed the rise of Tengku Abdul Rahman, 
whose popularity peaked as he capitalized on the campaign to appeal for persons 
who were sentenced to death. The same was true for the Malay radicals whose 
imprisonment and proscriptions upon the quelling of mass violence had expanded 
their influence and mass support. Following their release, a select few had 
initiated a shift in political strategy and eventually become ardent supporters of 
UMNO to pursue their intended objective of accelerating the process of 
independence from within an influential party.723 Indeed, it was the rapid growth 
of popular support, strategic alliances and the progressive dismantling of 
Communist as well as other leftist strongholds that provided the Tengku with the 
necessary political leverage to accelerate the country’s progress towards 
independence. Merely seven years after the Maria Hertogh riots, and despite the 
initial plans of Whitehall officials, Malaya was no longer a part of the British 
Empire. Independence was declared in 1957 before the emergency ended and 
before Malaya had developed a multiracial political outlook.724
But the drama did not end there. The new Prime Minister of Malaya 
played an instrumental role in the movement to incorporate Singapore - one of the 
last among British colonies in Asia - as part of a new Malaysia in 1963. The 
merger experiment was, however, doomed from the onset. Dissensions between
722 Joel S. Kahn, Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), p. 108.
723 Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 119.
724 Anthony J. Stockwell, “Imperialism and Nationalism in Southeast Asia”, in Judith M. Brown 
and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford Histoiy o f the British Empire: The Twentieth Centuiy, 
Volume IV  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 487 and Barbara Watson Andaya and 
Leonard Y. Andaya, A Histoty o f  Malaysia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 277.
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politicians on both sides of the causeway developed and soon went far beyond the 
possibility of resolution. In spite of appeals by Sir Harold Wilson to exercise 
restraint, the Tengku decided upon the separation of Singapore from its peninsula 
hinterland. On 9th August 1965, a new nation, the Republic of Singapore was 
born.725
In hindsight, the Maria Hertogh controversy was momentous not only for 
those who had been traumatized throughout the ordeal, nor for the British who 
endeavoured to restore their image and agency. Rather, the three long years that 
succeeded the riots provided a powerful impetus towards a new destiny for the 
peoples of Singapore and Malaysia. It is more than timely, therefore, for historians 
to go beyond the study of the causes that led to mass violence in a given colonial 
context, and examine the strategies employed by colonial regimes in the 
aftermath, the resistance they encountered and the impact of these processes upon 
the local communities. Among several riots involving Muslims in the post World 
War Two era which could be re-examined, so as to refine or even challenge the 
validity of arguments brought forth by this thesis, are those that occurred in other 
British colonial territories such as Aden (in 1947), Somalia (in 1948), Mauritius 
(in 1955) and Bahrain (in 1956). Perhaps more could be learnt from such an 
extension of our study of the past; on ways to restore peace and rebuild societies 
tom asunder by mass violence.
725 Albert Lau, A Moment o f Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics o f Disengagement 
(Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), pp. 263-265.
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APPENDIX 1
STATEMENT BY MEMBERS OF THE INTER-RELIGIOUS 
ORGANISATION AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF 
RELIGIOUS BODIES, 22nd FEBRUARY, 1951
The world today is an arena in which forces of good and evil are locked in deadly 
combat.
We summon men of goodwill to return to faithful obedience of God and His Law. 
In obedience to the Law of God is the only foundation of freedom and the only 
protection from slavery.
We summon men of goodwill to set men free from every force that enslaves them; 
from ignorance and falsehood, from want and exploitation, from persecution and 
oppression.
We repudiate and condemn mob violence and political terror.
We deeply deplore the recent sad happenings in Singapore, and express our 
profound sorrow and grief at the sufferings caused.
We offer our condolence to the relations and friends of those who were killed in 
those days and sympathise with those who were injured or sustained any loss.
We will henceforth do all in our power to promote understanding and 
reconciliation between those at variance.
We pledge ourselves and summon all people of goodwill to further the cause of 
men living in freedom and righteousness according to the Law of God; and to this 
end to advance and protect those natural and lawful associations in which men 
grow to freedom and justice -  the family, the school, the occupational association 
or union, the nation, the religious community.
We pray God to awaken in the hearts of all men the spirit of Forgiveness and 
Love.
SIGNED BY:
Mohamed Abdul Aleem Siddiqui (Muslim) Ahmad bin Mohamed Ibrahim (Muslim)
Dato Syed Ahmad Alsagoff (Muslim) Syed Abdullah bin Yahya (Muslim)
M. Tahir Mahmood (Muslim) Syed Abubakar bin Taha Alsagoff
(Muslim)
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Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff (Chairman, M.A.B.)
Ang Girn Tong (Buddhist)
A.K. Isaac (Methodist)
Herbert H. Peterson (Methodist)
M. Bonamy (Vicar-General Catholic 
Church)
Henry, Lord Bishop of Singapore 
(Anglican)
Professor T.H. Silcock (Society of Friends) 
K.. Ramanathan (Theosophist)
Haji Ali bin Haji Said Salleh (Chief Kathi) 
Venerable Sek Hong Choon (Buddhist) 
Paul B. Means (Methodist)
H.B. Amstutz (Methodist)
Rev. I.J. Aloysius (Catholic)
R.K.S. Adams (Anglican)
Rabbi Jacob Shababo (Jewish)
Mehervan Singh (Sikh)
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APPENDIX 2
EXCERPT FROM REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
APPOINTED TO EXAMINE AND REPORT ON THE CHRISTIAN 
MARRIAGE (AMENDMENT BILL), 1952
The reasons advanced by the Churches referred to above against the enactment of 
the Bill may be summarized as follows:-
1. The prevailing social custom in Singapore in respect of the age of marriage 
differ widely from English custom.
2. It would be imprudent for the Christian Churches to have to enforce a 
minimum age of marriage which is widely different from that sanctioned 
by the social custom of eastern peoples. If it is the social custom of a 
particular group of the population to permit marriage under the age of 
sixteen, the Christian Churches would be penalized by being put in a 
position where is appears to condemn those who contract such a marriage 
in spite of the fact that this social custom has had the support and sanction 
of centuries.
3. There has been no substantial change in social custom since the enactment 
of the principal Ordinance in 1940 which justifies any amendment in 
respect of the age of marriage.
4. The enactment of the Bill would produce a situation in which the 
minimum of marriage was different in the Federation of Malaya and the 
Colony. This would produce embarrassing relationships within families 
and would not enhance respect for the law.
5. The spirit of the English law is observed better by the existing Ordinance 
governing the age of marriage in Singapore which is the same for all 
irrespective of race or religion, than by the proposed Ordinance which 
would appear to discriminate in regard to one group of the population for 
no other reason than that they are Christians or profess the Christian 
religion.
6. The number of marriages celebrated under the provision of the Ordinance 
each year since the reoccupation does not support the view that the present 
legal minimum age encourages very early marriage nor that the Bill would 
substantially affect the average age of marriage,
7. The Bill would deprive the Churches of a pastoral discretion used hitherto 
for the benefit of a few young people.
8. It is doubtful whether the effective means of achieving a higher age of 
marriage is best found in legislation. It should follow a process of 
education rather than precede it.
We have a good reason to hope that the Christian Churches can be persuaded
to revise their attitude to the Bill and to give the lead to the other religious
groups and we therefore recommend that the principle of the Bill be accepted.
Mr. P.F. de Souza however dissents from the Bill.72
726 Proceedings o f the Second Legislative Council, Colony o f Singapore (Singapore: Government 
Printing Office, 1952), p. C381.
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